Khaled Hroub: Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide. London: Pluto Press, 2010.
Founded in 1987, in 2006 the Iranian-backed Islamist organization Hamas surprised the world, very much including its own members, by winning an impressive electoral victory in Gaza, taking control of the Palestinian Legislative Council, which Hroub describes as a “quasi-parliament with limited sovereign powers.” Hamas defeated its “main rival,” Fatah, the main secular party among Palestinians. In the years between its founding and its election, Hamas had become “deeply entrenched socio-political and popular force,” combining “military confrontation” against what Hroub calls the “Israeli occupation” of Palestine with “grass roots social work, religious and ideological mobilization and public relations networking with other states and movements.” (He eventually concedes that Hamas ties receipt of its social service to Islamic religious conformity.) Hroub, a Palestinian who teaches at Northwestern University in Qatar and serves as a senior research fellow at the Centre for Islamic Studies at the University of Cambridge, assures his readers that this is no “apologetic treatise about Hamas,” but he could have fooled me. This notwithstanding, he does provide some useful information about the group and, by his own manner of presentation, alerts readers to the rhetorical tactics deployed on university campuses to win sympathizers to the Palestinian ’cause.’ [1]
Seven years after this book’s publication, Hamas published a new iteration of its charter, well worth consulting before reading Hroub’s “guide.” In it, Hamas asserts that Palestine, defined as the land which “extends from the River Jordan in the east to the Mediterranean in the west and from Ras al-Naqurah in the north (along the Israel-Lebanese border) to Umm al-Rashrash in the south” (a.k.a. the Gulf of Aqaba). It is not only “an Arab Muslim land,” a “blessed sacred land,” it is “the spirit of the Ummah and its central cause” and indeed “the soul of humanity and of its living conscience”—large claims, all.
Since 1948, however, parts of Palestine have been “seized by a racist, anti-human and colonial Zionist project” founded on “a false promise,” namely, the 1917 Balfour Declaration supporting the establishment of a “national home” for Jews in Palestine. Hamas’s “goal is to liberate Palestine and confront the Zionist project, retaking Jerusalem, “not one stone” of which “can be surrendered or relinquished.” All Palestinians living in other lands have the “natural right” to return to Palestine, an “inalienable right “confirmed by all divine laws as well as by the basic principles of human rights and international law.” “Hamas affirms that its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion.” The “Jewish problem, anti-Semitism and the persecution of the Jews are phenomena fundamentally linked to European history and not to the history of the Arabs and the Muslims or to their heritage.”
As one might suppose, the truth is somewhat more complicated and difficult to ascertain. ‘Palestine’ itself, originally organized as a unit by the Romans, has seen numerous border changes over the centuries. At least until 2012, Fatah spokesmen defined Palestine to include Jordan, whose Hashemite rulers have said the same thing, although not recently. At the beginning of the last century, the Ottoman Empire ruled the area, but the Ottomans made the mistake of choosing the wrong allies in the First World War, while Jews in Europe and the United States backed the eventual winners. After the Ottoman defeat and the ruin of their empire, the Zionist movement, founded by Theodore Herzl in the 1890s, found a hearing for its proposal to open part of Palestine for Jewish immigration, although Jews had been present on the land for millennia and there already had been a recent influx of Jews from eastern and central Europe, fleeing the pogroms that followed the assassination of Czar Alexander II, which was blamed on ‘the Jews.’ [2] Numerous other peoples had lived in the area in ancient times, as the Bible records; by contrast, the Arabs are called as the “peoples of the east,” its tribes including the Amalekites, Ishmaelites, and Sabeans. This notwithstanding, according to the Bible, Moses himself married an Arab woman, and “Father Abraham” came from Ur, in southern Mesopotamia. Other distinct peoples, notably the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Egyptians—imperialists all—conquered the area and mingled their blood with the conquered. Modern Palestinian Arabs often trace their origin to the Canaanites or to the Philistines, which gives them a stronger claim to at least a share of the land than their ‘Arab’ identity could do. It is hard to resist the suspicion that rival origin stories cannot settle matters, even ‘in theory.’
