Raymond Aron: Aron et De Gaulle. Partie I: De Gaulle et les Parties (1943-1948). Jean-Claude Casanova, ed. Paris: Calman Levy, 2022.
Raymond Aron: Liberté et Égalité: Cours au Collège de France. Pierre Manent, ed. Paris: Éditions EHESS, 2013.
Fifteen years younger than Charles de Gaulle, Raymond Aron came of age intellectually at about the same time that de Gaulle came of age politically, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, with a communist tyranny secured in Russia and Nazi tyranny rising across France’s border with Germany. All was not quiet on the eastern front. As republican regimes across Europe grew increasingly endangered, both men, each a staunch republican, prepared for conflict. As a Jew, Aron had what later became the obvious additional concern that neither Hitler nor Stalin much liked his people. (For his part, de Gaulle had taken the side of Captain Dreyfus as a youth, and so could claim few friends among the substantial portion of the French ‘Right’ which adhered to anti-Semitic prejudice.)
In his characteristically deep-probing introduction to “Liberty and Equality,” the concluding lecture in the last course Aron taught at the Collège de France, Pierre Manent provides an overview of Aron’s political thought, aptly remarking that “the work of Raymond Aron is like politics itself: apparently simple of access and nevertheless difficult to grasp in the last resorts and in its final ends.” One might add that Aron’s thought is political in Aristotle’s sense of politics, animated by reciprocity and deliberation, by ruling and being ruled in turn, not a matter of merely seeking influence (as do those, like Hitler and Stalin, who are all-too-sure of themselves) but seeking to be influenced—influenced not by influential persons but by the facts that turn up, by experience and by reflection upon that experience. Aron, Manent writes, spent fifty years reflecting upon politics, “an education” never completed. In politics, there is always something more to learn.
By 1978, the year of his lecture, Aron understood his lifetime, most of it lived in the political, intellectual, and spiritual aftermath of the Great War—that vast deflation of once-fashionable confidence in inevitable historical progress—as “an epoch wherein European politics had begun to put European civilization in danger.” “Germany made the destiny of Aron.” He knew Germany rather well, having spent the ominous years of 1930-1933 in Cologne and Berlin, where he studied the writings of Max Weber. Aron admired the philosophic sociologist’s “sense of the conflict, of the drama and even the tragedy that is the human adventure.” German sociology provided him with “intellectual equipment” indispensable for the coming “black years.”
Unlike most German intellectuals, but exactly like that maïtre of democratic civil society, Alexis de Tocqueville, Aron detested “deterministic evolution” and “historical relativism,” which he regarded as “two strategies opposed to one another but equally ruinous, neutralizing or abolishing the proper character of the historical condition of man and his specific tragedy, which is precisely that man is neither the lord nor the plaything of the times.” Against Hegel and his countless epigoni, “In [Aron’s] eyes, history could never become a substitute for philosophy.” He clearly saw the link between historicism as a philosophic doctrine and modern tyranny or ‘totalitarianism’ as a political ideology and practice. The existence of such a regime, instantiated by the Right and the Left, proved Weber mistaken in one sense: “the administration of things” had not replaced “the government of persons”; on the contrary, persons of tyrannical passion ruthlessly and repeatedly purged the bureaucracies they ruled, turning the remnants to acts of tyranny up to and including mass extermination of enemies real and imagined. Meanwhile, democratic-republican regimes like France’s Third Republic urgently needed to “reconstitute a directing elite, neither cynical nor cowardly, which has political courage without falling into Machiavellianism pure and simple”; additionally, and crucially, that elite needed “a minimum of faith in the common will, lest they fall into tyranny themselves, whether ‘soft’-bureaucratic, as Tocqueville had warned, or ‘hard’-dictatorial, as fascist and communist rulers exemplified.
