Xi Jinping: The Governance of China. Volume I: November 2012-June 2013. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2019.

Xi Jinping: The Governance of China. Volume II: August 2014-September 2017. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2017.

 

Now President of China and, more importantly, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping spent his first five years as General Secretary explaining and implementing a comprehensive strategy for his country, the goal of which he identified in a press conference in November 2012 as “a happy life” for the people of China (I.3; see also Speech at a ceremony marking the 95th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 71/16, II.40-41)). “A happy life comes from hard work” (I.4), and he unhesitatingly put himself, his Politburo colleagues, the Chinese Communist Party rank and file, and the people of China to work, so that “China can stand firmer and stronger among the world’s nations and make a new and greater contribution to mankind” (I.4). He singled out corruption as his most immediate target for attack and “maintain[ing] close ties with the people” as the CCP’s most urgent constructive task (I.5). These tasks were related, inasmuch as “we will work for the satisfaction of the people and correct any of our practices they are not happy about” (Speech at the Central Conference on judicial, procuratorial, and public security work, 1/7/14, I.163). However, he soon elaborated a “Four-Pronged Strategy,” consisting of a goal—to “complete a moderately prosperous society in all respects,” to be realized by the year 2020, and three “measures”: to “further reform, to advance the rule of law and to strengthen Party discipline” (Speech to Provincial Officials, 2/2/15, I.23). 

To pursue this strategy, he emphasized the character of China’s regime, founded in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party, then ruled by Mao Zedong, who had founded the party in 1921. In a phrase that he would make famous, Xi called this regime a “socialist system with Chinese characteristics” (Speech to the first study group session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 11/17/12, I.6). He emphasized that “only socialism can save China” and that “only Chinese socialism can lead our country to development” in a manner that keeps the populous nation of numerous ethnic groups unified (ibid. I.7)—a perennial Chinese concern, given the history of conflicts between the emperor and regional warlords. Socialism “consists of a path, theory and system,” both a theory and a practice animated by the “scientific” methods of Marxism (ibid. 9). The “Four Cardinal Principles” of Chinese socialism are “the people’s democratic dictatorship,” leadership of the people by the CCP, Marxism-Leninism, and “Mao-Zedong Thought” (ibid. I.19 n.17). “Belief in Marxism and faith in socialism and communism are the political soul of Communists,” the “marrow of their faith” (ibid. I.16). The “path” governed by the Four Cardinal Principles has “economic development” along socialist lines as its “central task,” among many others (ibid. I.9). Because China is only at “the preliminary stage of socialism” (“socialist modernization…will take at least 100 years to take shape from the completion of the socialist transformation of the private ownership of the means of production in the 1950s” to its completion), the CPC, as “the core leadership for the cause of Chinese socialism,” has “shoulder[ed] a great responsibility.” To meet that responsibility “we must first run the Party well, and to run the Party well we must run it strictly” (ibid. I.15).  Corruption, inertia, incompetence, and separation from the people must be eliminated. This is because “the future and destiny of a political party and government depend on popular support,” the maintenance of which requires the Chinese Communist Party to “organize our people, communicate with them, educate them, serve them, learn from them, and subject ourselves to their oversight” (ibid. I.17). “Socialist democracy,” “consultative democracy,” the “people’s democratic dictatorship” must always be “led by the working class,” however, firmly upholds “the leadership of the CPC”; “we must remain committed to the Party’s core role in exercising overall leadership and coordinating the efforts of all” (Speech to the 60th Anniversary of the National People’s Congress, 9/5/14, II. 18 and II.314; Speech at the 65th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 921/14, II.318). Since “socialism with Chinese characteristics is a cause for all Chinese people,” always “under the Party’s leadership,” what Western political scientists, following Tocqueville, call civil associations require particular attention, inasmuch as they might interfere with the direct control of the central government, ruled by the CPC. “We must maintain and enhance the political nature of the Party’s work with social groups,” which “should always place themselves under the leadership of the Party and be consistent with the CPC Central Committee in politics, thought and action,” “guid[ing] the people to implement the Party’s instructions and follow the Party’s leadership, and unite their own people around the Party in the closest and most extensive way” (Speech to the CPC Central Committee conference on the Party’s work with social organizations, 7/6/15, II.335-336). For their part, the “social groups” should “learn work at the grassroots to learn about the people’s living conditions, becoming practitioners of the Party’s principle of serving he people, executors of the Paty’s mass line, and experts in the Party’s work for the people” (ibid. II.337).

That is, the regime of Communist China is an oligarchy, the rule of the few who are rich, but an oligarchy of a kind first seen only in the previous century, in Soviet Russia. Whereas previous oligarchies consisted of persons already wealthy, the new, Russian Communist oligarchy consisted of persons who had seized the wealth of the wealthy, deploying it as the means to end the old oligarchy. In order to do so, a new oligarchy needed to be established, one that deployed the institutions of the modern, centralized state in order to end private property and, eventually, lead all societies to communism. In Lenin’s formula, the socialist state will “wither away.” But it didn’t. The Russian Communists confronted two problems: in the economic field, socialism failed to deliver prosperity; in the political field, it failed to deliver equality. They lost whatever popular support they may have enjoyed. As a result of these failures, pressured geopolitically by the prosperous and (relatively) egalitarian commercial republics, the Soviet Union eventually collapsed. Xi is acutely aware of these failures, seeing that they are endemic to socialist oligarchies—unless, as he urges, Communists discipline themselves and make the people “moderately prosperous” and thus “happy.” Chinese Communists must undertake to square the Leninist circle, winning the continuous support of the people while keeping their party firmly in power.

To do this, the ruling body or politeuma must itself be united. “We have to unify the thinking and will of the whole Party, first in order to unify the thinking and will of the people of all China’s ethnic groups so that everyone works together to advance our reform.” In terms of the ruling institution or politeia, this will require “a complete set of closely connected and coordinated systems of the state.” Because the Soviet Union and its several Eastern and Central European satellites failed, “how to govern a socialist society, a completely new society, has not been clearly addressed by world socialism so far” (Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 11/12/13, I.101). Marx and Engels “had no practical experience in the comprehensive governance of a socialist country, as their theories about a future society were mostly predictive”; Lenin died before he could “explore this question in depth”; and the subsequent rulers of the Soviet Union “made serious mistakes and failed to resolve the problem” (ibid. I.101-102). This has left the task to “our Party,” which “has accumulated rich experience and achieved great success in improving our governance system and enhancing our governance capacity,” in “striking contrast to many regions and countries” today “that suffer constant chaos” (ibid. I.102). There are nonetheless substantial economic and political reforms remaining to be undertaken, given “the basic fact that China is still in the primary stage of socialism and will long remain so” (ibid. I.105). While the party has “a good blueprint” in hand for accomplishing these tasks, “what we should do is follow it through to the end and make it a success”; continuing his architectonic metaphor, Xi advises his colleagues, “we need to have a ‘nail’ spirit,” inasmuch as “when we use a hammer to drive in a nail, a single knock often may not be enough” (Speech to the second full assembly of the Second Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central  Committee, 2/28/13, I.446). “If a blueprint is good, factually based, scientifically sound [i.e., Marxist] and well-received by the people we should keep working on it, one administration after another, and the outcome of our work will be real and appreciated and remembered by the people” (ibid. I.446). Then, “as socialism progresses, our institutions will undoubtedly mature, the strengths of our system will become self-evident, and our development path will assuredly become wider.” “Marxism will not remain stagnant,” and it has not (Speech to the CPC Central Committee, 1/5/13, I.24); Chinese Marxism had its first stage under Mao, its second initially under Deng Xiaoping beginning in 1978, when China effectively adopted its own version of Lenin’s New Economic Policy in an attempt to ensure that socialism, state ownership of the means of production, did not suffocate economic growth and, in foreign policy, ended its geopolitical isolation. These latter-day policies might threaten firm Party rule over the country (as they did in 1920s Russia, a threat met with supreme force by Stalin, and again in the 1990s under Gorbachev, who did not meet the threat and lost the regime). 