After the Ottomans ceded the area in 1918, the League of Nations assigned the mandate for its rule to Great Britain in 1920; the border between ‘Palestine’ and ‘Transjordan’ was also established at that time. In the language of the League, the British were to rule the two regions “until such time as they are able to stand alone.” The British awarded rule of Transjordan to the Hashemites, who had administered it under the Ottomans but who had led the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in 1916, sending that empire into its final collapse. The League designated Palestine as a “national home” for the Jews while stipulating that this must in no way prejudice the rights of existing non-Jewish communities or to weaken the rights of Jews who did not choose to emigrate there. The Versailles Treaty had solemnized the principle of national self-determination. As British Foreign Secretary, Winston Churchill oversaw the partition and anticipated that Palestine might become a sovereign Jewish state, over time, as its population grew.
But before the partition, and indeed before the Balfour Declaration, a wartime exchange of letters occurred between the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca, Hussein bin Ali. Hussein wanted an “Arab Caliphate of Islam”; McMahon wanted the Arabs to fight against the regnant Ottomans, a British opponent in the war. The Arab Revolt of June 1916-October 1918 drew Ottoman attention away from the European front and contributed to the empire’s collapse. But although Palestinian Arabs, including Hamas, contend that the Balfour Declaration violated the terms of the agreement, Palestine was mentioned as a proposal by Hussein, and Hussein was a Hashemite, not a Palestinian; further, McMahon never explicitly agreed to turn over control of Palestine to either Arab group. What is more, in still another agreement between British representative T. E. Lawrence, the leader of the Arab Revolt, and Hussein bin Ali’s son, Feisal ibn-Hussein, the two sides agreed to Arab sovereignty over Baghdad, Amman, and Damascus in exchange for Emir Feisal’s relinquishment of his father’s claim to Palestine; in this agreement, Feisal would rule Baghdad as Feisal I of Iraq and his brother, Abdullah Feisal, would rule Transjordan. In a 1922 White Paper, Churchill maintained that Palestinian had been excluded from Arab control, although British Foreign Secretary Lord Grey demurred, a year later, saying that Palestine was indeed included, and a 1939 British report sided with Grey’s position.
What is indisputable is that at the time of the Palestine Mandate Palestine, including Transjordan, had a population of fewer than a million persons, ten percent of whom were Jews. Arabs now enjoyed civil rights, which they did not have under the Ottomans. During the Nehi Musa Riot of 1920, in which Palestinian Arabs attacked Jews in the Old City, chanting, “We will drink the blood of the Jews,” no nice distinction between Jews and Zionists was observed. In 1937, Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann proposed what is now called a ‘two-state solution’ to the problem, which would have allocated eighty percent of the land west of the Jordan to Arabs, a suggestion the Mufti of Jerusalem, a Hitler ally, scornfully rejected. Jewish immigration was restricted in the years prior to the Holocaust. Other two-state proposals have foundered on Palestinian Arab ambition. Hamas prefers not to mention much of any this tortured history, and not primarily for nationalist reasons.
Turning from nationality to religion, while the Hamas Charter claims that “Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance,” the peace and tolerance Muslims have in mind presupposes the subordination of other religious groups—the condition of ‘dhimmitude.’ The distinction between Jews and Zionists is valid in principle, since not all Jews have been, or are now, Zionists. [3] However, all Zionists are Jews and thus subject to dhimmitude, according to the Islamic law upheld by Hamas. “Resisting the [Zionist] occupation with all means and methods is a legitimate right guaranteed by divine laws and by international norms and laws”; “at the heart of these lies armed resistance” aimed at the establishment of “a fully sovereign Palestinian state on the entire national Palestinian soil, with Jerusalem as its capital.” This is “the central cause” not only for Palestinian Arabs but “for the Arab and Islamic Ummah.”