During his long career, Aron “was, with Bertrand de Jouvenel, the principal representative of French liberalism.” And if his (how you say?) research agenda derived from Weber, his reflections upon European political experience took him in an Aristotelian direction, made him into a political sociologist ‘of an Aristotelian mark.’ For him, liberalism was not a doctrine but a form of politics that “presented the best chances for rationality” and for “a life of human dignity”—rather as the American Founders saw things. The hyper-politicism of Carl Schmitt and the nearly apolitical economism of Friedrich von Hayek amounted to dazzling and deluding extremes that obscured the political character of liberalism—Schmitt, by denying liberalism has political content at all, Hayek by wishing that were true. In Aron’s more sober view, political liberalism consisted of the rule of law (so far, Hayek concurred) but also the understanding that foreign policy cannot be governed by law, even the ‘law of nations,’ but by men, and preferably just and prudent ones; no amount of Hayek’s beloved “spontaneous organization” animated by free trade will suffice. Further, political good “are difficult to produce,” even more difficult than commercial goods because they are often intangible, matters of honor and of justice. As Manent so judiciously puts it, “Aron was a liberal classic more than a classical liberal,” that is, “not so much a modern,” entertaining no “intemperate hopes in progress or in ‘modernity,'” but instead esteeming the classical virtues of moderation, sobriety, and “qualitative merit,” succumbing neither to the madness-inclining spiritedness of modern tyranny nor to the weak and poor-spirited shrinking from political and military reality that progressivist ‘idealists’ nurture but instead exhibiting a “virile acceptance of the limits in which human life is placed.” Virility or manliness need not careen into Achillean bloody-mindedness, if one is un homme sérieux. And so Aron’s classicism remained untainted by “nostalgia for the Greek polis or the ‘ages of faith,'” both no longer humanly recoverable, but is “particularly illustrated in the manner in which Aron conducted his political and sociological inquiries,” in which he located rights not so much in abstract doctrine but “a sort of ‘rule of ends,'” which never, computer-like, ‘prints out’ the prudential choices citizens must make. That is, ‘History’ determines only some things; it gives us our set of circumstances, which we as citizens must then understand, assess, and act within, but are seldom simply compelled by.
This made Aron the adversary not only of the regime of modern tyranny but of all those persons, however well-intentioned, who want to wipe the slate of our circumstances clean. One should not condemn “the society of which we are members in the name of a past glory or of a regime of the future.” A ‘classical’ soul living in modern circumstances, “Aron accepted the overall characteristics of the modern society and regime.” With Aristotle, he began his inquiries with consideration of the opinions of his fellow citizens—especially, their opinions on liberty and equality, not as ideas simply but as combinations of ideas and sentiments which “orient the evaluations and actions of men.” In testing those opinions against reality, in refining and enlarging the public views, Aron showed us that “the gaze of the wise man encourages the virtue of the citizen.”
While Manent surveys Aron’s intellectual trajectory, the economist Jean-Claude Casanova’s introductory essay to Aron et De Gaulle hews to the facts of his old friend’s biography. He knew Aron very well, having co-founded the journal Commentaire with him in 1978. He recounts that Aron escaped from Nazi-occupied France in late June of 1940. Like most Frenchmen, he had not heard de Gaulle’s now-famous eighteenth-of June radio ‘Call to Honor,’ broadcast by the BBC from his London exile. But he rightly anticipated that Churchill would never treat with Hitler, made his way to England, and soon found himself the editor of La France libre, a journal dedicated to exactly that purpose. Aron was thirty years old, already the author of the 1939 article, “Democratic States and Totalitarian States,” in which he had accurately described the geopolitical lay of the European land. He shared with Churchill and de Gaulle the confidence that American entry into the war would tip the balance against the Nazis.
After the liberation, he served briefly as André Malraux’s chief of staff during Malraux’s tenure as de Gaulle’s Minister of Information. He quit the editorship of La France Libre in June 1945, now publishing frequently in the journal Combat and in Le Figaro, then as now a leading newspaper in France. It was in this postwar period that he wrote his still-remembered, entirely accurate assessment of the Cold War: “Peace impossible, war improbable,” a formula which invites us to understand that peace isn’t the mere absence of war. Observing the parliamentary maelstrom that re-emerged in France in those years, he also remarked, again rightly, that the division between the Communist Party and the center-Left parties was sharper than the division between the centrists and the Gaullists, that the latter parties were real democrats, the Communists shammers. The controversy between the Gaullists and their fellow republicans was whether the French republican regime should be centered in a unicameral legislature or balanced between the executive and legislative branches, with the executive having charge of foreign policy. In this, Aron sided with the Gaullists, but only after writing an earlier piece, published in 1943, warning against the French (and not only French) tendency toward Bonapartism.
In the 1950s, unlike most of the French, Aron advocated Algerian independence, considering Algeria too Muslim to remain French. At this time, Gaullists were against decolonization, although de Gaulle himself, having seen the futility of French rule in Syria while posted there in the early 1930s, had likely begun to have other ideas. He also departed from the Gaullists in his friendly sentiments toward the Americans as prior liberators and current protectors of Europe against the tyrannical regimes still menacing France and the rest of Western Europe, nearby to the east. In 1958, while teaching at the Sorbonne, Aron applauded de Gaulle’s return to power as a “legislator” in the Rousseauan but also classical sense of a “founder of institutions”—namely, the constitution of the Fifth Republic. “Raymond Aron admired de Gaulle without always approving of him,” disagreeing with the General’s withdrawal from NATO, his anti-Israeli remarks in the aftermath of the 1967 war, and his call for U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1967. Through it all, Aron remained an “engaged spectator” of the Fifth Republic and of European politics generally. If de Gaulle had what Malraux once called “geological courage,” Aron had geological, rock-solid, good sense.
