Augustine: Confessions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. William Watts translation, revised by W. H. D. Rowse.
If the liberation offered by the liberal arts culminates in the philosophic life, and the philosophic life culminates in in in the trial and death of the philosopher at the command of the city, Christianity demurs. Christianity begins in humility; not wonder but fear of the Lord is the beginning of its wisdom. As Ann Hartle observed some years ago, a confession is the opposite of an apologia. Confession is humble, the opposite of presumptuous self-defense (VII. xx. 395).
Augustine devotes the first book of his Confessions entirely to prayer. His only judge is God—not the people, not his philosophic friends, least of all himself. And he admits his guilt forthwith.
Early education is a metaphor for man’s relationship with God: no one wants to go to school, but it’s good for you (I. viii. 30). God’s school is much better for you than the schools of men. The liberal arts are mere ornaments of pride; the truth is humblingly simple. Two plus two equals four, no matter what rhetorical embellishments human learning can add. Rhetoric stems from vanity, the desire “to content the eyes of mortals” instead of God (II. I. 65). Men do evil apparently for the thrill of liberation, love passion for the sake of the feeling of passion, but really only to please other men (II. iii-viii). Philosophy or the love of wisdom is only the most refined form of love for human admiration. (The ‘modern’ or Machiavellianized version of this claim is Nietzsche’s: philosophy in only the most refined form of the will to power.)
Augustine’s philosophy and his Manichaeanism contradicted each other. Philosophy can refute false religious doctrines (V. iii. 211; VI. xiv. 259, 261). False religions typically make claims to control the natural world, but philosophy really does understand nature as it stands, if not in its origin. Pseudo-religious niaiseries quickly succumb to philosophic scrutiny.
The vanity of public display, the rhetoric of the philosophic life, caused Augustine to become “a great riddle to myself” (IV. iv. 161). Contra the philosophers, philosophy cannot bring self-knowledge precisely because it must become politic and is at core social, vain. One cannot know what never stops changing: the self is driven by the passions, especially the passions of the crowd. In the central book of the Confessions Augustine confesses, “I was not able to discern my very self” (VII. I. 335). “I stood with my back to the light, and with my face towards those things that receive that light” (IV. xvi. 199). This is Socrates’ image, but Augustine replaces the Good with God. “The good that you love is from Him” (IV. xii. 181).
Turning from the crowd, Augustine examines his own soul. He sees that he has a will, which chooses good and evil (VII. iii. 343). Over the mind that examines itself and the rest of the soul is the light of God. ‘Over’ means not only ‘superior to’ but ‘prior to’: Whence came this soul, this willing mind, if not from a creator-God, that is, one who first of all wills? If corruption is a fading-away of being, then is genesis not the source of goodness, of strength of being or virtue? The Creator who can create such a being as man makes Augustine not wonder like a philosopher but “tremble with love and horror” (VII. x. 373). “I learned to rejoice with trembling” at the thought of such a powerful God (VII. xxi. 397). “Thou has created us for thyself, and our heart cannot be quieted till it may find repose in thee” (I. I. 3). Although introspection is necessary, it is insufficient. You cannot know yourself directly; your own passions preclude such knowledge. You can only know yourself by knowing your Creator, who knows you because He created you. Seneca advises: Let your true ancestors be the philosophers. Augustine replies: Your true father is God.
Both the philosophers and the Christians see the conflicts of the human soul. Philosophers see a battle among the elements of the soul itself—reason versus spirit versus appetites. Christians see the soul more as a battlefield where spiritual beings contend for rule: angels and demons, God and Satan. But in Augustine these spiritual beings approach the soul through the mind in the form of opinions. Bad people are not by nature any worse than good people; good people too are by nature fallen, inclined toward evil. Bad people are rather those who believe bad opinions; good people are those who believe good opinions (VIII. x. 451). In this, Augustine follows Paul in I Timothy 1:10 on “sound doctrine.)
This is why Christianity must open itself to philosophy with deadly seriousness, while at the same time must firmly rule it. Without a detailed legal code or praxis, as in Judaism or Islam, Christianity faces a paradox. “The unlearned start up and take heaven by violence, and we with all our learning, see how easily we wallow in flesh and blood!” (VIII. viii. 443). The unlearned easily accept right opinion. The learned must think before the accept, and are easily misled by corrupt thought-processes. Thus the audience of the Confessions cannot be God, to whom it seems to be addressed—why confess to an omniscient being?—but learned men, students of the liberal arts (II. iii. 71).