That is why “officials must be strict with themselves in self-cultivation, in the exercise of power, and in self-discipline” Speech to the Leading Group for Further Reform under the CPC Central Committee, 5/5/17, II.111). These are “Three Stricts,” outlined by Xi at a session of the Anhui delegation of the Second Session of the 12th People’s Congress in March 2014. Strictness in self-cultivation means a strong “sense of Party awareness,” firm “support of the ideals and principles of the Party,” and a certain high-mindedness, distant from “vulgar interests,” “unhealthy practices and evil influences.” Strictness in the exercise of power means exercising power “in the interests of the people” (very much as defined by the CCP Central Committee) according to the Central Committee’s “rules and regulations,” keeping power “within the confines of systemic checks” designed by the Central Commitee and never seeking privileges or abusing power “for personal gain.” Strictness in self-discipline means the willingness of “leading officials” to “always be ready to apply the rod to themselves,” prudently examining themselves in accordance with “Party discipline and state laws.” The Three Stricts must be supplemented by the “Three Earnests”; earnestly taking “facts as the basis of work planning, ensur[ing] that all ideas, policies, and plans are in line with actual conditions, objective laws, and scientific principle,” lest officials become “overly ambitious and divorced from reality”; earnestly being “down-to-earth” and “pragmatic in work” when undertaking new policies, facing and solving problems as they arise; and earnestly “upholding personal integrity,” by which he means loyalty to the Party, the people, and to Party colleagues. (Anhui delegation speech, I. 421-422). Such “internal Party scrutiny” “is the first and most fundamental means among all forms of scrutiny for the Party and the country,” but “it cannot work as a joint force without being integrated with scrutiny by state agencies, other political parties, the public, and public opinion.” Accordingly, “officials should invite scrutiny from all sides, showing both breadth of mind and confidence.” (Speech to the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/27/16, II.206).

During his years in Yan’an, after the Long March, Mao “put forward the idea of breaking the historical cycle of gaining political power only to lose it because of corruption that had often happened in Chinese history” (Speech to the Second Full Assembly of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, 10/27/16, II.203). This task remains. “Discipline and rules are indispensable for political parties, especially for Marxist parties,” which rule in the name of the people (Speech to the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 1/13/15, II.164). This means not only obedience to the Party Constitution and other state and party laws and policies but also “the traditions and working practices developed by our Party over the years” (ibid. II.164). The latter, unwritten rules are indispensable because the Party’s “very large membership” makes self-governance by rules alone impossible; no set of rules could be so detailed and pervasive as to govern such an organization effectively (ibid. II.164). And so, Party officials must avoid forming cliques of mutual self-promotion, oligarchies within the oligarchy; they must never make “careless and groundless remarks,” including gossip, rumors, and “inappropriate jokes” (ibid. II.165). Some kinds of grounded remarks are also forbidden, such as disclosing confidential information. In this vein, “some high-ranking officials have even compiled a coded language, which they use when speaking with their families and those close to them” (ibid. II.167). All of these practices subvert “the authority of the Central Committee” and “the unity of the Party” (ibid. II.168). Officials must “rein in our relatives and immediate staff,” not favor them (II.168). This bears on Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. Party members need “the moral fiber to denounce and rectify violations of Party discipline” (Speech to the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 1/14/14, I.440), building “a complete system of combating corruption through both punishment and prevention, strengthen[ing] education on combating corruption and upholding integrity” while “promot[ing] a culture of clean government” (Second Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 1/22/13, I.429; see also Speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/27/16, II.197-200; and see also Speech to the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 1/12/16, II.176-184). 

In addition to the “social groups” or civic associations, the regime has a more formal institutional structure that reaches down to the people, namely, the units of the CPC organized on the level of the counties. At the beginning of 2015, Xi announced that all county party secretaries would be trained at the Central Party School, a “strategic move with long-term significance” aimed at “help[ing] Party secretaries better to understand and hence better to implement the decisions made” by the Central Committee by studying “theories of Chinese socialism” along with theoretical and practical problems faced in the counties (Speech at the Central Party School, 1/12/15, II.151). “Counties are a key link in our Party’s set-up and state power, an important basis for developing the economy, ensuring people’s well-being, and maintaining and promoting the enduring peace and stability of our country” (ibid. II.152). Although “not a high-ranking post,” the county secretaryship can also prove a stepping-stone to higher office; “looking back, quite a few well-known figures started their political careers at county level” (ibid. II.152). Apart from Marxist faith, there are opportunities for career advancement within the oligarchy, if a County Party secretary acts well. For a party secretary, “loyalty [to the CCP] is central,” “the greatest virtue” (ibid. II.154). “County Party chiefs are an easy target for all kinds of temptation, plots, flattery and excessive praise with an aim to topple you” (ibid. II.154). To avoid this, they “must always follow the correct political direction,” remember that they “are part of the organization,” think of themselves as “someone who belongs to the Party” as a person “genuinely committed, persistent and faithful to Marxism” (ibid. II.155). County Party secretaries must “address the most pressing and relevant problems that are of the utmost concern to the people, especially the problems that the people complain about, and address them promptly” rather than “indulg[ing] in wasteful showcase projects to prop up your own image” (ibid. II.156-157). “We must act conscientiously as if we were treading on thin ice, and standing on the edge of an abyss,” the abyss of popular discontent (ibid. II.161). 

Overall, Party officials at all levels are subject to “discipline inspection” by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision Work under the Administrative Supervision Law (Speech to the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 1/12/16, II.185). These agencies will coordinate “discipline inspection tours” of the country, a Chinese tradition dating ack to the fourteenth century. While “our discipline inspectors are not ancient circuit inspectors…they must be authoritative,” being “vital to the development of the country and the Party,” both of which must minimize corrupt practices and ideological deviation in order to survive and to thrive (ibid. II.186). Regarding ideological deviation, Party members and prospective members are to study the Party Constitution and rules, along with Xi Jinping’s speeches, to practice the interaction between themselves and the people described above, and cultivate the virtues of honesty in thought, words, and deeds. “In strengthening the Party, the priority is to enhance its political philosophy, and the key is to ensure discipline among Party members and officials” (Directives on the “Two Studies, One Action” education program, 2/4/16, II.189). In selecting and training officials, the Party needs to have a clear understanding of “what a good official is, how to become a good official, and how to use the right officials for the right job” (Speech at the National Conference on Organizational Work, 6/28/13, I.461). The definition of a good official has changed over several historical stages of the Party. In the revolutionary war period, “good officials needed to be loyal to the Party, brae and skillful in battle, and unafraid to sacrifice their lives”; during Mao’s socialist construction period, “good officials needed to be politically and professionally competent”; in the early, Deng Xiaoping period of “reform and opening up,” good officials needed to “have professional knowledge and be determined to carry out reforms”; now, in the Xi Jinping period of reform and opening up, “we require that good officials be politically reliable, professionally competent and morally upright, and…trusted by the people” (ibid. I.461). That is, prior to the 1949 founding, the Party needed warriors; in the first decades of the regime, Communists whose loyalty had been proven in revolutionary war but lacked experience in government needed to learn how to rule; the first stage of reform and opening up also required such knowledge but also willingness to put some of the practices of the Mao period aside and implement the Chinese version of a New Economic Policy; once the increase of prosperity had taken hold, however, a more comprehensive set of characteristics is needed, characteristics that practice good government not only in terms of technical expertise but in moral and political virtues, “cherish[ing] the lofty ideal of communism” while following the precepts of Marxism, the practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics, serving the people in a “realistic and pragmatic manner,” never shirking responsibilities, and exercising power cautiously, “keeping it under control in a bid to sustain their political life” (ibid. I.462). Xi knows that “some Party officials…fail to meet these qualifications,” being “skeptical about communism, considering it a fantasy that will never come true,” believing not “in Marxism-Leninism” but in “ghosts and gods,” seeking divine advice”; some (horror of horrors) “even yearn for Western social systems  and values, losing their confidence in the future of socialism” (ibid. I.463). In a socialist regime, in any regime, “the most dangerous moment is when one wavers or begins to show doubt about one’s ideals and convictions” (ibid. I.464). Look at the fall of the Soviet empire: “I have long been wondering if we were confronted with a complex situation such as a ‘color revolution,’ would all our officials act resolutely to safeguard the leadership of the Party and the socialist system?” (ibid. I.464). Most would, but vigilance is still needed: “The exercise of power without supervision will definitely lead to corruption,” endangering the regime by weakening the popular base that underpins all regimes (ibid. I.468; see also Speech at the Fifth Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee 4/19/13, I.433-435). Assuredly, “if we tailor our practices to western capitalist values, measure our national development by means of the Western capitalist evaluation system, and regard Western standards as the sole standards for development, the consequences will be devastating” (Speech at the National Conference on Party Schools, 12/11/15, II. 356).