Nor did he lack civic courage. In the one wartime essay published here, “The Spirit of Bonaparte,” Aron raised a cautionary flag at de Gaulle himself in the form of a monitory history of French absolutism, an ambition for which many suspected the General of entertaining. He begins with a certain jaunty irony: “Since the traditional monarchy collapsed in the revolutionary tempest [of 1789], France has multiplied its political experiences with prodigality,” to wit, three constitutional monarchies (divided between two dynasties), two plebiscitary empires (Napoléon I and Napoléon III), and two parliamentary republics. “But the social structure of France,” French civil society, “was less shaken during this period than those of other great countries of Europe.” The political crises were caused by “conflicts and traditions and ideologies over, as one says today, the principle of legitimacy,” specifically, the aristocratic-monarchic model against the elective-democratic model. That is, what embittered French political life were controversies over the foundation of political life itself, the regime. A form of democratic republicanism finally established itself (firmly, this time) in 1871, though shaken by the Great War and finally overwhelmed by the Nazi Blitzkrieg in 1940. Now, in 1943, humiliated and “vibrat[ing] with a touchy patriotism, the French want to restore “a regime of liberty,” once the Allies throw out the Nazis. France seeks an effective government to repair the ruins and to strengthen the new armature of the country.” She wants no extremism but she does want unity, and, unfortunately, the regimes most successful in promoting unity in recent French history have been Bonapartist—plebiscitary despotisms, phenomena seen in many countries but with distinctive French characteristics.
Napoléon I having been sui generis, Aron concentrates his readers’ attention on his much more ordinary nephew, Louis-Napoléon. Louis-Napoléon regarded himself as one of those providential personages “in whose hands the destinies of their countries are placed,” and it did indeed require qualities owing less to his nature than to his fortune in order for such a mediocrity to ascend to prominence: “his name” and “the circumstances” which “transformed a mediocrity into an emperor.” He owed his popularity to “a cult founded on memory”—the “Napoleonic myth”—bestowed upon this hitherto “unknown person.” He and his political allies reinforced the myth by “purely personal propaganda, approaching commercial advertising,” which included pictures and songs. As to the circumstances, the people were terrified by the workers’ revolt of 1848 and wanted a “party of order” to quell the disturbances. The shrewd parliamentary Adolphe Thiers, who had already acted as a kingmaker in the 1830 “July Restoration” of the Bourbon line, judged Louis-Napoléon “a cretin,” and therefore “an ideal candidate” for the inaugural presidency of the Second Republic, as against the alternative, Louis-Eugène Cavaignac, a capable French general, previously Minister of War, whom Thiers regarded as too sympathetic to the Left. “For the first time, but not for the last time in the history of Europe, the most reactionary elements of the ruling classes gave their approval to an adventurer against a conservative republican,” hoping that the adventurer’s “popularity among the popular classes would be the best barrier against social troubles.” The pattern would be repeated, much more ominously, in Italy with Mussolini and in Germany with the choice of Hitler over Brüning. “Across the country, the masses, overheated by a mythology and maneuvered by the party of order, assured a brilliant victory to a phantom of a hero.” More, this election “confirmed the unpredictable results of a plebiscite organized outside the parties,” an election animated by a passing if powerful sentiment instead of “durable political convictions.” “Inevitably,” the plebiscitary system “favors the candidate who appears the most charismatic, the demagogue more than the bourgeois, the inheritor of the revolutionary general [the first Napoleon] against the conservative general.” This election by the whole people elevated Louis-Napoléon above the assembly deputies, who in any event were factionalized between advocates of a social regime and the petit-bourgeois supporters of commercial republicanism.
So disunited were the republicans, they proved “incapable of common action, even for defending the Republic” against a president who had begun to believe his own propaganda. Imitating Napoléon I, Louis-Napoléon paraded around the country in military array; he named his own ministers, ignoring the parliamentarians—all of this “a sort of pale prefiguration of the train of gangsterism which surrounds the tyrants of today.” Captains of industry and finance, having rallied to his candidacy in 1848, successfully prepared for “the coup d’état of Napoléon III” in 1852, an event staged in the name of nothing less than republicanism. “Louis-Napoléon, like all plebiscitary chiefs, is in a sense the substitute for a monarch.” But not the traditional, dynastic monarch he invoked “revolutionary dogmas (national sovereignty, civil equality, property) combined with the defense of order and social stability.” Thus was effected “the transformation of an unknown émigré” into the “emperor of France.”