The 2017 Charter affirms that this sovereign state shall be built on “sound democratic principles, foremost among them [being] free and fair elections.” As Hroub emphasizes, Hamas won such an election in 2006, although he concedes that no such elections have occurred since then, after the military wing of Hamas took over from the civilians in 2008. He explains the electoral victory as the result of Fatah/Palestinian Liberation Organization repeated failures to progress toward rule of Palestine. Founded in 1965, the PLO vowed to retake the land “occupied in the war of 1948” and the war of 1967—i.e., all of modern Israel. Although Hroub carefully avoids mentioning it, the PLO, led for years by Yasr Arafat, aligned itself with the Soviet Union for the first quarter-century of its existence, “recognizing Israel and its right to exist” and “drop[ping] the armed struggle as a strategy” only at the end of the 1980s, when the Soviet empire collapsed. Arafat compounded his folly when he backed yet another loser, Saddam Hussein, in his 1991 war with the United States; this weakened his negotiating position still further. The two Oslo Agreements, negotiated with the United States as the broker, Palestinians won self-government but not statehood in Gaza and elsewhere in the area. The Agreements split Palestinians, with Hamas and other irredentist elements continuing to demand full Palestinian statehood over all lands west of the Jordan River. Meanwhile, “Israel did everything possible to worsen the life of Palestinians and enhance its colonial occupation in the West Bank” (i.e., Judea and Samaria); Hroub makes no mention of the several thousand Israelis killed or wounded by attacks from Hamas and other Palestinian groups who aimed at undermining the Agreements; the first suicide bombing by Hamas occurred in 1994, in retaliation for an attack by “a fanatical Jewish settler” who gunned down twenty-nine worshippers at a mosque in Hebron. Hroub ignores the prompt condemnation of the act by both Prime Minister Itzak Rabin and opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu and the banning of the far-right Kach organization, to which the mass murderer, beaten to death on the spot by Palestinians, belonged. He also ignores the retaliatory attacks on Jews by Palestinians, including a murderous assault on schoolchildren in Brooklyn, New York, by an individual who shouted “Death to the Jews.”
Hroub has his moments of honesty. Describing the 2006 election victory, he writes, “Many Palestinians support the nationalist/liberationist and social work of Hamas, but not its religious ideal. Hama purposefully overlooks this fact, and instead considers any vote for its political agenda as a vote for its religious one too.” He recounts that Hamas entered the election period itself with a miscalculation, hoping not to win but to obtain enough seats in the legislature to leave “the ‘dirty’ business of day-to-day governing” to Fatah, while holding effective veto power over Fatah’s attempts to negotiate a ‘two-state solution’ to the Palestinian question with Israel. He acknowledges that Hamas’s governance of Gaza was hobbled by Fatah and “groups in the Gaza Strip”—rival Islamists, he should have remarked—who, along with “Israeli efforts to bring down Hamas’s government”—that is, to police the area in accord with the Oslo Agreements—all “precipitated Hamas’s preemptive, violent military take-over of Gaza in June 2007—displacing the remaining Fatah leadership and controlling all security forces.” He never quite gets around to mentioning that no further elections have been permitted by Hamas since then. In a particularly entertaining formulation, Hroub avows that “Hamas is as genuine in its democratic conviction as any other political party, in a region inexperienced in this form of governance.” As to his complaint that “the United States rejected the outcome of Palestinian democracy,” the very regime change it had long advocated throughout the Middle East, Hroub would do better to understand that Americans founded their regime based on consent of the governed within the framework of the principle of an unalienable right of all human beings to life, liberty, and property—none of which suicide-bombing Islamist terrorists much respect. And given the fact that “Hamas’s political leadership is kept almost in complete darkness about any detailed timing and places of attacks beforehand” by a military wing that “functions virtually independently,” albeit “governed by a political strategy that is drawn and exercised by the political leadership,” prospects for democratic governance by Hamas look dim.