Xi understands that Marxism is a materialist form of historicism. “Time is the origin of thought, and practice is the source of theory” (Speech at opening ceremony of a study session on the guiding principles of Xi Jinping’s speeches, 7/26/17, II.66). Therefore, the “ideological progress” that must be “one of [the CP’s] top priorities” will emphasize the unity of theory and practice in time (Speech at the National Meeting on Publicity and Theoretical Work, 8/19/13, I.171).  “It is the requirement of materialistic dialectics to promote work in all areas by focusing on and tackling key issues” (Speech at a Study Session on the Guiding principles of Xi Jinping’s Speeches, 7/26/17, II.64). “To consolidate Marxism as the guiding ideology in China and cement the shared ideological basis of the whole Party and the people,” additional “efforts should be made to enhance the awareness of socialism with Chinese characteristics among the people of all ethnic groups, so as to inspire the people to strive for Chinese socialism” (ibid. I.172). This task takes on special urgency because the CP has “opened its door wider to the outside world,” exposing the people to non-Marxist ideas and beliefs (ibid. I.172). Xi takes care to explicate Marxism as adapted to China, first by Mao Zedong, then by Deng Xiaoping. Mao took Marx’s scientific socialism (“seeking truth from facts,” not abstractions) and Marx’s “mass line” (Party interaction with and leadership of the people) and added “independence”—that is, a refusal to follow directives from the Soviet Union, whose Communist Party under Lenin and especially Stalin attempted to direct Mao’s policies before and after the Chinese Communist revolution (Speech at the Symposium Marking the 120th Anniversary of Mao Zedong’s Birth, 12/26/13, I.27). Although facts obey the dialectical laws of history, which are “universal truths with eternal ideological value,” “classical Marxist authors did not exhaust truth but blazed a trail to seek and develop truth” (ibid. I.28); this, Mao understood. The “mass line” is what “enables our Party to maintain its vitality and combat capability” (one of Mao’s tracts is indeed titled, “Combat Marxism”); the mass line “translates the Party’s policies into the people’s conscientious action” (ibid. I.29). It “encapsulates the basic tenet of Marxism that the people are the creators of history” (ibid. I.29), and Mao likened the Communists to the “seeds” and the people to the “soil” (ibid. I.30). As for independence, in Xi’s paraphrase, “We should always rely on ourselves when seeking our national development and defending our national pride and confidence,” given our status as “an Eastern country with a large population and backward economy” (ibid. I.31). “The diversity of historical conditions determines the diversity of the development paths, chosen by various countries” (ibid. I.31). 

Deng, who studied in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, “never faltered in his faith in the scientific nature and truth of Marxism or in the bright future of socialism and communism” (Speech at Seminar Commemorating the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Deng Xiaoping, 8/20/14, II.3). His “firm faith in communism” and “unshakeable belief in socialism with Chinese characteristics” led him to policy departures, not departures in principle, from Mao (ibid. II.3). “His lofty revolutionary ideals and charisma will always be an inspiration to us on our path towards the Two Centenary Goals”—a “moderately prosperous society by 2021, the centenary of the CPC’s founding—and the full consolidation of the regime as “prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious” by the centenary of the founding in 2049 (II.15 n.1). Like Mao, he endorsed Marxism as scientific socialism, “seeking truth from facts” and following the laws of historical/dialectical materialism, which, as he put it, “govern the development of human society” (ibid. II.4). But, as he also said, “The world changes every day, and modern science and technology in particular develop rapidly”; as a consequence, “anyone who fails to carry Marxism forward with new thinking and a new viewpoint is not a true Marxist” (ibid. II.8). This is why he “took another historic step in adapting Marxism to China’s conditions after Mao Zedong Thought” (ibid. II.8). While retaining Mao’s insistence on Chinese Communist “independence and self-reliance,” he opened China to the world because “the problem of development…concerns all mankind” and must be “stud[ied] and solv[ed] on that level,” most especially in reaching out to the Third World (ibid. II.10)—effectively following the strategy that had been recommended by Frantz Fanon, implemented clumsily by the now-failed Soviet empire.

Such worldwide outreach makes sense to Xi because “no theory in history can match Marxism in terms of rational truth, and spread, and no theory has exerted such a huge influence on the world as Marxism”; Marxism therefore has an “irreplaceable role in understanding, reshaping, and advancing the world” as a synthesis of theory and practice (Speech at the 43rd Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 9/29/17, II.68). Marxism “must show the way to the people in modern times” and it can do so, if we Chinese Communists “upgrade Marxism on the basis of the realities of modern times” (ibid. II.69). Capitalism, too, has proved highly adaptable; “we need to enhance our research on modern capitalism” in order to “acquire a better understanding of the law governing the profound and complicated changes in capitalism and international political and economic relations” (ibid. II.69). Know your enemy. Learn from him even as you move to defeat him. Although “history will move forward,” Chinese Communists “should always retain the spirit of the Communists at the time of the founding of our Party,” continuing “to hold Marxism as our guiding philosophy” (Speech at a ceremony marking the 95th Anniversary of the Founding of the CPC, 7/1/16, II.32). Indeed, Engels himself wrote that Marx regarded Marxism as “not so much a doctrine as a method” providing “not so much ready-made dogmas, as aids to further investigation and the method for such investigation” (ibid. II.33). Mao acknowledged this, insisting that such ‘bourgeois’ practices as accounting should be adopted without hesitation by Chinese Communists, now that they had a state to run. Today, “we must neither follow the old path of a rigid closed-door policy” as set down by Mao, “nor an erroneous path” of “abandoning socialism” by accepting not merely some capitalist techniques but capitalism and republicanism as a regime (ibid. II.39). The right path is to undertake “a new ‘Long March,” differing from, but just as arduous as the one Mao led, in its own way (Speech at a ceremony commemorating the 80theAnniversary of the Victory of the Long March, 10/21/16, II.49). “The victory of the Long March proved that belief in our hearts gives strength to our legs” (ibid. II.51). The new Long March will bring China to realize “a great national rejuvenation,” “building China into a strong, democratic and harmonious modern socialist country” (Speech at Beijing University Commemorating the 95th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement, 5/4/14, I.189).

In terms of institutions, Marxist doctrine will be taught at the Party Schools. In them, “Marxism and communism come above all else,” Marxism as “the guiding thought of the Party,” communism “the lofty ideal,” the egalitarian social condition of humanity at the end of ‘history’ (Speech at the National Conference on Party Schools, 12/11/15), II. 354). As in any form of historicist thought, an ‘ideal’ for a Marxism means not an abstraction from material reality but the culmination of the evolution of that reality. “The CPC is a Marxist political party under a unified central leadership”—unity in “political stance, homogenized theory and practice” being “critical to the development and growth of the Party’s cause” (Speech at the National Conference on Party Schools, 12/11/15, II.171). Stance, theory, and practice should “always keep in line with the CPC Central Committee,” but “alignment in political stance, theory and practice is not as easy as correction of the physical formation” seen in a military drill (ibid. II.171). Xi again cites Mao’s efforts in the 1940s, which aimed at “reaffirm[ing] the practice of applying the basic theories of Marxism to the actual conditions of China’s revolution” (II.174 n.2). While criticism of Party and state policy is “welcome,” “no matter how sharp it may be,” “academic research does not justify impulsive remarks any time or remarks made for the sake of being different and seeking notoriety”—evidently as judged by the Party (ibid. II.173). Again, the “mass line” of the Party, “linking theory with practice” by maintaining close links with the people, undertaking criticism and self-criticism, exhibiting tenacity in work, pursuing the truth, and being pragmatic, has “underpinn[ed] one victory after another for the Party and the people” (Speech at the Program of Mass Line Education and Practice held by the CPC Central Committee, 6/18/13, I.401). Based on Marxian “dialectical and historical materialism,” the mass line remains “an essential requirement for the Party to maintain its progressive nature and its integrity” (ibid. I.403-404). Following the mass line will prevent the “Four Malfeasances”: going through the motions, excessive bureaucracy, self-indulgence, and extravagance, which “run contrary to our Party’s very nature and purpose”—which, as a form of historicist progressivism, must avoid anything that ossifies, anything that interferes with ‘history’s’ dialectical advance—and “are the problems that the public hates the most,” giving them reason to overthrow the regime (ibid. I. 411). 

“Teachers are the engineers of the human soul, who undertake the essential mission of molding minds” (Speech to the National Conference on Education in Political Philosophy at Institutions of Higher Learning, 12/7/16, II.409). Beyond the Party Schools, all Chinese elementary and secondary school students shall be taught to “act conscientiously to foster and practice” the “thoughts of the ancient sages, the aspirations of public-spirited people, the ideals of the revolutionary martyrs and the expectations of ordinary people” (Speech at the Minzu Primary School, Beijing, 5/30/14, I.201). “Schools should attach greater importance to moral education and work hard to enhance the school spirit and teachers’ professional ethics” (ibid. I.202). At the university level, “education in political philosophy” also requires the integration of “moral and political education,” thereby serving “the people, the CPC’s governance of China, the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, reform and opening up, and socialist modernization”—in sum, adhere to “the correct political direction” (Speech at the National Conference on Education in Political Philosophy at Institutions of Higher Learning, 12/7/16, II.406, 407). By political philosophy, Xi of course means “the scientific theory of Marxism,” with its understanding of “the historical necessity of social progress and Chinese socialism” (ibid. II.407). With that foundation, university students can then achieve “an accurate understanding of Chinese socialism in comparison with other social systems in the world,” thereby enhancing “their awareness of China’s historical mission” in the world (ibid. II.408). Chinese higher education shall “firmly uphold CPC leadership” and shall be guided in that task by local Party secretaries and by party committees at the universities and colleges, which will “enforce Party leadership and discipline” (ibid. II.409, 410). 