De Gaulle’s friends in exile may be excused for suspecting that Aron implied in all of this any number of resemblances, real and potential, to de Gaulle himself, especially as Aron went on to consider the career of Georges Ernest Boulanger, another Bonapartist (though not himself a Bonaparte), whose fervent nationalism, expressed in his calls for the recovery of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which France had lost in its war with Prussia, earned him the title “General Révanche.” Thiers was gone, but Boulanger had another parliamentary maneuverer, Georges Clemenceau, as his sponsor, early on. The American president, Franklin Roosevelt, indeed compared de Gaulle to Boulanger at this time, so the thought was in the air.
Aron identifies five conditions in which such plebiscitary dictators arise. First, in France, when “the popularity of a man is simply the popularity of a name; ‘Bonaparte’ was associated with national self-respect. To this, add “nostalgia for a certain reconciliation between the heritage of revolutionary romanticism and the stabilization of the established order.” Almost no one in France outside the Army and French ruling circles knew de Gaulle, either, but his speeches in London had brought popularity to his name. Second, the bourgeois classes may rally to the new ‘Caesar’ because they fear social troubles (the Communist Party was the most powerful party in wartime France, organizing much of the underground resistance to Nazi rule) and in light of the impossibility of a monarchic restoration (given the “dynastic disunion” between Bourbons and Orléanists). The third condition of Bonapartism or Caesarism is disdain, sometimes earned, of the parliament. Crucially, in France “the Republic and democracy” are terms that “express rather a certain sentimentality or a certain revolutionary ideology than a choice decided in favor of determined methods of deliberation and government.” The French of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries bore little resemblance to the Americans of 1776-1800. Fourth, Bonapartism thrives when republicans and the French people themselves are divided but long for unity. And finally there are the chances offered by the plebiscitary system of election itself, which (as Louis-Napoléon had shown) lends itself to an eventual coup d’état.
Boulanger enjoyed a similar set of circumstances. As a general, then Minister of War in 1885, he’d established himself as a friend of social order. He had some parliamentary support, especially among the Radical Party of Clemenceau. He shrewdly proposed to exclude the military and military families from rule, thus appealing to the Left and turning on his old military chief, Henri d’Orléans, the Duke of Aumale—a likely parallel to de Gaulle’s break with his patron, the great (if now much-diminished) Philippe Pétain, who had lost credit with many of his countrymen by agreeing to head the puppet government headquartered in Vichy, in southern France. The reforms Boulanger had introduced into the army had enhanced his popularity (even as de Gaulle’s advocacy of tank warfare, against the French military establishment in the 1930s, had given him credit after the Maginot Line was breached in 1940). Boulanger effectively played on révanchist sentiments, as of course de Gaulle was quite rightly doing; his propaganda was similar to that of Louis-Napoléon, with its “advertisements like those of American commerce”; he had ‘evolved’ from Left to Right; and he wanted “a strong government” (by which Aron means an executive branch) to balance the parliament, as indeed de Gaulle now wanted. And, in a sentence that must have deeply offended the Gaullists, “Like Hitler never ceasing to denounce the ‘system’ of Weimar, the Boulangerists reprimanded the republican personnel and regime,” rulers who had acceded, Hitler charged, to “the scandal of Wilson”—that is, the Versailles Treaty, its terms understandably hated by Germans—and who had indulged in “factional quarrels” without vindicating the national honor.
Unlike 1849 and 1851, however, in 1889 the parliamentarians were alert to the danger. And Boulanger was by then only a Parisian parliamentarian, not a president of the Republic, as Louis-Napoléon had been when he staged his coup. Boulanger amounted to little more than a “Caesar of the music-hall,” a point that illustrates “the fragility of these brilliant popularities.” Gaullists, take note? They would surely take offense, and did.
Aron then asks, are Bonapartism and fascism “specimens of the same genre”? Not really. The Second Empire established itself in a period of economic prosperity, not depression. The Bonapartists were supported by small peasant proprietors, defending their landed property; what Tocqueville calls democracy, social egalitarianism, was the heritage of the Revolution, which by now had replaced aristocratic and Church hierarchies, as indeed Marx observed at the time. This, indeed, is what made the political device of plebiscitary election feasible and appealing. By now, too, there were many more city-dwellers, including some petit-bourgeois many artisans, and “even workers” who thrilled to the myth of the charismatic leader, the national hero leading to mass mobilization. Several of these features did indeed resemble the circumstances in which fascism arose, and in nineteenth-century France, as in twentieth-century Italy and Germany, “Popular Caesarism” became possible due to an alliance of a part of the bourgeoisie and a part of the proletariat against dynastic monarchy and against the “menace to the social order” posed by the Left. Still, the comparative extremism of the later fascists was fostered by an economic desperation not seen in France. The French were responding to “social troubles and the weaknesses of all the constitutions” they had seen in previous decades. The fascists exploited economic as well as political crisis, and that made them more radical, more dangerous. In France, it was regime instability that caused “the desire for a strong power, incarnated in one man,” a longing for “unity of sentiment,” in the phrase of the celebrated writer, Maurice Barrès. What occurred in mid-nineteenth century France, was “the anticipation of and the French version of fascism” but never the thing itself.