We happy few? You will find your true friends only among those who are truly good. Aristotle says as much, but Augustine adds: The truly good share the same opinions, they share the Holy Spirit (IV. iv. 159). Given the immortality in Heaven of right-minded souls, you will never lose a true friend. (I once talked to a Christian college professor who regretted the death of an unbelieving friend because “I’ll never see her again.” Augustine would have had to convince him that she had not been a true friend. Augustinianism need not take second place to Stoicism in the severity of the love and the liberation it offers.)
How then shall the learned few be brought to believe? Unlike Socrates, who knows he does not know and lives with that knowledge, the young Augustine sought certain knowledge (VI. iv. 279). He wanted to be as certain in spiritual matters as he was of arithmetic truths. God rectified his heart by causing him to reflect upon the many things he believed that he could not see; “we could do nothing at all in this life” without such beliefs (VI. v. 283), such as reports of reliable witnesses of cities we have never seen and of medical remedies we have never tried. The reports of Scripture, preached “among all the nations” (VI. v. 283), supplements the human-all-too-human inability to find the truth by “evident reason” (VI. v. 285). Unassisted human reason cannot account for its own genesis, and must therefore depend upon reports. What the Bible reports are the right opinions brought by the Holy Spirit which alone make human souls good—happy because they have rediscovered their true nature or origin as images of God.
Human souls confirm the truth of the Holy Spirit not first of all by thinking but by first of all believing—by gaining a knowledge available only by means of believing because it is a knowledge granted, not achieved. To Socrates Augustine replies: What you know you do not know is what you most need to know, and you can know it only if you first believe the true reports of the Holy Spirit as He spoke through His prophets. Only after you believe those reports is the Holy Spirit likely to speak to you as well, although the Holy Spirit has been known to speak in a still, small voice to unbelievers. Only then will the question of human origins be answered for you. The right questions are not ‘What is?’ (the ancient philosophers) or ‘How?’ (the modern philosophers) but ‘Who?’ and ‘Where from?’
This is why, before philosophizing, Augustine prays to the most authoritative Person: “Courage, my mind, and press on strongly. God is our helper, he made us, and not we ourselves.” (XI. xxvii. 264). Unassisted human reason can understand nature ‘as it stands,’ refuting the charlatanries of astrologers. But unassisted human reason cannot understand the origin of nature, cannot understand nature as a whole as it exists in time.
Augustine’s meditations on time (Book XI0 and on substance (Book XII) both concern origins. His meditation on time is a meditation on the beginning of time, where the Bible narrative itself begins. This meditation is a ‘baptized’ version of the philosopher’s ‘eternal present’—now truly eternal and truly present because Augustine acknowledges the Creator-God. The meditation on substance is a meditation on chaos, the first substance, the stuff the Creator-God shaped.
To be, to know, to will: One being ‘does’ all these; the knowledge of the Creator-God is creative as no ‘god of the philosophers’ can be. What the Creator-God wills is absolutely coterminous with what He does and knows. Human art is only weakly analogous to this; it is merely productive, not truly ‘original’ or creative. The coterminousness of being, knowing, and willing are more analogous to the three-personed God: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. A being that is knowing and willing—whose very being deliberately creates—is one person and three.
For a Christian, to love wisdom is to love God. But this love differs from philosophic love in two ways. To love God is to love a person. A person is not a form, nor is it ‘the Good’—which, in Plato, somehow accounts for the forms. A form can be ‘seen’; it is an object of noēsis. A person can be seen externally, but not fully understood by sight. A person’s soul also can be known as it were externally, by classifying it as to its ‘type.’ And a person can be known intimately but remain surprising in ways that a form, once known, cannot be. God says: “My thoughts are not your thoughts.” And some of God’s creations—angels, men—can surprise God, rebel against Him, change their minds and thereby induce God to change His mind—as he does more than once in the Bible. God knows man much better than man knows God, but man, being a person too, having free will, retains a touch of opacity even in the eyes of God.
The Christian love of God differs from philosophic love in a second way. The Confessions is is no more a Symposium than it is an Apology. To desire the wisdom and power of God would lead not to the Cross but to Machiavelli. Agapic love is neither erotic nor ‘philiac,’ friendly. God is not our beloved or our friend. Even as God does not love human beings erotically or as a friend—why would he need or desire or buddy up with an inferior?—God properly loves man agapically, as does man love God. Agapic love can be between unequals. In Greek, agape refers to brotherly love, or the mature fondness of a husband and wife; it is the only kind of love associated with justice.
