Article published July 1978
Summer 1978 saw an impasse in the tripartite Mideast peace talks initiated by the Carter Administration upon taking office 18 months earlier. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt had requested an Israeli goodwill gesture–that is to say, a unilateral concession–in the Sinai Desert, which had been occupied by Israeli troops since the 1967 war. Prime Minister Menachem Begin rejected this request publicly. The Carter Administration sided with Sadat on the matter, and diplomatic pressure was exerted. Serious talks resumed in September, leading to the Camp David peace accords signed by Sadat and Begin in March 1979. One commentator who backed the Carter Administration in its campaign to pressure the Israelis was the conservative pundit, William F. Buckley, Jr.; what follows is a critique of a column he wrote that summer.
Since the June War of 1967, American conservatives have generally supported Israel’s aims and the methods Israelis choose to attain them. During this period the American Left has become increasingly critical of these aims and methods. In thel ast year or so, many American liberals have condemned what they call Israeli `intransigence’ vis-à-vis the Palestine Liberation Organization and the West Bank, which Israel seized during the war. Had Palestinian Arabs produced a Mahatma Gandhi to lead them, scarcely less sentimental guff would be heard.
But now William F. Buckley, Jr., the most famous American conservative journalist, has joined not the critics of Israel–he still admires Israelis and their country–but the critics of Prime Minister Begin. It is not, he writes, “that Israel does not want a just peace, but that Israel under Begin does not seek a just peace.” Begin is “a die-hard, defined in this case as someone who is prepared to let his country die with him.” Examples: “his stubborn settlements policy in the Sinai–inexplicable in the context of the delicately midwived conversation with Sadat”; his recent “idiosyncratic” interpretation of UN Resolution 242, which set the terms for Israeli-Arab relations following the 1967 war; and finally, the “massive retaliation against civilian residents of PLO-infested areas,” an action the avoidance of which would have been “a diplomatic finesse” assisting President Sadat’s attempt to buoy “the confidence of the other Arab states” in his peace initiative. “What [U. S. President Jimmy] Carter and the Senate need now,” Buckley concludes, is to persuade Begin “that whereas he has manifestly a problem in distinguishing between himself and his country, we Americans do not share that problem.”
Straw men burn easily. The real Begin, as distinguished from Mr. Buckley’s artifact, is no straw man, and his alleged intransigence doesn’t ignite and go up in smoke when journalists light matches.
Still,. in view of Mr. Buckley’s sincere admiration of Israel, if not Mr. Buckley, perhaps he can be persuaded that the Prime Minister’s `intransigence’ is really the sort of determined patriotism that he himself exhibits when confronted by threats to his own country’s existence. I shall take his three substantive criticisms in order.
Mr. Buckley finds the Sinai settlements policy inexplicable. I don’t. Leaving aside Mr. Begin’s campaign promises as well as legal and military arguments, one notices one important diplomatic fact: the settlements controversy arose just when the major issue at the peace talks had been reduced very nearly to the question of the West Bank. Mr. Begin had offered major territorial concessions to Sadat. His peace plan went so far as to concede Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai, including strategic Sharm-el-Sheikh. Of course there were sticking points: demilitarization zones, the status of Israeli air bases, the timing of phased withdrawals among them. Instead of negotiating on these points, Sadat decided to shit ground and focus world attention on the issue of a `Palestinian’ homeland on the West Bank–not a word about which is mentioned in UN Resolution 242. Here he merely followed established Arab strategy, which is to con the United States into believing that the entire Middle East problem could be solved if Israel would only recognize the `Palestinians’ right to self-determination . Nothing could be further from the truth.
By reducing the larger strategic and geopolitical problems of the Middle East to the `Palestinian’ issue and by couching that issue in the democratic language of self-determination, Sadat provided the Western democracies with convenient moral cover for taking the side of Arab autocracies over against democratic Israel. Now the pressure could be applied in good conscience. And, indeed, Sadat’s tactics produced the intended results. Pressure on Israel did begin to increase. `Why not make one more concession?’ `Israel must take risks for peace.’