“Uncertain of his rights and his fortune, the Caesar is unceasingly pushed toward new enterprises by the insatiable need of renewing the source of his authority, of refreshing the favor if his own people.” Hence Napoléon III’s vain march against Germany, resulting in the catastrophic defeat at Sedan in 1871. “As in so many times in history, the adventure of a man ended in tragedy for a nation.”
Three years later, Aron looked upon de Gaulle with much more confidence, having observed his decidedly republican, not Bonapartist, policies during the war and its immediate aftermath. In June 1946, the fifth anniversary of de Gaulle’s now-famous radio “appeal” to the French from London, de Gaulle had given a speech in Bayeux, advocating a new constitution in which the executive branch would have independence from the legislative branch—this, to remedy the foreign-policy imbecility repeatedly demonstrated by the parliament-centered and factionalized Third Republic. This speech, Aron wrote, “manifestly pursues a higher ambition” than the resolution of some immediate crisis; de Gaulle aims “to influence the evolution of the political crisis in which the French nation is floundering,” the “central theme” being “that of a State worthy of the name.” “The thought of General de Gaulle is manifestly dominated by one major care: How to prevent the State, torn between rival ambitions, not to disaggregate to the point that the country has only the choice between anarchy and a tyranny.” Such an ambition and such a thought obviously elevated de Gaulle well above a Louis-Philippe, to say nothing of a Boulanger.
Such a reform was urgently needed. “The politicization of l’existence Française—economics, administration, literature—has progressed in a manner recalling the last years of the Weimar Republic.” The supposedly apolitical administrative state itself has been politicized, as well, as the cabinet offices have been divided among the three major parties (republican, democratic-socialist, and communist). “Such a regime, by definition, can offer no promise of stability.” In his proposal for a president installed by a large electoral college, not just the National Assembly, de Gaulle would establish an element within the State that is above the parties, an element which “takes account of the national interests in their continuity.” This “decisive idea, which provokes the most criticisms,” would take executive power out of the hands of party leaders. The president, “foreign to partisan conflicts, would be the equitable arbiter” among them, attending to “the general interest” of the French nation—impartial “with regard to all groups and organizations, passionate only for France and her grandeur.”
De Gaulle’s proposed constitution is undeniably republican, but is it presidential or parliamentary? The president names the ministers but do the ministers report to the Assembly (as in Britain) or to the president (as in the United States)? Aron says it does neither, that it isn’t inspired by “the Anglo-Saxon democracies” at all. In them, “the stability of the executive” is “rooted in a traditional principle, between the system of two parties and the constitutional mechanism.” In Britain, socialists and conservatives tend to agree on British national interests, especially in foreign policy; in America, the same attitude prevails among Democrats and Republicans (as it did at the end of the Second World War, very much in contrast to the end of the First World War). But in France, as noted, the parties are ‘regime’ parties; France needs the model of the arbiter-executive to a degree that the “Anglo-Saxon democracies” do not. De Gaulle intends thereby to counterbalance “the regime of the parties,” which consists of a regime that cannot actually rule because they each attract substantial voting blocs but share scarcely any conception of what France should be and do. Although de Gaulle’s critics decry his Constitution as undemocratic, true defenders of democracy, Aron insists, want a regime that functions.
Against this proposal, the National Assembly had proposed a constitution similar to that of the Third Republic. This merely “codifies and prolongs the current practice without seriously modifying it, the practice of parliamentarism under its present form, that is, the regime of the parties.” De Gaulle’s proposed constitution instead “requires the parties to renounce one part of the power they retain” from the pre-war regime. In so doing, he has consulted “History and the experience it gives to reason,” rather than assuming that the course of history itself must be rational, as Marxists of both the democratic and the Leninist stripe do. In doing so, Aron now sees, de Gaulle’s Bayeux speech “conforms to the ‘style’ of June 18th [1940].” “I am not sure, on my account, that this ’18th of June strategy’ will suffice in the present situation,” in which all the major French parties had been oppressed by the Nazis, united against a common enemy, but it is true that a constitution with an “omnipotent Assembly” and a precedent and cabinet “without real authority” will fail. Against all suspicions of Gaullist Bonapartism, Aron now remarked that the General had in fact exhibited “a sense of the authority of the State, and of respect for legality”; he “has the demeanor of a legitimate sovereign, not of a usurper or a tyrant.” True, he advocates a Constitution with a strong executive, but both the American president and the former German Reich Chancellor did that, and “can one really think that Roosevelt and Hitler were leaders of the same species?” He has “rejected the formulas of presidential power and personal power,” affirming instead “the separation and balance of powers.” “General de Gaulle is not Marshall Pétain.”