Xi therefore emphasizes the need to “develop philosophy and social sciences with Chinese features” (Speech at a Seminar on Philosophy and Social Sciences, 5/17/16, II.366). “Our standing in the areas of academic ideas, thought, viewpoints, and standards, and our voice in international academia, are still incommensurate with our overall national strength and international status” ibid. II.366). To remedy this disparity, in a sense a disparity of theory and practice intolerable to a Marxist, Chinese philosophy and social science should “bear three hallmarks”: they should “encompass all resources and legacies and retain their Chinese identity” (ibid. II.366); they “must display originality and zeitgeist” (ibid. II.370); and they “must be systematic and professional” (ibid. II.372). The resources include “the best of Chinese culture,” “the philosophy and social sciences of other countries,” selected according to Chinese Marxist criteria (ibid. II.367). “We should make the past serve the present, and the foreign serve China” for the sake “of the development trends of Chinese socialism” (ibid. II.367). The theory and practice of Chinese socialism can then be extended (according to “the law of evolution from particularity to universality”) from “domestic practices” to “suggestions and solutions for global issues” (ibid. II.369). “Originality and zeitgeist” refer to “the requisite of social, practical and historical progress” in philosophy and social science (ibid. II.370). All theories, “unexceptionally,” are “the product of their times and the result of pondering over and delving into prominent conflicts and problems of a given society at a given time,” as Marx contends (ibid. II.371). Recent examples include efforts to “strengthen the Party’s governance capacity” and to “build stronger armed forces” (ibid. II.372). “Systematic and professional” refers “an all-encompassing system of learning”: “strengthen[ing] Marxist subjects; improving “pillar subjects” (i.e., philosophy and the various social sciences); paying “great attention to important subjects in which we are strong”; “give priority to emerging and interdisciplinary subjects of great practical significance” while not neglecting “more marginal subjects that are of high cultural value or bear on Chinese heritage” (ibid. II.372-373). The main point is to promote and teach “Marxist theory,” to establish and fortify “centers of research into Chinese socialist theories, to academies of Marxism, and to newspapers, periodicals, websites and other platforms for ideological and theoretical work,” nationally and internationally (ibid. II.376).

Party rule also applies to the “rule of law,” the laws being framed and enforced by the Party. The supreme law of the land, the Party Constitution, was adopted by the Party in 1982, following the first such constitution, which had been adopted in 1954 and its forerunner, the Common Program of 1949. The 1982 constitution set down the legal framework for Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up policy, intended to help the country recover from the excesses of Mao’s “Cultural Revolution,” begun in 1966 and ending in exhaustion ten years later. Deng sought stability, writing, “To ensure people’s democracy we must strengthen our legal system…so as to make sure that institutions and laws do not change whenever the leadership changes or whenever the leaders change their views or shift the focus of their attention”—as had happened under Mao who, rather like Stalin, ordered not only mass killings of class enemies but, far more concerning for Party members, purges of the Party. (quoted in Speech at a meeting of the People from all Walks of Life to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the Promulgation and Implementation of the Current Constitution, 12/4/12, I.150). (Xi’s father was the victim of such a purge, and he himself was sent to a remote part of the country, from which he worked his way back, and up.) In this, Deng was a sort of Chinese Khruschev, and Xi is careful to show that he remained a Marxist, quoting him as saying “I am convinced that more and more people will come to believe in Marxism, because it is a science” (Speech at the Seminar on Philosophy and Social Science, 5/17/2015, II.358). Xi approves of the Constitution while calling for its “comprehensive implementation” of the 1982 Party Constitution in order to build “a law-based socialist country,” a “democratic dictatorship”—democratic in the particular sense of Communist oligarchic rule in order to achieve an egalitarian society which eventually will need no state apparatus at all (ibid. I.152). In the meantime, “law is written morality, while morality is conscious law” (ibid. I.157), meaning that the morality of socialism with Chinese characteristics must pervade the hearts and minds of all Chinese, backed by the Constitution, “a legal weapon to safeguard [the] rights and interests” of the Chinese as those rights and interests are defined by the Party as it monitors the people, prudently attentive to their complaints (ibid. I.157). “Upholding the Party’s leadership is fundamental to socialist rule of law” (Speech at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/23/14, II.120). As leaders, “we need to motivate the public to actively involve themselves in the practice of the rule of laws” as “devoted advocates, conscientious observers, and resolute defenders of socialist rule of law,” “integrat[ing] the rule of law with the rule of virtue” (ibid. II.122), considering that “law is a set of virtues in writing” and “virtue represents the law in one’s inner world” (Speech to the 37th Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 12/9/16, II.144). Given the historical progress anticipated by Marxism, Chinese laws, including the supreme law, will continue to be amended, a process which the CPC’s “Leading Group for Further Reform” will oversee. (See also Xi’s Speech to the National Conference on Law and Order, 9/19/17, II.416). 

Xi’s socialism is doggedly Marxist, but what are its “Chinese characteristics”? “Imbued with the national spirit of patriotism, we have launched the great cause of rebuilding the country” (Speech at “The Road to Rejuvenation” exhibition, Beijing, 11/29,12, I.37). As a place and as a people, China and the Chinese people have suffered from “backwardness,” the failure to modernize which has “left us vulnerable to attack” by Western powers and by Japan. “All Party members” must “bear in mind” this lesson, fostering “the Chinese Dream” of “national rejuvenation” (ibid. I.38). Consider, then, that “the Chinese nation has an unbroken history of more than 5,000 years of civilization,” “creat[ing] a rich and profound culture” that has made “an unforgettable contribution to the progress of human civilization” (Address to the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress, 3/17/13, I.41). The Chinese spirit,” a “national spirit with patriotism at its core” is also “the spirit of the times with reform and innovation at its core” (ibid. I.42). That is, patriotism can be artfully blended with Marxism (hardly a Chinese doctrine at its origin) by claiming, in the same sentence, that “patriotism has always been the inner force that binds the Chinese nation together, and reform and innovation have always been the inner force that spurs us to keep abreast of the times in the course of reform and opening up”—the spirit not only of Chinese Communism but of contemporary, Deng-Xi Communism at that (ibid. I.42). 

This spirit should be made to saturate social institutions that might otherwise resist the Marxist state—families, ethnic groups, and religious denominations. Patriotism or nationalism holds the nation itself to be one big family. Therefore, “we must enhance civility in Chinese families and make it an important foundation for the country’s development, progress, and social harmony” by “combin[ing] the love we have for our families with our love for our nation and integrate our family dreams with the dream of the nation,” “work[ing] together with one heart to weave the wisdom and enthusiasm of our 1.3 billion people from 400 million families into a powerful force” that can realize “the Chinese Dream” (Speech at the First National Conference of Model Families, 12/12/16, II.382-383). Families should encourage “family members, especially he younger generation, to love the Party, the motherland, the people, and the Chinese nation” (ibid. I.384). After all, “traditional Chinese ethics,” taught in families, such principles as “”respecting the elderly and loving the young, gender equality, marital harmony, frugality, and neighborhood solidarity, while promoting loyalty, responsibility, family affection, learning, and public welfare” can surely reinforce a socialist regime, if not in all instances the regime of communism, far in the future (ibid. II.384). And as for ethnic groups, if they respect “the principle of equality” in relation to one another, they can “work together and achieve common prosperity,” thereby “consolidating the ideal that the Chinese nation is a community formed by all ethnic groups,” living in harmony under the rule of the Party (Speech at the Central Conference on Ethnic Affairs, 9/28/2014, II.328). Finally, in regard to religion, “the Party’s basic guidelines on religion result from its adherence to Marxist views on religion”—atheism being the leading one, discreetly unmentioned by Xi—guidelines that acknowledge the facts “prevailing conditions in China and the realities of religion in China” (Speech at the National Conference on Religion, 4/22/16). “The prime purpose and ultimate goal in implementing policies on freedom of religious belief is to unite believers and non-believers to the maximum extent” by “encourag[ing] religions to adapt to our socialist society,” “lead[ing] believers to love the country and the people” and to “embrace the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system,” endeavor[ing] to integrate religious tenets with Chinese culture, “participat[ing] in reform and opening up and socialist modernization” by “contribut[ing] to the realization of the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation” (ibid. II.329-330). To put the matter in plainer terms, over time religions in China will be coopted by the Party. 