Hroub outlines the origins of Hamas in the Muslim Brotherhood, the first important modern Islamist organization. The Palestine branch was founded in Jerusalem in 1946, “two years before the establishment of the state of Israel.” Hamas derives much of its orientation from the minority, radical elements of the Brotherhood, many of them persuaded by the arguments of Sayyed Qutb, who advocated the founding of Islamic states throughout the Middle East, “with the ultimate utopia of uniting individual Islamic states into one single state representing the Muslim Ummah.” Hamas has positioned itself apart from the more peaceful Brotherhood members but does not go so far as al-Qaeda, which targets not only “foreign occupying powers” in the region but “legitimate national governments.” Hamas has no interest in knocking down buildings and murdering people on American soil. This notwithstanding, the Brotherhood did recognize Hamas as “an adjunct organization with the specific mission of confronting the Israeli occupation” just before the first intifada, which began in December 1987. According to one Hamas document, “Islam is completely Hamas’s ideological frame of reference.” If so, and if the Muslim Brotherhood has allied with it formally for more than three decades, Islam must justify suicide bombing, according not only to Hamas but the Brotherhood. In a 1993 “Introductory Memorandum,” Hamas averred that “confronting and resisting the enemy in Palestine must be continuous until victory and liberation”; the “holy struggle” of confrontation and resistance consist of “fighting and inflicting harm on enemy troops and their instruments”—evidently, the civilians who support those troops. Overall, Hamas has consistently aimed at the “liberation of Palestine” from the Zionist ‘occupation’ and “the Islamization of society (or the establishment of an Islamic state),” both goals consistent with those of the Muslim Brotherhood. Much to Hroub’s relief, Hamas has not hesitated to form “alliances with leftist groups” who are scarcely religious. How long that alliance would last were it victorious, he prefers not to say, although it is noteworthy that the Muslim-secular Left alliance that brought down the Shah of Iran ended with the demise of the leftists, too. Iran is Hamas’s principal backer, as Hroub mentions in passing but takes care not to emphasize, and Hamas depends upon its backing, along with the Iran-based Islamists of Hezbollah in Lebanon, to achieve its stated aims. Iran in turn depends upon these proxies to gain dominance over the rival Sunni Muslims states, especially Saudi Arabia, in its geopolitical effort to reconstitute a caliphate, this time on Shi’a terms. Hroub himself credits Iran with Hezbollah’s “astonishing performance” against the Israelis in the 2006 war.
Is Hamas anti-Semitic? After observing that Arabs are as much Semites as Jews, Hroub invokes the claim that Muslims, Christians, and Jews of the Middle East “lived together with a remarkable degree of coexistence” for centuries, a veritable “‘golden era’ of centuries-long peaceful living under Islamic rule, in what is known now as the Middle East and North Africa, and particularly in Andalusia,” acknowledging the “common roots of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity in the Old Testament.” There is “in principle…no theological basis for religious (as well as ethnic or racial) discrimination that could lead to European-type anti-Semitism and its manifestations.” As mentioned above, this did not prevent Islam’s own form of anti-Judaism and its manifestations, perhaps most notoriously during the 1930s and 1940s, culminating in the expulsion of approximately 800,000 Jews from Muslim countries in 1948. In 1990, Hamas published a document quoted by Hroub distinguishing Judaism from Zionism, promising not to “adopt a hostile position in practice against anyone because of his ideas or his creed,” except when “those ideas and creed are translated into hostile or damaging actions against our people.” He also admits that “ordinary people, including Hamas members, do use the terms ‘Jew,’ ‘Zionist’ and ‘Israeli’ interchangeably.”