The problem with de Gaulle’s proposal is not some alleged despotic intent but its current feasibility. Admittedly, the Bayeux Constitution is “perfectly legitimate on the plane of History,” but on the level of “political struggle” in today’s France it provokes “stirrings that are difficult to foresee that are not all favorable.” During the war, de Gaulle was in accord “with the sentiment of the people,” but now, in 1946, such unity of sentiment is no longer possible. “When General de Gaulle demands a homogeneous government, one well knows he has good reason in theory, but one can ask how a nation so profoundly divided as ours can have a unified government.” In the event, the Constitution for the Fourth Republic, ratified in October, reprised the parliamentary republicanism of the Third Republic, with the three major parties firmly in control of the executive.
Why so? In the United States, a Democratic Party president, Harry Truman can collaborate with a Republican-controlled Congress on many policy decisions. That is because the United States Constitution is “rooted in the habits and national convictions” of Americans. And so, given a perceived common threat, Soviet Communism, American foreign policy will not return to the “isolationism” of the 1930s. Similarly, under Great Britain’s unwritten constitution, a “homogeneous” parliamentary majority supports the Prime Minister. But in France, with its more tortured recent political history, which has spawned ‘regime’ parties, the parties “paralyze the public powers”; even when an executive administration or “government” has been formed, it is a coalition government in which “communists, socialists, and republicans continue their quarrel while feigning to collaborate.” The unspoken underlying dilemma is that one of the major parties, the Communists, do regard the Soviet Union not as a common enemy but as an ally. While the Gaullist presidency would “surmount this impotent union,” the parties are not unhappy with it. “If the Fourth Republic is endangered by dictatorship, it is not because General de Gaulle enjoys great popularity with his ideas on the organization of the State, it is because the coalitions, which pass for inevitable, are revealed to be impotent.” Under such conditions, a real ‘dictator’ might arise to deal with the next major crisis—whatever and whenever that might be.
Given this danger, simultaneous with the regime of parliamentary republicanism which has left France in it, and given the rejection of de Gaulle’s constitution, what is to be done? “The current crisis amounts to givens that are simple to define but difficult to modify,” namely, the choice between government by a minority party or government by a coalition of two or more minority parties. “In the abstract, the first, thanks to its homogeneity, works better. Meanwhile, the economic and financial crisis continues to worsen. It can be met, but the political system prevents it, thanks to “the game of the regime.”
By the end of November 1946, de Gaulle had refused to serve under the new constitution, breaking with the centrist parliamentary republicans with whom he had allied. Aron sympathized. Admittedly, “the life of parties cannot be separated from democratic realities,” and anti-democratic regime cause “the reduction of the parties to a unity, the identification of one party and one credo with the state which simultaneously, extends its faction to infinity and augments its authority with the prestige of a pretended absolute truth”—a form of tyranny Mussolini himself named ‘totalitarianism,’ a “confusion of the temporal and the spiritual.” [1] But in France, on the level of civil society, the regime consists of “the masses and their organizations” or civil associations. Under these conditions, it is “difficult to safeguard independence, the capacity of decision” that the “public powers” must maintain, pressured as they are by these organized “social groups.” That is, the political paralysis of the regime of the parties has a civil-social foundation that makes that regime possible and hard to dislodge or to reform. further, in that civil society, and therefore in that regime, there is a “totalitarian party,” the Communist Party, which uses “democratic methods” in an attempt “to found a regime in which it will rule alone it, it and its secular religion and its partisan State.” This is “the fundamental crisis” in France, owing in part to the fact that de Gaulle’s constitution was rejected and “the Fourth Republic exists.” It means that the parties’ “most redoubtable enemy is not outside but within themselves.”
In April 1947, de Gaulle announced the formation of the Rassemblement du Peuple Français, a movement that amounted to a party against the regime of the parties, a party that aimed at the more nearly presidential, balanced-power republic enunciated in the Bayeux Manifesto. The leaders of the existing parties were quick to express their contempt, a contempt that may have been more affected than real. “Solidly entrenched in their fiefs, the parties must become well assured of their lot and disdain the words of a man who has no other arms than his past and his prestige.” But in reality, “the new regime” of the Fourth Republic “lacks confidence in itself and in the future.” The parties fear the Gaullist movement because they understand, ‘from the inside,’ their own vulnerability. “The Fourth Republic is founded on compromise between incompatible ideas, on the collaboration between parties which always try to continue their fight and govern in common.” Obviously, there can be no “moral unity” or “unity of action” between communists and non-communists without “a common enemy,” as there was during the Nazi Occupation. “The “true dilemma of France is this “coalition of contraries, vegetating in mediocrity and at every instant menaced by paralysis” or by ‘civil war and recourse to authoritarian methods” that would be necessary to end that war, at the expense of the regime of the parties.