Patriotism can also be deployed to counter foreign influences among Chinese who have studied abroad or emigrated to other countries. Xi tells scholars who have returned from foreign countries, “I hope you will adhere to patriotism” “remember[ing] that wherever you are you are a member of the Chinese family; the country and the people back home always care about their sons and daughters, and your homeland is always a warm spiritual land for you” (Speech at the Centenary Celebration of the Western Returned Scholars Association, 10/21/13, I.63, 64). As for the emigrants, they should “forward the Chinese nation’s fine traditions of diligence and kindness, and contribute to the development of the country and friendship between the Chinese people and the people in their host countries” (Speech at the 12th National People’s Congress, 3/17/13, I.45). “In the best of Chinese traditions, generations of overseas Chinese never forget their home country, their origins, or the blood of the Chinese nation flowing in their veins” (Speech at the Seventh Conference of Friendship of Overseas Chinese Associations, 6/6/14, I.69). Chinese living in other countries should “serve as a bridge for wide-ranging exchanges and cooperation between China and their new home countries” wielding Chinese ‘soft power’ (ibid. I.70).

Whether in families, ethnic groups, religious congregations, or Chinese living oversea, “cultural soft power depends on the vitality, cohesion and appeal of the core values of a nation” (Speech at the 13th Study Group Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 2/24/14, I.181). In order to “cultivate and disseminate the core socialist values we must take traditional Chinese culture as the base” while “mak[ing] the past serve the present,” treating tradition with “a critical approach,” “eliminat[ing] the false and retain[ing] the true while “put[ting] forth new ideas” (ibid. I.182). “As spring drizzle falling without a sound, we should disseminate the core socialist values in a gentle and lively way by making use of all kinds of cultural forms,” whether literary works or “artistic images” (ibid. I.183). The gentle and lively ways must nonetheless be supplemented by “laws and regulations,” which “should act as a driving force for the spread of the core values” (ibid. 183-184). That is, the Party should “transform and boost traditional culture in a creative way,” as Xi urges in a September 2014 speech (II.341), even as we “carry forward the spirit of hard work and plain living,” a spirit not in the least inconsistent with Marxism (Speech to the fourth group of nominees and winners of national ethical model rewards, 9/26/13, I.177). This, he frankly contends, is a “strategic concept”; “deal[ing] with the relationship between material progress and cultural and ethical progress in a dialectical, comprehensive and balanced way, pursu[ing] progress in all aspects of social life in our reform, opening up, and modernization,” standing in the forefront of the times” as the Marxist vanguard with Chinese characteristics (ibid. I. 353). In literature, writers should “speak for the people” by “serving the socialist cause,” “firmly upholding the Marxist view” (Speech at the Forum on Literature and Art, 10/15/14, II.343). “Writers and artists should artfully tell Chinese stories, spread the Chinese spirit,” “giving foreign audiences a better understanding of China through their works, “introduc[ing] foreign audiences to the charm of Chinese culture” while taking care to follow Lenin’s exhortation to appeal to the workers (ibid. II.344-345). “Whether an artist can produce excellent work depends on whether he or she can stand for and speak for the people,” a characteristic with which, Xi assures his listeners, “all classics of Chinese literature are suffused” in their “humanistic vision” (ibid. II.345). As for Party members, so for writers and artists: “To bring down any invisible wall between you and the people, you should not only approach them physically but also empathize with them emotionally” (ibid. 347). And, consistent with Marxist historicism, one must understand that “each era has its unique art and literature as well as its unique spirit,” a spirit “epitomiz[ing] the social life and spirit of that era with coincident traces and features” (Speech at the 10th National Congress of China Federation of Literary and Art Circles and Ninthe National Congress of China Writers Association, 11/30/16), II.379). 

Extending soft power is also the responsibility of the media, necessarily controlled by the CPC for the sake of “the governance and stability of the country,” inasmuch as “we must uphold the leadership of the Party, keep the correct political orientation, maintain a people-centered work ethic” in the dissemination of news (Speech at the Seminar on the Party’s Media work, 2/19/16, II.359). To “adhere to the Marxist view of journalism” the “fundamental prerequisite is the Party’s leadership over publicity” (ibid. II.360). The media “must represent the Party’s will and advocacy” (ibid.360). This extends not throughout China but to “international audiences,” as it can give the Party “a stronger voice in the international community,” “greater international influence” (ibid. II.362).

And then there is the internet. Xi finds “two groups of people” using it: “new media professionals and social media ‘opinion leaders'” (Speech at the Central Conference on the United Front, 5/18/15, II.354). Because “cyberspace is a major domain for publicity,” “we must take the initiative in this field and win over these two groups,” “work[ing] to enlist the most prominent figures among them in the United Front”—since the 1930s, the term for a Communist strategy for a coalition with other Leftists against a common enemy—establish “regular contact, strengthen online and offline interaction, and seek a common political understanding” (ibid. II.354). In this case, “hostile forces at home and abroad constantly try to undermine our Party, attempting to make us abandon our belief in Marxism, communism and socialism” (ibid. II.355). More specifically, “Western political dogma,” including “Western capitalist ideology,” have seeped into the minds of some Chinese, even Party members, who “cannot see the underlying dangers of accepting the ‘universal values’ that have developed in the West over hundreds of years” (ibid. II.355). Since these dogmas include Marxism, this argument is an obvious smokescreen for fears of regime change in China, and indeed Xi goes on to say that “since the end of the Cold War, some countries, affected by Western values, have been torn apart by war or afflicted with chaos” (ibid. II.356). By 2016, he was prepared to impose restrictions. Since the internet “influences the way that people view the country, society, their jobs and also their lives,” and since “a society that lacks common ideals, goals, and values and that finds itself in disorder all the time will never achieve success,” the Chinese regime “will need to form concentric circles online and offline” (Speech at the Seminar on Cyber Security and IT Application, 4/19/16, II.363). Seeing that “netizens” are the new “grassroots,” the people the Party must listen to in order to ‘lead’—that is, rule—and seeing that “if members of the public go online, so does public opinion,” the Party must also “go online regularly, observing, charting, and posting their comments” (ibid. II.363). But more than that, “the internet cannot be a lawless place”; “the use of the internet to advocate the toppling of the government, preach religious extremism, or incite separatism and terrorism must be resolutely prevented and punished” (ibid. II.364). While continuing to “strengthen positive publicity” about the regime, the Party must also prevent netizens from “caus[ing] trouble” by “overstep[ping] the boundaries of the Constitution and other laws” (ibid.365). Although the CP began its “Golden Shield Project” (nicknamed the “Great Firewall” by an Australian journalist) in 1998 and had established the Cyberspace Administration of China in 2011, under Xi a new, stricter Cyber Security Law would be enacted in 2017. In a speech to the Second World Internet Conference in December 2015, Xi advised the attendees to observe “respect for cyber sovereignty”; if “cyberspace is not beyond the rule of law” and “greater efforts should be made to promote ethical standards and civilized behavior in cyberspace,” then China, as a sovereign lawgiver, ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, enforcer of ethical standards, is entitled to make its cyberspace conform to the laws and ethical standards of the CP regime (Speech to the Second World Internet Conference, II.12/16/15).

Having established the happiness of the Chinese people as the purpose of the regime and considering “the ultimate purpose of economic development” to be “to ensure and improve people’s well-being,” Xi devotes substantial attention to political economy (Speech at the Sixth Plenary Session, 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/27/16, II.404). “It is the essential requirement of socialism to eradicate poverty, improve the people’s livelihood and achieve common prosperity” (Speech in Fuping County, Hebei Province, 12/29-30/12, I.209). As of 2015, some 70 million Chinese lived in poverty according to “our standards,” 200 million by World Bank standards (Speech at reception in Seattle, Washington, 9/22/15, II.30). This notwithstanding, he regarded the country as on track to become “a moderately prosperous society in all respects” by the CP centenary, a few years later, although, admittedly, some regions, usually the rural ones, will not have achieved this status by then (ibid. II.30; see also Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/29/15, II.73-75, 83). Rural areas need increased job opportunities (particularly in jobs that improve the Chinese ecosystem such as reforestation, relocation of many residents to the cities, improved education, state-sponsored investment, and “social security,” including public services and healthcare, with all of these initiatives ruled by “Party committee secretaries and Party governors,” themselves supervised by the higher authorities (Speech at the Central Conference on Poverty Alleviation and Development, 11/27/15, II.91 and Speech at a seminar on eliminating poverty, 6/23/17, II.96, 98). 

“Key to realizing a moderately prosperous society” is “expanding the middle income group” by offering property rights, including rights to intellectual property (Speech at the 13th Meeting of the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs under the CPC Central Committee, 5/16/16, I.397). But such prosperity, including the existence of a middle income group—dare one say a ‘bourgeoisie’?—brings its own problems. “In the past, we tended to think that the conflicts and problems afflicting the people resulted from a low level of economic development and low income; if only we could develop the economy, and if the people lived a better life, social conflicts and problems would consequently decrease. Now it seems that problems always exist whether the economy is undeveloped or developed, and that the problems arising when the economy is developed are no fewer than those arising when the economy is undeveloped—they can become more complicated.” (Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/29/15, II.85; see also Explanatory Notes on the “Decision to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform” Third Plenary Session, 18th CPC Central Committee, 11/9/13, I.78). Such complexity may be seen in Xi’s term for the Chinese political economy: “the socialist market economy of China” (Speech to the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 12/31/12, I.73). What might a “socialist market economy,” this “key breakthrough in theory,” be? (Explanatory Notes, op.cit. I.82).