God’s knowledge of man is superior to man’s knowledge of himself because God is the creator of man. “There is some thing of man, that the very spirit of man that is in him, knoweth not. But thou knowest all of him, who made him.” (X. iv. 85) To create is to know in a way that the introspective philosopher wants but cannot do; it surpasses even the self-knowledge that comes from dialogue with other people. God’s knowledge is the only kind that is intrinsically efficacious, a perfect fusion of theory and practice. Machiavelli and his followers (most spectacularly, the Germans) attempt to know man by making him a self-creating being. The results are more impressive than felicitous.
At best, man knows by seeing, first, that the senses collect data but do not bring knowledge. He then sees that sounds are not the things signified by the sounds, as sounds differ from language. Neither sense impressions nor words by themselves yield knowledge. As for the operations of the mind, memory in the simplest sense—memory of sense impressions including those made by words—does not bring knowledge. Animals have such memory. To know, one needs the Platonic notion of ‘remembering.’ ‘Remembering’ or seeing the forms must then be reconciled with the God of the Bible. Unlike such disguised ‘Christian’ Platonists as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, Augustine really does adapt Platonism to Christianity (and not the other way around) by asserting that the core memory is the ‘memory’ of God in oneself, the self created in the image of God. This image is not darkened by ‘selfishness’—actually false selfishness or love of corporeal things. Love of things aims at the created, not the Creator. Just as God’s crating is as much will as knowledge, so man must “make choice of thee” in order to know God (X. ii. 77). Only in such choosing can such knowledge be had.
Against Plato, Augustine maintains that there can be no noble lie. God and a lie “cannot be possessed together” (X. xli. 199) precisely because God is a creator. Divine truth is persuasive by itself—creative or transforming. When he writes “On Lies” Augustine permits, at most, misdirection. Lies are human pseudo-creations, apings of God—private, one’s own, like sin. God and Word are seamless; His creating Word is eternal, wisdom’s self (XI. ix. 229). To the philosophers, by contrast, wisdom has no self. It is an attribute of a self.
Augustine answers not only Plato but Nietzsche and Foucault, in advance. To Nietzsche he says: Wisdom and life are one in God’s creating Word (XI. ix). Light is the first of all created things because God’s mind is enlightening to all His creations. Christianity is therefore not Platonism for the people. It is the salvation of the philosophers, saved from their own inability to explain origins. How can any will to power be separated from some one who wills it?
Against Foucault, Augustine warns that the desire to know is “more dangerous” than sensual temptation—”of making experiments with the help of the body” (X. xxxv. 175). Foucault therefore in a way does not love too dangerously but not dangerously enough. To attempt to combine the desire to know with sensual experiment would misdirect mind and body alike, ending in un-creating wordlessness. The better course is, “Be angry and sin not”—angry at one’s self for its clottishness (IX. iv. 21).
A genuine liberal education would aim at—or, more modestly, keep before it—the angelic ideal. Angels read not books but the face of God. Angels “always behold thy face.” “They read, they choose, they love. They are ever reading; and that never passes away which they read; because by choosing and by loving, they read the very unchangeableness of thy counsel.” (XIII. xv. 407) As for Christians, they should follow a special form of the Biblical injunction to increase and multiply: They should spread the Word as preserved in the Book of books. For man, believing is seeing (after hearing); for God, seeing and speaking is creating.
It is very difficult for a philosopher to convert to Biblical religion. Intellect, reasoning, aim at principles, even as the senses aim at empirical substances. A Biblical orientation elevates the dialogical or ‘political’ element of Platonic philosophy to a ‘metaphysical’ level. Dialogue becomes a meta-cosmic condition, but it is not a dialogue among equals—even less than a Socratic dialogue is a dialogue among equals. Although not political in Aristotle’s distinctive sense—as the dialogue between God and man more resembles fatherly rule than it does the reciprocity of ruling and being ruled between husbands and wives or among fellow-citizens—it is political in the more capacious sense of personal rule, including rule by God via His laws. In this, philosophy retains a place, as a handmaiden, because creation also means separation; in Christianity if not in Judaism you do have nature, if in a weaker sense than in ‘the ancients,’ many of whom supposed nature to be eternal. (In saying the personal is the political, modern feminism follows Christianity. But by focusing politics narrowly on human ‘power relations’ its atheism deprives it of Christian metaphysics and classical rationalism. Indeed, its irrationalism tends to give feminism its secular-fanatic air, its ‘German’ tendency to conflate the least lovely elements of philosophy and Biblicism.)
The Confessions shows the difficulty philosophers and ‘intellectuals’ more generally have in converting, reorienting their souls, away from nature, from principles, and toward personhood as a metaphysical truth.
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