There might be a remedy for this dilemma within the legal framework of the Fourth Republic, Aron hopefully suggests. Potentially, there is a majority of democratic-republicans who, “on condition that they surmount the secondary and anachronistic quarrels, can give life back to parliament and restore the distinction, indispensable in democracy, of the majority and the opposition without such a regrouping” of the parties, “no such regime will be viable.” The only thing they currently agree on is the supposed danger to the Republic de Gaulle poses, but de Gaulle, Aron calmly observes, has respected the rule of law. One may not be entitled to condemn parties in a democracy, inasmuch as they are inevitable in any regime of liberty, but one can surely condemn a regime of “rival parties incapable of a sustained and coherent policy.” “In truth, there can scarcely be doubt about the justice of [de Gaulle’s] critique. The real question is another. What means can emerge?” That is, how can a democratic republican regime overcome the results of serious party factionalism?
Aron recommends that the centrist party, the Mouvement Républicain Populaire, and the Socialist Party disavow collection with the Communist Party and rule as a majority—in effect forming a true ‘popular front,’ inasmuch as genuine democrats really do have enemies on the Left. This would solve, or at least ameliorate, the problem in terms consistent with the parliamentary republicanism of the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle’s “attacks on the [Fourth Republic’s] Constitution risk the formation, against the danger of ‘personal power,’ of an artificial and sterile solidarity between the rival parties and to add one more quarrel to those we already have.” “For better or for worse, the Parliament reflects the country: there is hardly more unity in the one than in the other,” since “our official divisions are linked to the past” regime struggles. France as it is today simply will not adopt de Gaulle’s constitution, although it is within the democratic “cadre” of regimes. It is “vain to invoke a fictional unity.”
Aron also does not share de Gaulle’s conviction that “it is necessary to reconstruct Europe as a neutral zone established between the giant empires.” Nor does he think that it is possible to establish a socio-economic system between communism and capitalism—de Gaulle’s conception, drawn from Catholic social thought prior to the First World War, of labor-capital ‘association.’ In both his foreign and domestic policy proposals, “I fear that the president of the RPF fishes with optimism.” As of now, April 1947, “the evolution of our politics depends less on the French and their words than on the world and its tragic conflicts,” no matter how much de Gaulle, and not only de Gaulle, may detest that reality.
By July, Aron had become editor of Le Figaro. In its pages, he published a careful analysis of the French political situation. The Socialist prime minister had excluded Communist Party member from the government—a hopeful sign. The partisan constellation was now configured with the Communists on the left, the MRP and the Socialists in the center, and the Gaullists on the right. Under the Constitution (recently adopted in a third referendum), “the Assembly is sovereign, but it does not encroach upon the prerogatives of the government.” Nonetheless, the executive powers themselves are weak. As a result, “the Constitution functions badly, but the faults experience has revealed are not exactly those which the critic,” de Gaulle, “passionately denounced in advance.” The second chamber, the Council of the Republic, has withered because both the Communists and the Socialists prefer unicameralism; it had little legal authority, anyway, and now has little moral authority, either. Having taken all responsibility for itself, the Assembly has acted irresponsibly, failing to address the major issues confronting France—import policy and the Monnet Plan (the first fruit of postwar French economic central planning which sought to modernize the French economy by increasing productivity), foreign trade, and foreign investment under the dirigisme of Jean Monnet’s General Planning Commission. More, the Assembly members have failed even to “accomplish their traditional tasks” of ordinary legislation. Aron wants to see an orderly governing process, whereby the governmental ministers conceive and apply a program, the Assembly members “attend thoughtfully to the quality of the laws,” and the administrators perform the “essentially technical” task of carrying out those laws at the direction of the ministers, the “government.” Unfortunately, the instability of the governments, dominated by the Assembly, prevents them from performing their duties, while the Assembly members lack the “competence and interest” to perform the executive and technical tasks. This leaves technical matters to administrators, unsupervised and the political matters to the groups that pressure the Assembly. No real deliberation occurs in the legislative branch. “How can one be surprised that Parliament falls, little by little,” in prestige?