“The pivotal part of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics” is a policy whereby “public ownership is dominant” but “diverse forms of ownership develop side by side” with it (Speech at the 4th Session of the 12th CPPCC National Committee, 3/4/16, II.281). The public sector will guide the development of the private sector, as “it is imperative that all sectors work in unison” (ibid. II.283). Entrepreneurs must “maintain a positive social image,” with Party officials “build[ing] a gentlemen’s relationship with them,” unlike the relations “between feudal bureaucrats and entrepreneur holding official posts or between financial consortiums and politicians in Western countries” (ibid. II.288). Similarly, Xi’s version of “supply-side economics” centers not on tax cuts for private businesses but for state-supervised efforts to “ensure that the supply structure is more adaptive and flexible to changes in demand” by reducing “overcapacity and excess inventory” (Speech at Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 1/18/16, II.277). Such state supervision is necessary because “allowing people to share the fruits of reform and deployment is the essence of socialism,” “demonstrat[ing] the superiority of socialism and the Party’s whole-heartedness in its mission of serving the people” (Speech to the Second Fall Assembly of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/29/15, II.220)

That is, the regime shall remain firmly in control as the proletarian vanguard. “We must make sure that the working class is our main force,” since “the working class is China’s leading class,” representing China’s advanced productive forces and relations of production,” serving as “the Party’s most steadfast and reliable class foundation” (Speech at discussion session of “model” national workers, 4/28/13, I.47-48). “Model workers are the cream of the country and role models for the people” (ibid. I.49). Accordingly, “we need to give leverage to the superiority of our socialist system, and let the Party and government perform their positive functions” (Explanatory Notes, op.cit. I.85). “We must put the interests of the state first when making deliberations” (ibid. I.98). While “the proposal to let the market play the decisive role in allocating resources is a breakthrough in our Party’s understanding of the laws governing the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics as well as a new achievement in the sinicization of Marxism,” this “does not mean that the market can replace the government’s functions,” which are primarily administrative, indirect, the exercise of “overall leadership” and the coordination of “all efforts” (Speech to the 15th study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 5/26/14, i.128-129). Further, the CP “should strengthen and improve the Party’s leadership” of its state-owned enterprises, “with a goal of making them the most reliable force of the party and the country and a major force in implementing the decisions and plans of the CPC Central Committee,” a “material and political foundation for socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Speech to the National Conference on Party Development of SOEs, 10/10/16, II.191). SOEs constitute a “modern corporate system with Chinese features…because it incorporates the party’s leadership into all aspects of their corporate governance and Party organizations into the corporate governance structure” (ibid. II.193). Such “democratic management” makes the “workers congress” its “basic element,” listening “to the views of workers in major decision-making” by including them in the SOE boards of directors (ibid. II.194). The Party committees that rule the SOEs with “strict discipline” “must take political philosophical education as a regular and basic task,” along with “resolving concrete problems” (ibid. II.195-196). The same kind of political structure characterizes financial institutions (Speech at the National Conference on Finance, 7/14/17, II.304-308).

The “growth pattern of our country,” which “is evolving from an extensive economy to an intensive economy”—that is, from an agricultural and manufacturing economy to a technology- and innovation-driven economy—provides a major source of the complications which the “socialist market economy” is intended to address (Speech at the Central Conference on Economic Work, 12/18/15, II.261). Such an evolution “is an objective law, and we cannot go against it no matter what we think” (ibid. II.261). “We should see the Chinese economy dialectically” as good Marxists, understanding that the CPC’s promotion of industrialization has succeeded, now ranking “first in the world,” but that the world economy has itself moved forward technologically, animated by the spirit of the ‘information economy’ (Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 1/18/16, II.262, 270). “The world’s major countries are seeking to make new scientific and technological breakthroughs and gain competitive edges in future economic as well as scientific and technological development,” and China “must catch up and then try to surpass others” (Speech at the 17th Assembly of the Members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 6/9/14, I.132). As of 2014, “the foundation of our scientific and technological innovation [was] not solid enough,” as “we still have to depend on others for core technology in key fields”; “we cannot always decorate our tomorrows with others’ yesterdays” (ibid. I.135). Such dependence undermines Chinese sovereignty, especially in such areas as the combination of robotics with IT. “The most urgent thing in this regard is to remove institutional barriers so as to unleash to the greatest extent the huge potential of science and technology as the primary productive force” (ibid. I.134), by which he means that industry should be more tightly coordinated with the university research laboratories, all within “a national innovation system within which experts in all fields can interact and collaborate to achieve high efficiency” (ibid. I.139). The Party will grant scientists “freedom to experiment, always careful to set the goals for such experimentation (Speech at the Joint Session of the National Conference on Scientific and Technological Innovation, 18th Meeting of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 5/30/16, II.301). 

Xi summarized his economic policy in a speech delivered at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee on January 18, 2016. “Despite being the world’s second largest, China’s economy is obese and weak” because “China has lagged behind” since “the advent of modern times,” having “missed the great development opportunities brought by the scientific and industrial revolutions of the 18th and 19the centuries” (II.223, 224). Innovation is “the primary driving force for development” (II.221). “According to the materialist dialectics” of Marxism, “things are universally related”; “the world is an interrelated whole and also an interactive system” (II.225). Recognition of this point has led to, among other things, the initiation of the Belt and Road Initiative, a transportation network intended to the prosperous east coast of China to the western hinterlands. Such development can be undertaken according to a “harmonious coexistence of humanity with nature,” as explained by Friedrich Engels in The Dialectics of Nature (II.228). “Only by respecting the law of nature can we avoid setbacks in developing and utilizing nature” (II.230). [1] He acknowledges “four difficulties” in doing so in China: inadequate supervision by the central government over actions taken by local governments and other central government departments; persistent “local protectionism” of polluting industries, which interferes with “the monitoring and scrutiny of law enforcement”; inadequate management of “cross-region and cross-basin environmental issues”; “difficulty in regulating and strengthening local environmental protection bodies” (Speech to the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/26/15, II.423). That is, the solution to environmental protection is the implementation of stronger central rule by the regime. In addition to the need for technological innovation and “green development,” Xi calls attention to “economic globalization” (Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 1/18/16, II.232). Globalization began with Western imperialism, made possible by modern technology in Europe and North America. It continued after World War II, with “two parallel world markets,” capitalist and socialist (ibid. II.232). Globalization “quickened its pace” in the years following the end of the Cold War, but today Western dominance declines, the effects of the worldwide financial crisis have abated, and China’s share of the world economy and of “global governance” increases rapidly (ibid. II.232-235). Xi presents China as “the biggest driver of global trade liberalization and facilitating, resisting various forms of Western protectionism” (ibid. II.233). He leaves unmentioned the fact that the Chinese economy itself is largely illiberal, state-owned and state supervised, which means that international trade liberalization with Chinese characteristics embeds the Chinese Communist Party in every country with which it trades and in every foreign corporation it allows to enter its territory. [2]

Xi describes all of this as “the people-centered philosophy of development” (ibid. II.235). “It displays the CPC’s fundamental purpose of serving the people wholeheartedly, and the materialistic historical view that the people are the primary force for propelling development,” “shared prosperity” being “a primary goal of Marxism” and even “a basic ideal of the Chinese people since ancient times” (ibid. II.235). “According to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, communism will eradicate the opposition and differentiation between classes, between urban and rural areas, between mental labor and physical labor; it will adopt the principle of distribution from each according to his ability to each according to his needs, so as to achieve shared of development of society and the free and well-rounded development of individualism in the real sense,” rather than the false, ‘bourgeois’ sense (ibid. II.235-236). Of course, “there will be a long historical trek through history to reach this goal,” and in the meantime socialism, the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat led by its vanguard, the Communist Party, must prevail (ibid. II.237). 