How, then, could Jews be allowed to survive in a future Palestine, were it ruled by Muslims? By making Palestine part of an Arab-Muslim caliphate in which Jews “would lose any numerical superiority” they might continue to live in Palestine itself, Hroub suggests. Obviously, this “one-state solution,” as opposed to the ‘two-state solution’ envisioned by many in the United States and Europe, and indeed by some Palestinians, would result in a new dhimmitude. More modestly, “a treaty in which Palestinian rights were acknowledged and granted in a manner likely to be satisfactory to the Palestinians” would satisfy Hamas, Hamas spokesmen say; “the democratically elected Hamas will abide by whatever the Palestinian people concerning their own fate, in a free and democratic referendum.” Hroub affects to believe that, while admitting that Hamas and “the Palestinian left” haven’t played nice with one another: “In the end, suspicion and ideological differences overrode common cause and pragmatism.” It seems unlikely that either Palestinian secularists or Palestinian Islamist will tolerate a government of the other.
Contending that its strategy of armed resistance caused Israelis to withdraw from Gaza in 2006, and from southern Lebanon in 2000, after Hezbollah employed the same strategy, Hamas extends the lesson to the West Bank. There, “Hamas believes that carrying out cycles of confrontation against the occupation will make the cost of the Israeli presence there unsustainable; that multiplying Israeli costs in terms of human loss, draining of resources, mounting internal tension and deteriorating image worldwide will eventually bear fruit.” This was the rationale behind the several intifadas, the many suicide bombings, and indeed the raid-massacres of October 2023. So far, the strategy has been ineffective.
It may be that prior to their vicious terror raid in 2023 Hamas officers assumed that Israel could do little to injure them, based upon their experience with the Israeli counterattacks on them in December 2008, in which the Israeli Defense Forces killed only 400 of an estimated 15,000 “Hamas strong fighters,” leaving Hamas leadership largely unscathed and increasing its prestige both in Gaza itself and in the region. Most casualties were civilians, most of them women and children. This seems not to have fazed Hamas, and indeed rather to have encouraged its militants. Israel’s crushing assault on Gaza in response to the 2023 attack has killed many more civilian deaths and injuries than in 2008, a humanitarian crisis indeed, and one that could be ended if Hamas surrendered. The fact that no one even conceives of such a possibility, much less proposes it, may be taken as a measure of the world’s estimation of the character of Hamas.
Writing in 2010, Hroub hangs his hat on future moderation of Hamas both with respect to its demand for Islamization of Arabs, its practice of jihad, and its resistance to a two-state solution. As he puts it, “Hamas in power felt the burning need to repackage its positions in a more political format.” He gives no evidence that this is any more than rhetoric, and none has been forthcoming in subsequent years. After all, “the route to Palestinian legitimacy and leadership has always hinged upon offering a plausible strategy to resist and reverse the Israeli occupation,” but neither negotiation nor warfare has achieved any such thing. Indeed, Israel has gotten bigger and more powerful with each decade of its existence.
Notes
- His publisher, London-based Pluto Press, describes itself as an “anti-capitalist, internationalist and independent publisher,” “emerging from the Marxist tradition.” It was originally associated with the Socialist Workers Party. Hroub himself is decidedly a ‘man of the Left.’ He explains his otherwise anomalous support for Hamas thusly: “As a secular person myself, my aspiration is for Palestine, and for all other Arab countries for that matter, to be governed by human-made laws. However, I see Hamas as a natural outcome of un-natural, brutal occupational conditions,” the “predictable result of the ongoing Israeli colonial project in Palestine.” The enemies of his enemies—the United States, Britain, ‘the West’ generally—are his friends, at least for now.
- Anti-Jewish sentiments had been weak or nonexistent in Russia for centuries, but the conquest of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and a portion of the Ottoman Empire in the period 1772-1815, places where important Jewish settlements existed, fired antagonisms, making conspiracy theories concerning the assassination plausible to Russians.
- The first, 1988 Hamas Charter contained what Hroub called and “embarrassing” passage condemning Jewish bankers for the French Revolution, the Communist Revolution, the First World War “in which they destroyed the Islamic Caliphate” (the Ottoman Empire), the League of Nations, and the Second World War. Such claims have been excised from subsequent iterations of the Charter.
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