By reopening the Sinai controversy, Mr. Begin reminded Sadat and the rest of the world that Israel could also make demands, that Israel would not allow itself to be put on the defensive–especially by Sadat, who, we are frequently told, lacks the military and economic if not rhetorical means to demand anything of anyone. Here is something Mr. Buckley should be among the first to admire: a democratic statesman standing up against the world when, for more than a democratic leaders have been shamelessly appeasing one or another form of tyranny.
Turning to the “idiosyncrasy” of Mr. Begin’s interpretation of UN Resolution 242, this isn’t the piece of comedy Mr. Buckley believes it to be. Resolution 242 requires “the application of both of the following principles: (1) withdrawal of Israeli forces (and only armed forces) from territories occupied in the 1967 war, and (2) the right of every sovereign state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.” Mr. Begin’s “interpretation” of Resolution 242 is not so much an interpretation as a statement of a basic security dilemma: what Israel may regard as secure boundaries will not be recognized as such by its adversaries. Conversely, the boundaries which her adversaries would supposedly recognize–they say the pre=1967 ones–can hardly be regarded as secure by Israel (or indeed by any impartial observer), which means that Resolution 242 is an attempt to square the circle.
Regarding the recent Israeli military action in Lebanon, Mr. Buckley knows that it was aimed at PLO terrorists, not civilians. What he may not know is that the terrorists, with Soviet and Syrian support, were developing a fourth Arab front against Israel; that even a year ago Israel had wanted to attack PLO bases in southern Lebanon but refrained from doing so on request by the United States. Israel’s military action in Lebanon was not a mere act of retaliation for the bloody massacre of Israel civilians on the Jewish Sabbath; it was an act of national self-defense. Most of the casualties were in fact terrorists, not civilians. It would be absurd to deny that civilians did not sustain casualties, although it should be noted that Lebanese Christians welcomed the Israelis as liberators. But the unsentimental preventative for the recurrence of such casualties is to eliminate their cause: the PLO.
As for the Arab states’ confidence in Sadat’s peace initiative, are such realistic men as Syria’s Assad and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein really quite so hypersensitive? Hardened by many years of wars of their own making, they may use the Israeli action in Lebanon as a pretext for continuing hostility, but pretexts are never hard to find. If they want peace, they can have it; if they want land, they can negotiate for it. Which is not to suggest that this would sole the strategic problems of the Middle East.
It is trite to say that if only the Arabs would lie in peace there would be peace in the Middle East. One might as well say that if the Russian would lie in peace there would be peace in the world. But feeding land to Arabs and Russians seems not to quell their appetites. If the words of Mr. Sadat himself, “We should get all that we can get until we can get all that we want.”
Anyone familiar with the long history of intra-Arab rivalry knows that there would be more conflict in the Middle East, and therefore greater Soviet influence in the area, were it not for Israel. The truth is that Israel has been in the forefront of the global battle for freedom against servitude. So is Israel’s Prime Minister. Mr. Begin’s recent actions and statements are rather more realistic than Mr. Buckley contends. Far from being an egoist prepared to let his country die with him, Begin has shown that he is a man prepared to die that his country may live. Questioning Begin’s policies is one thing, questioning his character another. Israelis have known him for a long time and saw fit to entrust their safety to him. They are likely better judges of his character than Americans like Buckley or Morrisey.
As things happened, talks resumed without any of the concessions Americans and Egyptians demanded–demonstrating once again the inutility of unilateral concessions during diplomatic negotiations. One point I missed: UN Resolution 242, which still forms part of the framework for any future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, calls for Israeli withdrawal from “territories” won in the 1967 war; contrary to popular belief, and Arab propaganda, this does not mean that the Israelis are obligated to withdraw from all of those territories. During the negotiations, Begin stipulated that this language be used. The exact amount of land that may be relinquished by Israel remains subject to negotiations to this day.
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