“As China has increased its dependence on the world and its involvement in international affairs, so has the world increased its dependence on China and had greater impact on China.” Given both this new interdependence and “China’s development as a major country,” “we should uphold the CPC’s leadership and Chinese socialism” with an “independent foreign policy of peace,” of “promot[ing] democracy,” and of “uphold[ing] international justice,” especially as regards “developing countries” (Speech to the Central Conference of Foreign Affairs, 11.25/14, II.481-482). Accordingly, “we should abandon the Cold War mentality in all its manifestations, and foster a new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security” (Speech during the General Debate of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 9/28/15, II.572). [3] To be sure, “we should respect the right of all countries to independently choose their social systems and development paths and the diversity of civilizations,” at least insofar as commercial republics might penetrate China and its allies; “promoting democracy” evidently means promoting socialism with local characteristics (Speech to the Fifth BRICS Leaders Meeting, 3/27/13, I.356). Assuredly, “no matter how strong its economy grows, China will never seek hegemony, expansion or spheres of influence” (Speech at the United Nations Office in Geneva, 1/18/17, II.597). You can depend on that because “to abolish war and achieve peace has been the most pressing and profound aspiration of the Chinese people since the advent of modern times” (Speech to the Third Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the CCP 18th Central Committee, 1/28/13, I.271). To do so, under Mao China established the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (Speech to the Symposium Marking the 120th Anniversary of Mao Zedong’s Birth, 12/26/13, I.32). I.33 n.6). To those who might suspect otherwise, he insists that “China’s pursuit of peaceful development is not an act of expediency, still less diplomatic rhetoric. Rather, it is the conclusion drawn from an objective assessment of China’s history, its present and future.” (Speech to the Körber Foundation, Berlin, 3/28/14, I.293). More, China “present[s] the world with a major country meeting its responsibilities and upholding international humanism” (Speech to the National Health Conference, 8/19/16, II.402). 

“Because different countries and nations have different historical traditions, cultural accomplishments and basic conditions, their development paths are different” (Speech to the National Meeting on Publicity and Theoretical Work, 8/19/13, I.174). Xi can thus appeal to diversity, the principles of the Peace of Westphalia, and so on while simultaneously praising China and working to advance the Marxist cause, now guided by the CCP, globally, upholding international humanism. “We should make the past serve the present and foreign things serve China,” as the ancient Chinese made Buddhism, imported from India, into “Buddhism with Chinese features” (quite literally, on the temple statues) (Speech at UNESCO Headquarters, 3/27/13, I.286). Or, as he puts it more plainly to his CP comrades, “Under the guidance of Marxist and socialist ethics, we should make the past serve the present and put forth new ideas on the basis of eliminating the false and retaining the true for the creative transformation and progress of traditional Chinese ethics, so as to lead the people on the way to yearning for and aspiring to life-long learning, respecting and obeying moral standards, so that every one of the 13 billion Chinese citizens can be part of a team to disseminate Chinese identify and culture,” “popularize our cultural spirit across countries as well as across time and space, with contemporary values and the eternal charm of Chinese culture,” “tell[ing] the rest of the world about the new Achievements of modern Chinese Culture,” thereby “strengthen[ing] our soft power” in the world (Speech to the 12th Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 12/30/13, I.178-179, 180). A well-known instance of this strategy has been seen in the ‘Confucius Institutes’ established on numerous college and university campuses in the West.

Where acknowledgment of cultural diversity actually counts is in crafting geopolitical strategies in different regions of the world. In these early years of Xi’s rule, he was careful to emphasize economic development. In the Asia Pacific, he proposed a “modern Maritime Silk Road,” a trade route financed by the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund, which just happens to have been “set up by the Chinese government” (Speech to the People’s Representative Council of Indonesia, 10/3/13, I.321). Similarly, “cast[ing] away the Cold War mentality,” Asian countries should cooperate with one another for “common security” while cultivating “mutual understanding and friendship” (ibid. I.322) among members of “the Asia Pacific family” (Speech at the APEC CEO Conference, Bali, Indonesia, 10/7/13, I.384). All of this, in an effort to push the Americans out of the region without being so crude as to say so.

In its immediate neighborhood on land, Xi tells the CPC that “China and its neighbors are full of vigor and vitality, and show obvious strengths in development and high potential, with regional stability and a willingness among the smaller states to foster “cooperation with China” (Speech at the Seminar on the Work of Neighborhood Diplomacy, 10/24/13, I.326). “We must appreciate the situation to the full, devise appropriate strategies, and plan carefully, to perform better in our diplomatic exchanges with our neighbors” (ibid. I.326).  will see the land version of the modern Silk Road, again for improving transportation infrastructure, fostering “unimpeded trade,” enhancing monetary circulation, and “increas[ing] understanding between our peoples” (Speech at Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan, 9/7/13, I.318), always “driven by…and serv[ing] the Two Centenary Goals and our national rejuvenation” (Speech at the Seminar on the Work of Neighborhood Diplomacy, op. cit. I.326). Eurasia will see the modern Silk Road on land as well as the one at sea under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, again dominated by China (Speech to the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 9/13/13). [4] The Road would extend not only to the member states but to Mongolia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. “China is the initiator and propeller of the Belt and Road Initiative, but the initiative is not China’s business alone,” as China “welcomes other countries to board China’s express train of development and help them realize their own development objectives” (Speech to the 31st Group Study Session, Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, 4/29/16, II.547). The Road will not be function only as a travel route but as a comprehensive geo-economic program for “mutual learning” and “mutual benefit,” complete with “people-to-people contacts,” science and technology “exchanges,” and “green development” (ibid. II.558, 564). While it is evident that geo-economic cooperation with China is also geopolitical, Xi deprecates “outdated geopolitical maneuvering” (II.563). He does not rule out updated geopolitical maneuvering. 

Both the Maritime Silk Road and the land-based Silk Road figure prominently in his approach to the Arab states. Invoking the centuries of “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit” between “the Chinese and Arab peoples,” including Chinese “support [for] the cause of the Palestinian people,” Xi proposes the “1+2+3” program for cooperation. The “1” refers to “cooperation in energy,” which is the “core” of the program; “2” refers to the “two wings” of infrastructure and trade/investment; “3” refers to using three advanced technologies, nuclear energy, space satellites and “new energy” as “breakthrough levers in an effort to raise the level of pragmatic China-Arab cooperation.” (Speech at the Sixth Annual Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, 6/5/14, I. 348-349). Knowing that Chinese persecution of Muslim Uighurs has increased tensions with the Arab states, he calls for “a consensus in the fight against terrorist and extremist forces” and exchange visits by “100 eminent religious leaders” under the auspices of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (Speech at the Arab League Headquarters, 1/26/16, II.503).

China’s most important ally is in northern Eurasia. Xi emphasized that Russia was his first stop on his first overseas trip since becoming the Chinese president. “The relationship between China and Russia is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world” as well as “the best relationship between major countries,” a relationship that “not only serves the interests of our two countries but also provides an important safeguard for maintaining the international strategic balance as well as peace and stability in the world”  (Speech at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, 3/23/13, I.301).”China and Russia enjoy a high complementarity in development strategy,” he tells the Russians (ibid. I.301), and he is pleased to remark the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Treaty of Good-neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the PRC and the Russian Federation, three years later (II. 509). As for the rest of Europe, Xi treats it with anodyne pronouncements about “peace and stability,” “growth and prosperity,” “reform and progress,” and “common cultural prosperity” (Speech at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, 4/1/14, I.309-310). In an invocation of Mao’s “Thousand Flowers” campaign, he intones, “Let us work together for all flowers of human civilization to blossom together” (ibid. I.310).

Africa, a continent of greater opportunity for China, rates more attention than Europe. “Unity and cooperation with African countries have always been an important foundation of China’s foreign policy” since the founding of the Communist regime (Speech at the Julius Nyere International Conference, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 3/25/13, I.337); he refers to the policy of supporting Marxist movements in the Third World, including that of Julius Nyere himself. Stirring any lingering resentment of European colonialism, he tells his audience that “China upholds justice and opposes the practice of bullying the small, the strong lording over the weak, and the rich oppressing the poor, just as it opposes interference in other’s internal affairs” (ibid. I.337)—a claim that might fall rather flat in, say, the Philippines. The line about interference in others’ internal affairs signals that China will not let human rights violations in African countries interfere with Chinese investment and financing there, or with the establishment of 18,000 “government scholarships” in the coming years (ibid. I.338). He erects “five major pillars” of Sino-African relations: political equality and mutual trust; mutually beneficial economic cooperation; mutually enriching cultural exchanges; mutual assistance in security; and solidarity and cooperation in international affairs (Speech at the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 12/4/15, II.496-497). 

Regarding the one formidable enemy, the United States, Xi treads lightly in these early years. He establishes inroad in Latin America, telling journalists from Mexico, Costa Rico, and Trinidad and Tobago that “although there is a vast ocean between China and Latin America, we are connected heart and soul,” in “the common pursuit of beautiful dreams,” and China stands “ready to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries hand in hand, supporting one another and cooperating sincerely on the path to realizing the great dream of development and prosperity”  (Interview, May 2013, I.62). In the United States itself, he assured journalists that “bilateral cooperation” can be enhanced, thanks to the establishment of “more than 90 mechanisms for high-level dialogues on strategy, economy, culture and humanities (Remarks at a press conference with President Barack Obama, 6/7/13, I.307-308). These initiatives include the presence of some 190,000 Chinese students on American campuses and more than 20,000 U.S. students in China. He also praised efforts at cooperation in cyber security, “eschewing mistrust” (ibid. I.308). With President Donald Trump, he emphasized “pragmatic cooperation” in business dealings and “world peace, stability and prosperity” (Press conference, 4/6,17, II.534), exhibiting some awareness of the difference in the preoccupations of the two American presidents.

