Charles E. Butterworth, ed.: Averroës’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s “Topics,” “Rhetoric,” and “Poetics.” Albany: University of New York Press, 1977. Charles E. Butterworth translation.
Averroës’ name, synonymous with skepticism, might better be associated with coherent skepticism’s only basis: a rigorous standard for the establishment of certainty. These commentaries form part of a series of commentaries on Aristotelian treatises, the majority of which concern logic. In them, Averroës measures not only the Koran’s teachings in accordance to a logical hierarchy; he measures Aristotle’s teachings, as well.
Butterworth recalls that Averroës was considered “the commentator on Aristotle” by medieval scholars, not only by Muslims but by Jews and Christians (vii). These scholars esteemed commentary as a philosophic genre far more than most do today; “with the spread of the assumption that all things evolve through time, inventiveness has come to be acclaimed the mark of excellent thought and commentary condemned as imitative or servile” (vii). But on the contrary, “the art of the commentary was completely transformed” by Averroës, as he presented “a unique interpretation of Aristotle’s ideas under the guise of a commentary” (viii). With a succession of deft omissions and additions to Aristotle’s actual arguments, Averroës makes a “consideration of the logical arts” into “little more than a veil behind which [he] evoked the problematic relation between philosophic thought, religious belief, and political conviction” (ix). “Starting with the particular perspective of Islam, Averroës was able to raise the universal question of the relation between philosophy, politics, and religion” (ix). We are likely intended to notice that in his second formulation of these three topics, Butterworth has shifted politics to the central position. And indeed all three commentaries are concerned with assent, a problem at or near the core of politics. Each treatise presents “ways of imitating or abridging correct reason in order to influence other human beings,” especially as regards their “political decisions and religious beliefs” (19). “His thought about this problem was based on specific ideas about the logical character of different kinds of speech, their proximity to certain knowledge, and the investigative or practical purposes to which each might be put” (21). “These treatises contain the fullest statement of the grounds for Averroës’ abiding disagreement with those who considered themselves the defenders of the faith” (21).
Averroës ranks the “logical arts” in a hierarchy, with demonstration at the apex, followed by dialectic, sophistry, rhetoric, and poetics. He does so in order to study other arts, which turn out to include dialectical theology, traditional theology, and traditional jurisprudence.
Aristotle’s Topics concerns dialectic. Whereas Aristotle regards dialectic as a means of bringing the man partial opinions up to the standard of truth, and even as a means of examining “the ultimate bases or grounds of each science” [Topics 101a25-101b2], Averroës regards dialectic’s materials (opinions) too weak to support philosophic certainty. As Butterworth explains, “the crucial difference” between demonstrative and dialectical argumentation “is that dialectical premises may be false”—chosen for their “renown”—”whereas demonstrative premises are always certain and true” (25). In particular, induction cannot yield such certainty because the necessity of the universal cannot be proven by collecting some or even all the particulars; induction cannot demonstrate because it cannot set forth what Averroës calls the essentially necessary predicate of the argument. His example of this is a critique of an argument by Muslim dialectical theologians as a proof that the world was created, although Averroës carefully avoids mentioning those theologians in the course of his discussion. Tellingly, Averroës relegates his explicit discussion of dialectical theologians to his commentary on the Rhetoric. Dialectical training, he writes, “seems unnecessary for the perfection of the demonstrative arts” (55). He is silent on Aristotle’s contention that dialectic is useful in conversation, in the philosophic sciences, and even in demonstration itself because it examines “the ultimate bases or grounds of each science” (Topics 101a25-101b2).
Rhetoric ranks still lower than dialectic in the hierarchy, as it does for Aristotle. Averroës considers rhetoric, not dialectic, to be (in Butterworth’s words) “the proper art for instructing the general public or addressing it about any matter” because it “permits the speaker to pass over difficult matters or even to be deceptive regarding them, whereas such practices cannot be admitted in dialectic argument” (29). But Aristotle regards rhetoric based on enthymeme as at least partly reasonable, not merely useful; this may coincide with his well-known advice that one should seek “as much clearness as the subject matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts” (Nicomachean Ethics 1094b3). Averroës tolerates imprecision less, perhaps because in his day the dialectical theologians defended Islam with enthymemes, which he calls “unexamined opinion previously existing among all or most people” (63-64). Averroës also goes so far as to cast doubt on rhetoric’s “most powerful” non-syllogistic technique, testimony (74)–the basis of most theologies, dialectic or otherwise. As Averroës wryly puts it, “As for imagining that something is impossible when it is possible, there are many things whose existence is not difficult when the beliefs of the multitude about them are considered” (70). He singles out Aristotle’s short treatise On Prophecy in Sleep, which casts doubt on prophecy as delivered in dreams, which happens to be the means by which Mohammad perceived prophecies. He ranks religious testimony, tradition or community consensus, and the performance of miracles below enthymemes (77), just before he makes his first mention of the social and political nature of man.
Poetry ranks below rhetoric. “[S]peeches [that] cause something to be imagined are not speeches [that] make its essence understood” (83). What poetic imagery really does is to “move the soul to flee from the thing [imagined], or to long for it, or simply to wonder because of the delightfulness” of the imagery itself (83). Poetic metaphor can be deceptive if taken literally, especially if the thing or person described is difficult to conceive (like God, Butterworth observes, in a note). He goes on to note that Muslims often regard the Koran as “the best example of poetic excellence in Arabic” (38-39).
Averroës’ emphasis on demonstrative certainty in establishing the truth might be thought to be a response to the very high stakes the Koran puts on its own presentation of the truth, and on fidelity to that truth. Butterworth’s candid, astute introduction, along with his notes, serve to illuminate these texts in their entirety, or very close to their entirety. In addition, he provides careful English translations, the Arabic texts themselves, and three indices (of names, of titles, and of technical words): all the assistance contemporary readers will need to renew Averroës thought in their own minds.
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