In reality, then, “France is governed by the administration.” The “great functionaries” in the bureaucracies hold “a considerable part of the real power.” The parties distribute ministerial posts, but the civil-social pressure groups (Aron calls them “syndicates”) can obstruct them when the parties appear to act “contrary to their interests.” This “transfer of power from assemblies to the administration is neither a new phenomenon nor an exclusively French phenomenon. It is the fated result of the increasingly ample capture [of power] of the State” by administrators. “Only the administration has the competence and the continuity”—given the short life of governments and of parliamentary coalitions—that is “necessary for directing and orienting the economy of the nation.” Characteristically, the moderate Aron regards this as “not a question of rebelling against an irreversible evolution” but “a matter of adapting old institutions to the new tasks, of asking oneself in what condition such a regime will be effective.” Because administrative rule alone won’t work, either. “Left to itself, administration becomes at once arbitrary and impotent,” as seen in “the sclerosis of our army” between the world wars. And when government ministers attempt to ‘politicize’ the administration, “one does not have the impression that the government knows better than [popular] opinion,” that it refines and enlarges the public views, or that it even has the force or the courage to execute its decisions in the face not so much of administrative recalcitrance as pressure-group opposition. “Government, parties, administration, syndicates tolerate one another reciprocally. Unfortunately, their complex relations achieve not action but disorder and paralysis.”
In twentieth-century “mass societies,” the “same problems appear—namely workers and leaders of enterprise organize themselves into syndicates” in an attempt to influence the vast and complicated apparatus of the modern state. How can such societies “establish the necessary collaboration between the syndicates, on the one hand, and the State on the other,” especially given the emergence of state bureaucracy or administration as effectively a fourth branch of power? And how can modern states under democratic-republican regimes, with governments representing the popular will, “maintain the sense of the national interest, if they represent particular interests of social groups and political parties”?
The “totalitarian regimes give a brutal, primitive response” to such questions. “Reserving to one party the exclusive right to political action, integrating into the State all the particular groups, in creating a monopoly of ideology and propaganda, they suppress the problems rather than solving them. It is good to denounce this barbaric simplification. Now one must find a solution The Fourth Republic has not resolved these problems. To speak truly it has not even posed them or thought about them.”
De Gaulle and his “Rassemblement” have thought about them. But if “all the French were Gaullists in 1944,” only “forty percent of the electors voted for the RPF in October 1947.” In 1944, Gaullism had become “the symbol and the guide of the nation in combat,” de Gaulle an arbiter, neither partisan nor doctrinaire. Now, the RPF is “the first party of France,” but still a party. The “three great parties” reorganized themselves “under the shadow of Gaullism” in the aftermath of the war. When de Gaulle recognized this and resigned as the head of the provisional government, this decision, “surprising as it seemed at the time, takes in retrospect a logical meaning.” The parties had regained “the reality of power.” Having no party, de Gaulle “little by little lost his authority.” “He ran afoul of growing economic difficulties, without either the taste to study them or an overall conception for mastering them. He attempted, in the name of a fictional national unity that had not survived the war, to assume an arbitrating function more or less illusory.” Yet in attempting to regain political authority at the head of his own party, he now participates in the impotence of the Parliament.
Can he overcome that impotence? “If in the long term, this structure,” the Fourth Republic, “less constitutional than social and political, will not be modified, the regime will be paralyzed, and the country condemned to stagnation in the chaos.” What is needed is a “homogeneous majority” that can “break away from the syndicates under the control of the Communists,” who had succeeded to that extent in staging their long march through the institutions, and “bring them back to the legitimate function of defending professional interests, along with parliamentarism, the decline of which the crystallization of social groups has precipitated.” In the election, “the Rassemblement has pulverized the MRP and is ready to push socialism to the wall,” too. It has no doctrine, having downplayed the notion of worker-capital association, but it has a will to restore individual liberty and the liberty of the State from the syndicates and the parties. “Strong power of free citizens: the formula maintains a radical accent, provided that the first term does not erase the second.”
For their part, the Communists, the only ideologically coherent party, need another Popular Front à la 1935, but they have alienated the Socialists by claiming that democratic socialists are no more than agents of American imperialism. Yes, they have an ideology, but what an ideology it is—one that depending upon denying reality. Quite apart from the falsity of the charge, “we have an obvious need of American aid.” The RPF, however, could bring the “government sustained by a homogeneous majority” that Aron has been hoping for.”
This possibility proved just as illusory as Aron’s previous hopes for an RPF-Socialist coalition. Recognizing reality, de Gaulle reluctantly approved the formation of NATO in 1949, then rejected the proposed common market in coal a year later. By 1951, economic recovery and the nascent Pax Americana in Western Europe had reduced de Gaulle’s appeal, and the so-called Third Force, a renewed alliance of democratic socialists and the MRP, led by the skilled parliamentarian Guy Mollet, took control of the government. By the mid-1950s, De Gaulle retired to his home in the village of Colombey les Deux Églises to write his Mémoires de Guerre, seemingly removed from politics for the remainder of his life.
But then things took a turn.
Note
- Aron’s phrase may remind Anglophone readers of Temporal and Eternal, the title of a collection of several writings by the Catholic writer, Charles Péguy. However, Temporal and Eternal was published in 1955. It is possible that Aron borrows and adapts the phrase from the original works, published before the First World War; de Gaulle was a careful and sympathetic reader of them.
Recent Comments