Finally, there is the unusual category of foreign relations with areas the CCP refuses to recognize as foreign. Macao, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have (or for some time had) non-communist regimes. Regarding them, the CCP has leaned heavily on the nationalist side of things, announcing a “one country, two systems” formula for incorporating the two smaller places into the ‘People’s Republic (Summary of “talks” with chief executives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative region, 12/20/12, 3/11/13 and 12/18/13, I.247). “Our compatriots in Macao are masters of their own house, entitled to broad freedoms and democratic rights in accordance with the law,” which means that they are “upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation,” understanding “that the destiny of the future of Macao are intricately bound with the mainland” (Speech at a meeting celebrating the 15th anniversary of Macao’s return to China, 12/20/15, 459, 463). Xi uses similar language regarding Hong Kong, which “has joined us on our journey towards the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Meeting celebrating the twentieth anniversary of Hon Kong’s return to China, 7/1/17, II.471). According to him, “Hong Kong has retained its capitalist system and way of life, and its laws have remained basically unchanged,” with “more extensive democratic rights and freedoms than at any other time in its history” (ibid. II.472). It ought also be noted that the Communist regime took care to arrange the election laws in such a way that a pro-Beijing majority would be assured in the Hong Kong legislature. After all, “it is imperative to always act in accordance with the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” (ibid. II.474).

The Republic of China on Taiwan has been the much larger prize, since Chiang Kai-Shek retreated there, defeated by Mao on the mainland. Xi offers “the same treatment to Taiwan enterprises as to mainland enterprises in the fields of investment and economic cooperation,” which of course means CCP control of those enterprises (Main points of talks with Vincent Siew, honorary chairman of the Cross-Strait Market Foundation of Taiwan, and his delegation, 4/8/13 and 10/6/3, I.253). “We must increase political trust between the mainland and Taiwan and reinforce the common political foundation of the two sides,” although Xi doesn’t specify what that common political foundation might be, except to stipulate that negotiations must proceed “within the framework of ‘one China'” (ibid. I.254). Additionally, “we must handle cross-Straits relations on the basis of a clear understanding of the trend of history,” a trend Xi has often identified as a combination of Marxism and nationalist revival (ibid. I.257). “Forces and activities for ‘Taiwan independence’ remain a real threat to the peace of the Taiwan Straits,” he states, ominously. “It is therefore incumbent upon us to oppose and contain any rhetoric of move for ‘Taiwan independence’ without any compromise.” (ibid. I.258). “It is a simple truth that blood is thicker than water,” which is why the PRC and the Republic of Taiwan “share the same destiny” (Speech receiving Lien Chan, Honorary Chairman of the Kuomintang of China, and delegation, 2/8/14, I.261, 262). A footnote helpfully adds that a 1992 meeting between the two sides resulted in an agreement “that both sides would follow the one-China principle, each with its respective interpretation” (I.265 n.3). No doubt.

With respect to threats to peace, Xi has presided over a substantial military buildup, already outlined in these early years of his tenure. Political power, Mao famously aphorized, grows out of the barrel of a gun, and the expulsion of Japan from Chinese soil during World War II was “the first complete victory won by China in its resistance against foreign aggression in modern times,” a triumph that “re-established China as a major country and won the Chinese people the respect of all peace-loving people around the world” (Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War Against Japanese Aggression” (9/3/15, II.484). Today, “we must uphold the Party’s leadership of the armed forces,” inasmuch as “the future of socialism, the enduring stability of the party, and lasting peace of our country” are “central to the nature and mission of the armed forces” (Speech to the Central Military Commission, 11/16/12, I.238). “The Party’s absolute leadership over the military is a defining feature of Chinese socialism, and a major source of political strength to the Party and the state” (Speech on the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Liberation army, 8/1/17, II.452). To sustain this leadership, officers and soldiers must be given a “theoretical and political education” so that they “will follow without hesitation the commands of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission at all times and under all conditions”; for that reason, “we will apply political convictions as a measure when reviewing and appointing officers” so as to ensure that they “are reliable and loyal to the Party” (Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the Chinese People’s War Against Japanese Aggression, op. cit. I.238). “We must build a modern and standardized military dedicated to our revolutionary goals” (Speech to the Guangzhou Military Command, 12/8/12; see also Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the People’s Liberation Army delegation at the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress, 3/11/13, I.243ff.). This education will “develop the army’s military theory and constantly open up new horizons for the Party theory of Marxism and for military practice,” so that “the truth of Marxist military theory applied in practice will shine brighter in China” (Speech on the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Liberation army,” 8/1/17, II.453). “We must be on the alert against any possibility of a ‘color revolution'” supported by the military (Speech at the Military Conference on Political Work, 10/31/14, II.435). 

Accordingly, Xi lays down “Four Fundamentals” of CCP policy regarding the military. The Party must “foster our shared ideals and convictions” in the “new generation of revolutionary force,” particularly among “high-ranking officers” (ibid. II.436). The military must “love the Party, protect the Party, work for the Party and share [their] weal and woe with the Party” (ibid. II.437); “nobody is entitled to cross the red lines of political discipline and rule” and “those who do will have to pay a price” (ibid. II.438). The military must “uphold the standard of combat capability,” especially since “political work itself” depends on it; this includes not only combat capability but “winning local war in the informational era” (ibid. II.439). And finally, officers must “uphold the authority of political work” by serving as “role models,” combining “the power of truth” (Marxism) “with the power of their personalities,” while being pragmatic, fair, and honest (ibid. II.440). Institutionally, this means centralization of power under the Central Military Commission, power over the armed forces but also the “People’s Armed Police,” ensuring “the correct political direction” under the “absolute leadership” of the Party (Speech to the Central Military Commission, 11/24/15, II.443). This will achieve full “civil-military integration,” “a structure in which the military and non-military sectors develop together efficiently across multiple fields” (ibid. II.445). The “long-term endeavor to coordinate economic development with military defense” evidently means that the internal force of the People’s Armed Police will be deployed to enforce Party-driven economic initiatives, while the conventional army and navy will back up foreign trade relations. It will also tap the “tremendous potential for civil-military integration in such areas as infrastructure development, science, technology an industry for national defense, weaponry and equipment procurement, personnel training, outsourcing of military logistical support, and national defense mobilization to be “implemented in such fields as oceans, outer space, cyberspace, biology, and new energy, which can serve both military and civilian purposes” (Speech to the First Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Civil-Military Integration, 6/20/17, II.450).

There can be no question that in his first years of supreme authority in China, Xi Jinping enunciated a comprehensive, not to say ‘totalitarian,’ strategy for the regime of China, with a ruling body (the Communist Party), ruling institutions (economic, educational, and military), a way of life (“moderately prosperous socialism” in pursuit of the “Chinese Dream”), all aiming at the purpose of a “happy life” of the people, a life consisting of hard work in the service of eventual, worldwide Communism.

 

Notes

1. Xi has spoken extensively about “green development” and “promot[ing] green, circular and low-carbon growth” by “integrat[ing] or climate change efforts into the country’s medium- and long-term program of economic and social development” (Speech at the Paris Conference on Climate Change, 11/30/15, II.576) in order to “usher in a new era of ecological progress” (Speech to the Sixth Group Study Session, Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 5/24/13, I.231) in order to “leave to our future generations blue skies, green fields, and clean water” (Letter to the Eco Forum Annual Global Conference, 7/18/13, I.233-234) and to promote a “green way of life” (Speech to the 41st Group Study Session, Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 5/26/17). See also his speech to the Sixth Meeting of the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs, in which he announces a policy that will “revolutionize energy consumption” by “rein[ing] in irrational energy use” with “strict controls,” increase the supply of energy by technological innovation and NEP-like controlled allowance of market pricing, and “enhanc[ing] international cooperation” on energy supply with the Belt and Road Initiative, opening energy markets worldwide to China, and “intensify[ing] our efforts in energy exploration and extraction” of oil and natural gas, along with pipelines and storage facilities (6/13/14, I.143). Evidently, Xi wants his audiences to believe that increased use of fossil fuels will somehow co-exist happily with “green development.”
2. Along these lines, see also Xi’s speech to the G20 Leaders Summit, 9/5/13, I.369-371); Speech to the Senate of Mexico, 6/5/13, 342-343.
3. In this speech, Xi also observed that “China was the first country to put its signature on the Charter of the United Nations,” conveniently overlooking the fact that this was done by the Republic of China under Mao’s deadly enemy, Chiang Kai-Shek.
4. Other member states at this time were Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan