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    Why “Consent of the Governed”?

    May 6, 2026 by Will Morrisey

    A version of this article originally appeared in Constituting America, April 27, 2026.

     

    As a declaration, the Declaration of Independence argues a claim before the international ‘court of public opinion,’ showing respect for “the opinions of mankind.” To do so effectively, it must appeal to some human capacity that transcends borders, languages, customs, even religions. Only the natural human capacity to reason can meet that requirement. That is why the independence the Declaration declares is a logical syllogism.

    A logical syllogism consists of one or more ‘major’ premises–for example, “All men are mortal.” A ‘minor’ premise or set of premises—typically more specific than a major premise, such as ‘Socrates is a man’—comes next. To be reasonable, the conclusion of the syllogism must ‘follow from’ the premises: ‘Therefore, Socrates is mortal.’ No part of the syllogism may contradict any other part. The syllogism can be falsified not only if it is self-contradictory but if one or more of the premises are false. If, in this case, ‘Socrates’ is the name of my cat, the syllogism fails.

    The Declaration is a more complicated syllogism than that one, but a syllogism it is, with several major premises, including the self-evident truths of equal, natural, unalienable rights and fifteen minor premises, with numerous subdivisions, all leading to the conclusion that the United Colonies are now “Free and Independent” United States.

    One of the major premises that has most puzzled readers is the claim that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. If it is self-evident that one’s rights are unalienable, Creator-given, and governments that are rightly designed secure them, then what has consent to do with it? Why can’t a government simply serve our rights without asking our permission to exist in the first place?

    The answer is that, first, if liberty is among those rights, the formation of any government must rest on the consent of those ruled by it, initially and continually. But more broadly, consent must mean assent under the rule of reason. It must follow from the overall logic of the syllogism. As a political declaration, not a philosophic treatise, the Declaration does not elaborate on this point. For the Founders, John Locke had already provided that elaboration.

    Just as the rights asserted in the Declaration follow the account of natural rights Locke gives in his Essay on Civil Government, often called the “Second Treatise,” so too it is there that Locke defines a free action as one taken “within the bounds of the law of nature,” distinguishing liberty from licentiousness, which he defines as the condition in which “men’s opinions are not the product of judgment, or the consequence of reason…but the effects of chance and hazards as a mind floating at all adventures, without choice and without direction.”

    That last sentence comes from Locke’s most philosophically rigorous book, the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. There, he identifies reason’s purposes: to enlarge our knowledge and to “regulate our assent” by finding the logical connections between and among our perceptions. For this, “sense and intuition reach but a little way.” We need to make logical deductions and inferences to reach certainty and to establish probability in our opinions. This is a four-step process of, first, discerning truths by our immediate, “self-evident” perceptions; making regular and methodical disposition of these perceptions in a clear and fit order; perceiving their connection; and finally, coming to the right conclusion. (See An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, chapter xvii).

    That is exactly what the Declaration of Independence does. The Law of Nature, Locke writes in the “Second Treatise,” is reason, which “teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life (or Limb), Health, Liberty, or Possessions”—a principle, if followed, that will conduce to “the Peace and Preservation of Mankind.” Human beings are equal in the sense that we are all “of the same species and rank” within the natural order, unless God ordains otherwise by a “manifest Declaration of his Will.” As such, we have the right to punish those who transgress upon our equal rights. Such predators, very much including predatory humans, are “dangerous to Mankind” and must be stopped. However, given the human tendency to mistake innocent actions for offenses against us, and worse, our tendency to persuade ourselves that dealing out injury and committing acts of seizure are simple acts of justice, we need “a common Judge” to settle our disputes. Such a judge isn’t easy to find, since early human societies were family-based, divided into small clans that inclined to define right as the advantage of ‘one’s own,’ the good of one’s kin. In that “State of Nature,” individuals and families wield “political power” in pursuing their own interests, often securing their own natural rights at the expense of others.

    To remedy this condition effectively, Locke contends, men may join in a “Compact” with one another, “and make one Body Politick.” To do so, they must give up the right to self-enforce their natural rights. This requires consent, reasoned assent, since anyone who forms a political regime without the consent of those included in it “put[s] himself into a State of him” who is so included; if I have such “Absolute Power” over you, I have enslaved you, and having enslaved you, I can kill you whenever I want. Nothing could be more contrary to reason, contrary to the Law of Nature. Indeed, “the Freedom of Man and Liberty of Action according to his own Will, is grounded on his having Reason, which is able to instruct him in that Law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the Freedom of his Will.” Recourse to a tyrannical, ‘strong man’ regime to secure our rights is itself a violation of our natural right to liberty and is likely to fail to secure our rights to life and property, as well.

    This is why, “the end,” the purpose, “of Law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve and enlarge Freedom.” “Where there is no Law, there is no Freedom” from “slavery and violence.” Both the Law of Nature and the law of the political Compact depend upon the human person’s rational “capacity of knowing [the] Law.” Just as “we are born free,” we are “born rational” or, more precisely born with the capacity to reason after suitable parental governance and education.

    Thus, “Politick Societies all began with voluntary Union”—from consent, whether formal or “tacit,” and so they are maintained, inasmuch as any person “is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into another Commonwealth” or to form another “in any part of the World, they can find free and unpossessed.” North America comes to mind, as it did in fact come to Locke’s mind when writing the “Second Treatise” in the 1680s: when human populations all around the world there were sparse and scattered, “all the World was America.

    In any such Commonwealth, legislative power “can never have a right to destroy, enslave or designedly impoverish its subjects”—compromise their lives, liberty, or pursuit of happiness—since “the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule of all Men.”

    Locke emphasizes two features of “Bodies Politick” that need to be established in a manner consistent with the Law of Nature, of reason. They are property and majority rule. Both are justified and ruled by reason.

    Property, which enables human beings to sustain their lives and to protect their liberty is “for use of the Industrious and Rational,” not for “the Fancy or Covetousness of the Quarrelsome and Contentious. Industrious: human labor substantially adds to the value of nature, fashioning building materials out of stones and trees, clothing out of plants and animal skins. Security of property encourages such labor; if the products of our labor can be arbitrarily taken away, why work? The wealth of the Commonwealth, especially if it is held not in common but by individuals and families, will strengthen the regime that protects property. “That Prince who shall be so wise and godlike as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of Mankind against the oppression of power and narrowness of party will quickly be too hard for his neighbours”—too hard for them to conquer. It is, again, by “common consent” that his citizens agree to the establishment and protection of private property and money, as well, so as better to exchange the products of their labor with one another. By contrast, an “absolute” monarch, one bound by no Compact securing this and other rights, heads a regime “inconsistent with civil society,” hurling his subjects back into a state of war, crushing liberty and, with his absolute power, making himself “licentious by Impunity.”

    In governing themselves after establishing the social and political Compact, a people needs a practical way of legislating. Laws must be enacted by the consent of the majority of citizens. Majority rule must be a part of the Compact itself. Since it is hardly imaginable that any law will find unanimous favor with the people, this is the only reasonable way. Otherwise, the Compact “would signifie nothing, and be no Compact.” Such a regime would be effectively no different from “the State of Nature,” quickly dissolving. It “cannot be suppos’d that Rational Creatures should desire and constitute Societies only to be dissolved.” 

    Bringing the right to property and majority rule together, and upholding a principle the American Founders would restate and fight for, no government can take a man’s property “without his own consent.” Since no government can survive without revenues for such purposes as securing a more perfect Union, establishing Justice, insuring domestic Tranquility, providing for the common defense, promoting the general Welfare, and securing the blessings of Liberty, government will need to collect revenues with the consent of Constitutional majorities. There, too, the consent of the elective representatives and the tacit consent of those whom they represent exemplify the Lockean way, and the American way.

     

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    The Reformer of Tammany Hall

    April 29, 2026 by Will Morrisey

    George Washington Plunkitt: Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics. As told to William L. Riordan. Cleveland: Compass Circle, 2019.

     

    This review written in remembrance of my late colleague, Dr. Mickey Craig, who loved this book.

     

    Founded in 1786, the Society of St. Tammany began as a social club with Jeffersonian-republican leanings. ‘Tammany’ was a saint in no church, but he seems to have been a man of good will. As chief of the Lenni-Lenape Indians, he enabled William Penn’s Quakers to establish their peaceful colony along the Delaware River, eventually earning the title “Patron Saint of America.” The Manhattan Tammanyites played along with the story, giving Indian titles to their officers, calling their chief the “Grand Sachem.” As the Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties coalesced, Tammany became increasingly organized, recruiting immigrants, especially the Irish, into its ranks, lured by city jobs and happy with the social services Tammany provided. In 1828, President Jackson promised to give Tammany Hall control of federal patronage in Manhattan. Tammany’s candidate for mayor, Fernando Wood, was elected in 1854, and this began Tammany’s 100-year dominance of city politics. A few years later, William M. Tweed took control of the organization.

    Tweed quickly won notoriety as one of the biggest crooks ever to enter New York politics. Manhattan was an independent city throughout his reign, as the five boroughs didn’t consolidate until 1898. Stacking the county with his fellow thieves, he embezzled millions and built a real estate empire. It wasn’t until the 1870s that New Yorkers decided that enough was enough; he died in prison. Tweed and his ‘ring,’ as it was called by its critics, consisted of (nominal) Protestants; the fall of Grand Sachem “Boss” Tweed enabled Catholics to take over the organization, which remained corrupt but on a less gargantuan scale. By 1902, Tammany’s boss was Charles Francis Murphy, who worked to clean up the organization’s image without necessarily eliminating some of its sharp business practices, such as ballot-stuffing and patronage. Patronage was the key to Tammany’s success, with the promise of jobs keeping the boys well organized and disciplined. Civil service reformers, Tammany’s worst enemies, claimed that staffing government offices with tenured, professional administrators would eliminate or at least minimize corruption, saving the taxpayers millions wasted on graft. Even less plausibly, reformers also claimed that such a professional bureaucracy would be more democratic because any qualified person could win a job by scoring well on a civil service test, rather than depending upon the favor of the rough-edged Tammany oligarchs. It hasn’t quite worked out that way, but that is another story. 

    Born in 1842, George Washington Plunkitt flourished as Tammany’s leader of the 15th Assembly District before and especially during Murphy’s tenure. In his long career, he served New York, Tammany, and himself as a state senator, a state assemblyman, a New York County Supervisor and Alderman, and as a Police Magistrate. He chaired Tammany’s Elections Committee, always trusted to produce votes for the candidates. By the time he was interviewed by New York Evening Post reporter William L. Riordan, he held no formal office, having eased into the role of Murphy’s trusted advisor; Murphy supplied the book with a brief “tribute” to his ally, whom he lauded as “a straight organization man,” always “faithful and reliable,” a speaker of plain, home truths. In their own way, both men were reformers, if not (Heaven forfend) civil service reformers. They were men who recognized that the old-style political organization needed to sober up a bit in order to survive. 

    To prove that he has done so, Plunkitt makes a careful distinction. There is “dishonest” graft: blackmail, outright thievery of public funds as practiced by Tweed and his gang. But there is also “honest graft,” adroitly summarized in Plunkitt’s mot, “I seen my opportunities and I took ’em”—a thought he wanted to be engraved on his tombstone. The opportunities he saw were, for the most part, real estate investments based on what we now call ‘inside information,’ as when he knew that the city intended to establish a park or to build a road and would need a certain parcel of land to make the project viable. He would purchase said property from the unwitting owner, then sell it to the city at a fine profit. “Shouldn’t I enjoy the profit of my foresight?” he asks, rhetorically. All the auditors “can show is that the Tammany heads of departments looked after their friends, within the law, and gave them what opportunities they could to make honest graft”—a practice “that’s never goin’ to hurt Tammany with the people” because “every good man looks after his friends, and any man who doesn’t isn’t likely to be popular.” Surely, Tammany leaders never need to sully themselves with dishonest graft “when there is so much honest graft lyin’ around when they are in power.” No, indeed: “I don’t own a dishonest dollar.” If the reformers want to deprecate this as “the spoils system,” well, “all right, Tammany is for the spoils system.” Manhattan under the Tammany spoils system really is, as the song would later put it, an Isle of Joy, “a sort of Garden of Eden, from a political point of view,” an “orchard full of beautiful apple trees,” their fruits read to be plucked by an honest and attentive soul. Just don’t touch that “Penal Code Tree.” It is “Poison.” 

    Having established that fundamental principle, Plunkitt explains how a young man may become a true statesman, not a meddlesome reformer. “Some young men think they can learn how to be successful in politics from books, and they cram their heads with all sorts of college rot.” Such “book-worms” may “do some good in a certain way, but they don’t count in politics.” On the contrary, a college education handicaps them. Nor will the study of oratory do them much good. “We’ve got some orators in Tammany Hall, but they’re chiefly ornamental.” We trot them out for ceremonial occasions, but otherwise “they don’t count when business is doin’ at Tammany Hall,” since “the men who rule have practiced keepin’ their tongues still, not exercisin’ them.”

    The problem is, “You can’t study human nature in books.” You’ll need to unlearn whatever you learned, or thought you learned, in those things, “and unlearnin’ takes a lot of time.” “To learn real human nature you have to go among the people, see them and be seen,” find out “what they like and what they don’t like, what they are strong at and what they are weak in.” Then and only then will you be able “by approachin’ at the right side.” If I hear of “a young feller that’s proud of his voice,” I ask him to join the Tammany Glee Club.” When “he comes and sings…he’s a follower of Plunkitt for life.” Same thing with some kid who can play baseball; we have a spot on our baseball club roster just waiting for him. “You’ll find him workin’ for my ticket at the polls next election day.” They see their opportunities and they take them, courtesy of Mr. Plunkitt and Tammany Hall. What’s not to like? As for “the high-toned fellers, the fellers that go through college,” such a young man is “the daintiest morsel of the lot, and he don’t often escape me.” I just let him take that fool Civil Service exam and, once he flunks it, he finds his way back to Tammany Hall and joins up.

    No, real politics is a business, and to go into business you need “marketable commodities.” In the politics business, votes are the commodities you need. “Do as I did”: “Get a followin’.” If you have even one man who will vote the way you do, “through thick and thin,” then you can go to your district leader and say let him know that. Be assured, he will welcome you warmly into the organization. But if you tell him “I took first prize at college in Aristotle; I can recite all Shakespeare forwards and backwards”; I know science; “I’m the real thing in the way of silver-tongued orators,” well, “he’ll probably say: ‘I guess you are not to blame for your misfortunes, but we have no use for you here.'” You’ve got nothing marketable to sell. As for me, I started in politics at the age of twelve, making “myself useful around the district headquarters” and working “at all the polls on election day.” “Show me a boy that hustles for the organization on election day, and I’ll show you a comin’ statesman.” 

    Once in the organization, once a proven vote-getter for the organization, your best marketable commodities are charity for the poor and jobs for everyone else. If there’s a fire, I’m there, along with my election district captains, “as soon as the fire engines.” “If a family is burned out, I don’t ask whether they are Republicans or Democrats, and I don’t refer them to the Charity Organization Society, which would investigate their case in a month or two and decide they were worthy of help about the time they are dead from starvation.” I just go ahead and find them a place to stay, buy clothes for them, and generally “fix them up till they get things runnin’ again.” When you know human nature, you know that “the poor are the most grateful people in the world, and, let me tell you, they have more friends in their neighborhoods than the rich have in theirs.” One might say that Tammany embodied a branch of the Democratic Party that had adapted itself to a democratic regime, the one wherein the majority rules.

    Speaking of gratitude, “There’s no crime so mean”—none so much contra naturum, if you will—than “ingratitude in politics.” Sorry to say, “but every great statesman from the beginning of the world” has been up against it: “Caesar had his Brutus; that king of Shakespeare’s—Leary, I think you call him” (probably Irish, then)—suffered grievously when he saw “his own daughters go back on him.” I myself, Plunkitt, have endured such betrayals. “It’s a real proof that a man is great when he meets with political ingratitude”; “great men have a tender, trustin’ nature,” and “so have I”—well, “outside the contractin’ and real estate business.” Nonetheless, the natural order prevails in the end. “The ingrate in politics never lasts long.” He takes without giving, and that breeds distrust. As one Tammany boss, Richard Croker, was fond of saying, “Tellin’ the truth and stickin’ to his friends [is] the political leader’s stock in trade,” and he lived according to that precept. As a result, “every man in the organization trusted him.” The same is true of today’s boss, Charles F. Murphy, who “has always stood by his friends even when it looked like he would be downed for doin’ so.” Now, fortunately, Irish Catholics now run Tammany, not those Protestant Tweedites. “The Irish, above all people in the world, hates a traitor,” having had the experience of those Irish Protestant Orangemen back on the Auld Sod, conniving with the English to rule their Catholic brethren. “The Irish was born to rule, and they’re the honestest people in the world.” No Irishman would steal the roof off an almshouse. Not at all, although “he might get the city authorities to put on a new one and get the contract for it himself, and buy the old roof at a bargain—but that’s honest graft,” that’s “goin’ about the thing like a gentleman,” and there’s “more money in it than in tearin’ down an old roof and cartin’ it to the junkman’s—more money and no penal code.” This is why the Irishman “is grateful to the country and the city that gave him protection and prosperity when he was driven by oppression from the Emerald Isle.” And as for their benefactor, George Washington Plunkitt, “I made my pile in politics, but, at the same time, I served the organization and got more big improvements for New York City than any other livin’ man,” all while avoiding arrest by doing nothing illegal. 

    But the prime marketable commodity a Tammany leader has on offer is jobs with the city. As long as “the leader hustles around and gets all the jobs possible for his constituents,” no ingratitude is likely, and none deserved. He has “a sort of contract” with his constituents, a social contract, to use that high-toned language you need to unlearn from college. His constituents put him into office; now he is morally obligated to make sure “that this district gets all the jobs that comm’ to it.” If he does that, “he shows himself in all ways a true statesman,” and “his followers are bound in honor to uphold him, just as they’re bound to uphold the Constitution of the United States.” On the other hand, if he only works for himself or “shows no talent for scenting out jobs or ain’t got the nerve to demand and get his share of the good things that are going,” then his followers “may be absolved from their allegiance and they may up and swat him without bein’ put down as political ingrates,” as surely as the American colonists whacked their English oppressors back in the day, just the way the poor Irish wished they could have done and fled to America, where we do things right.

    Sometimes you hear of inter-party strife, Democrats versus Republicans. Not in little old New York City, at least when it counts. Sure, “we differ on tariffs and currencies and all them things, but we agree on the main proposition that when a man works in politics, he should get something out of it.” And so, if Tammany loses an election, not to worry. It simply turns to the Republicans, who know they can get jobs from Tammany when the electoral results turn against them. “When we win I won’t let any deservin’ Republican in my neighborhood suffer from hunger or thirst, although, of course, I look out for my own people first.” You might say that’s right out of Aristotle: politics is ruling and being ruled, in turn. To which Mr. Plunkitt adds, ‘and get something in return.’

    There’s no question, a true statesman needs, as Aristotle recommends in the Nicomachean Ethics, to adapt himself to circumstances. “Tammany Hall is a great big machine, with every part adjusted delicate to do its own particular work,” with leaders chosen to fit each voting district. In his own district, Mr. Plunkitt “don’t try to show off my grammar, or talk about the Constitution, or how many volts there is in electricity or make it appear in any way that I am better educated than they are,” although, by his own testimony, he has at least heard of Aristotle and Shakespeare and King Leary or whatever his name was. “Shakespeare was all right in his way, but he didn’t know anything about Fifteenth District politics.” On the other hand, when Mr. Plunkitt “get[s] into the silk-stockin’ part of the district, I can talk grammar and all that with the best of them,” having gone to school “three winters when I was a boy,” learning “a lot of fancy stuff that I keep for occasions.” Yes, “I’ve got to be several sorts of a man in a single day,” but always “one sort of man” in “one respect: I stick to my friends high and low, do them a good turn whenever I get a chance, and hunt up all the jobs going for my constituents,” there being no “man in New York who’s got such a scent for political jobs as I have.” To those who heed his hard-won prudential wisdom, he advises, “Puttin’ on style don’t pay in politics. The people won’t stand for it.” So, “be simple.” “Live like your neighbors even if you have the means to live better. Make the poorest man in your district feel that he is you equal, or even a bit superior to you.” 

    Having established the virtues of Tammany Hall politics and politicians, Mr. Plunkitt shares his animadversions against those who would interfere with them: those undemocratic, ignorant underminers of true patriotism, the civil service reformers. Now, as he has shown, Tammany has already reformed itself since the unfortunate days of the dishonest grafter, William M. Tweed. But there is such a thing as going too far.

    “Civil service law is the biggest fraud of the age,” the “curse of the nation.” To wrest from elected officials the power of appointing men to administrative offices in the city government violates the principle of “representative government.” “Is it all a fake that this is a government of the people, by the people and for the people?” And “if it isn’t a fake, then why isn’t the people’s voice obeyed and Tammany men put in all the offices?” To place men in office based on their scores on standardized civil service tests causes “the people’s voice” to be “smothered”; “it is the root of all evil in our government.” The menace is clear: “The civil service humbug is underminin’ our institutions and if a halt ain’t called our great republic will tumble down like a Park Avenue house when they were buildin’ the subway, and on its ruins will arise another Russian government.” And if not czarism, then the return of English-like or maybe Frenchified kings, much to the horror of every decent Irishman. Civil service may “gobble up everything, politicians would be on the bum, the republic would fall and soon there would be the cry of ‘Veyey le roi!'” And as for the allegedly democratic reform of primary elections, designed to take the political parties’ nomination power from the Tammany bosses, “it would mean chaos.” Civil service reform would put nominations in the hands of “cart-tail orators and college graduates,” which would be like “takin’ a lot of dry-goods clerks and settin’ them to run express trains on the New York Central Railroad.” “It makes my heart bleed to think of it” especially considering the “magnificent men” (John Kelly, Richard Croker, Charles F. Murphy) who have controlled Democratic Party nominations in New York in recent years. “What names in American history compares with them, except Washington and Lincoln?” Mr. Plunkitt would like to know. “They built up the grand Tammany organization, and the organization built up New York,” with none of the grandstanding seen in primary elections. “The men who put through the primary law are the same crowd that stand for the civil service blight and they have the same objects in view—the destruction of governments by party, the downfall of the constitution and hell generally.” 

    Where is their patriotism? The true American patriot wants some quid for his quo. Patriots are made, not born. “How are you goin’ to interest our young men in their country if you have no offices to give them when they work for their party?” There’s no use “of workin’ for your country” if “there’s nothin’ in the game.” “But, when a man has a good fat salary, he finds himself hummin’ ‘Hail Columbia,’ all unconscious, and fancies, when he’s ridin’ in a trolley car, that the wheels are always sayin’: ‘Yankee Doodle Came to Town.'” Take me, for example, “When I got my first good job from the city, I bought up all the firecrackers in my district to salute this glorious country” because “I felt proud of bein’ an American.” But when the Fourth of July comes around, what do the reformers do? They “run off to Newport or the Adirondacks to get out of the way of the noise an everything that reminds them of the glorious day.” Not so, Tammany; its constitution requires that members “assemble at the wigwam on the Fourth.” “You ought to attend one of these meetin’s. They’re a liberal education in patriotism.” For “four solid hours,” Tammany Democrats listen to a reading of the Declaration of Independence, speeches by “long-winded orators,” and patriotic songs from the glee club, all the while knowing that champagne and beer awaits them when it’s over. That isn’t just patriotism. It’s heroic asceticism, “the highest kind of patriotism, the patriotism of long sufferin’ and endurance.” Doesn’t that civil service reformer who fought in Spain, Theodore Roosevelt, concern himself when a young man who was blocked from a city job because he couldn’t pass the civil service exam turned around and fought for Spain in Cuba? And then there was the other “young man” who “worked for the ticket and was just overflowin’ with patriotism, but when he was knocked out by the civil service humbug he got to hate his country and became an Anarchist.”

    A syllogism is in order, here. “First, this great and glorious country was built up by political parties; second, parties can’t hold together if their workers don’t get the offices when they win; third, if the parties go to pieces, the government they built up must go to pieces, too; fourth, then there’ll be hell to pay.” “The republic will go to pieces,” and “then a czar or a sultan will turn up.” 

    Therefore, the reformers “are underminin’ the manhood of the nation and makin’ the Declaration of Independence a farce. We need a new Declaration of Independence, independence of the whole fool civil service business.” And maybe independence of New York City from New York State, the latter being run by hayseeds—farmers who want nothing more than to enact civil service laws and to plunder the riches of industrious City residents. They object to New Yorkers, especially corporations headquartered in the city, who contribute to political campaigns for Tammany candidates. “They might as well howl about givin’ contributions to churches. A political organization has to have money for its business as well as a church, and who has more right to put up than the men who get the good things that are goin’?” Tammany “does missionary work like a church,” giving charity to the poor, and those “big expenses” need “to be supported by the faithful.” (And by the way, Tammany leaders are as much teetotalers as any reform-minded Prohibitionist. “I honestly believe that drink is the greatest curse of the day, except of course, civil service.” Those “great leaders of Tammany Hall” above mentioned had not a regular drinker among them. “A drinkin’ man wouldn’t last two weeks as leader of Tammany Hall. Nor can a man manage an assembly district long if he drinks. He’s got to have a clear head all the time.” Mind you, that didn’t prevent Big Tim Sullivan and Little Tim Sullivan from running saloons down in the Bowery. They made money out of liquor by “sellin’ it to other people,” which is “the only way to get good out of liquor”—if not wine out of water, then profits out of beer.

    Tammany Hall has reformed itself but to save Americans from the civil service tyranny the whole Democratic Party needs to get back on the straight and narrow. “The trouble is that the party’s been chasin’ after theories and stayin’ up nights readin’ books instead of studyin’ human nature and actin’ accordin’.” These issues about money—the gold standard versus the silver standard—have no practical value because, as Boss Croker aphorized back in 1900, “What’s the use in discussin’ what’s the best kind of money? I’m in favor of all kinds of money—the more the better.” Same thing with imperialism. “You can’t get people excited about the Philippines.” You need something “that will wake the people up, somethin’ that will make it worth while to work for the party.” And that is nothing less than abolitionism—the “abolition of the iniquitous and villainous civil service laws which are destroyin’ all patriotism, ruinin’ the country and takin’ away good jobs from them that earn them.” Solons of democratic republicanism, repeal those laws and “put every civil service reformer in jail”—that’s the right platform plank to stand on. If such reforms were carried through, “we would have government of the people by the people who were elected to govern them,” “the kind of government Lincoln meant.”

    “I see a vision. I see the civil service monster lyin’ flat on the ground. I see the Democratic party standin’ over it with foot on its neck and wearin’ the crown of victory. I see Thomas Jefferson,” American Founder and founder of the Democratic Republicans, “looking out from a cloud and sayin’: ‘Give him another sockdologer: finish him.’ And I see millions of men wavin’ their hats and singin’ ‘Glory Hallelujah!'”

     

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Russian Military Strategy

    April 22, 2026 by Will Morrisey

    Gudrun Persson: Russian Military Thought: The Evolution of Strategy Since the Crimean War. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2025.

     

    Russia’s long borders, most without natural barriers to protect its cities, requires military planning that is not only careful but well integrated into whatever regime prevails in the state. For this reason, “the Russian view of strategy is broader and more encompassing than recognized in the West,” whose rulers tend to ‘compartmentalize’ military strategy, political strategy, and economic strategy. Indeed, “an inclination to holism is characteristic throughout the Russian intellectual tradition in literature, religious philosophy and the sciences.” Persson wisely attempts to understand Russian thinkers as they have understood themselves, never imposing analytical ‘frameworks’ alien to Russia. 

    Modern Russian military thought originated in the eighteenth century with Czar Peter the Great, Petr Aleksandrovich Rumiantsev, and Alexandrovich Suvorov. Even before that, however, “when Russia consisted of little but Muscovy, the army was an integral part of the state and the ruling elites.” The flat steppes of that region lent themselves to raids and counterraids, many of them defensive responses to intruders. To expand, the regime needed to enforce strict loyalty, made possible by the close association of civilian and military officers, all drawn from the aristocracy. By the middle of the sixteenth century, Russia confronted the principal political/military powers of northern and central Europe: Sweden (‘The Hammer of Europe,’ as it was then known) and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Muscovy was successful, doubling its size in the seventeenth century. By the time Peter declared his country an empire, he had transformed Russia into a modern, centralized state featuring an efficient standing army and navy coordinated with its diplomatic corps. As an enthusiast of the Enlightenment, Peter established military councils that met sometimes as often as twenty times a year to debate strategy; Czar Peter adjudicated, and his decision became Russia’s authoritative military doctrine. Previously, education in Russia was the exclusive domain of Orthodox Christian priests; Peter founded a system of military school teaching mathematics, navigation, artillery and engineering. His formidable successor, Catherine the Great, founded a comprehensive system of primary and secondary education which could prepare Russian youth for careers in these technical fields. During her eighteenth century, “Russia was almost constantly in a state of war,” fighting Sweden, Persia, the Ottoman Empire, the Tatars of Crimea (a country it incorporated into the empire in 1783), Poland, and revolutionary France. It was under Catherine that Rumiantsev wrote Customs of Military Service, setting down organizational practices, and Thought, a memorandum successfully arguing for increased military funding, “given the territorial expansion of the empire.” He was careful to emphasize that Russia’s unique geopolitical characteristics (including its “wicked neighborhood”) meant that its military officers could learn from foreign strategists but implement only those practices fit for Russia. Conversely, Russian strategists needed to understand their many enemies not by Russian standards but “by working out what we might do if we were in his place” (emphasis added). 

    Responding to Russia’s geographic vulnerability within the armature of a modern state, these strategists emphasized offensive military operations, departing from Muscovy’s defensive stance. Whether predominantly offensive or defensive, Russia’s wars have been numerous. In the centuries between 1500 and 1900, it was at war for 353 years. At the end of this period, the head of the General Staff Academy pointed to Russia’s defeat of Napoleon, saving not only itself but Prussia and Austria, as the army’s premier achievement, while observing that “war was always and throughout all times been, spontaneously and consciously, a sacred, great, an important act in the life of the state,” fought under the principles, “Faith, Czar, and Fatherland”—religion, regime, and state, fully coordinated. Rumiantsev’s contemporary, General Suzorov, emphasized “speed, assessment, attack.” Given the vast Russian peasantry and its small aristocratic officer corps, both of these classes needed to be well understood in order for their command-and-obey relationship to succeed. To do so, he appealed to the shared sentiment of patriotic pride, formulating the chant: “Subordination, Exercise, Obedience, Education, Discipline, Military Order, Cleanliness, Health, Neatness, Sobriety, Courage, Bravery, Victory! Glory! Glory! Glory!” His relentlessly offensive strategy (retreat, he thought, was equal to weakness) comported well with his spiritedness.

    The following century found its major strategist in Nikolai V. Medem, the first professor of strategy at the Imperial Military Academy. In his An Overview of the Most Famous Rules and Systems of Strategy, he described the thought of such important Western strategic thinkers as Jomini, Frederick II, and Clausewitz. Against Jomini and with Clausewitz, he insisted that there can be no “immutable laws in strategy that can guide the actions of the commander in war,” but that ever-changing circumstances must be observed and respected. In chess, learning the rules doesn’t make you much of a chess player. A strategist, he wrote, must have “the knowledge of the characteristics of all strategic elements and means,” perform “the assessment of their mutual influence.” and study “the importance of each individual element in relation to the actual military actions.” Persson cites this as a characteristic example of the “holistic view of strategy” that “has remained one of the constants of Russian strategic thought” to this day.

    The Crimean War (1852-1856) ended or at least interrupted the peaceful decades following the Napoleonic Wars. After Crimea, Europeans followed Prussia’s policy of universal military conscription; Russia took its time, finally introducing it in 1874. The democratization of war was complemented with important technological innovations in weapons, which could be mass-produced for mass armies as industrial economies replaced agrarian ones. Historicism and positivism dominated philosophic thought. As a result, “the study of military science became more systematic and professionalized.” The need to coordinate such technologies as steam railways, telegraphs, and the rifled muskets and cannons that enabled militaries to strike one another at greater distances, coupled with the further need to coordinate technology with the training of mass armies and with building up industrial production, made military planning more complex than ever. A better-educated, professionalized officer class was now indispensable. All of this required substantial increases in funding, which meant that economic prosperity more than ever became a precondition of military survival and victory.

    The geopolitical event of the century was German unification under Prussian auspices. This ruined French hegemony on the continent, as seen in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), which closely followed Prussia’s defeat of Austria, its sole possible competitor for dominance among the German states. Prussia’s king was proclaimed emperor of Germany as William I. Excluded from Germany, Austria sought to counterbalance its neighbor by forming the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a dual monarchy. Italy finally realized Machiavelli’s envisioned structure, its several states uniting in one nation-state in 1870. 

    In Russia, Czar Alexander II foresaw the need for much larger armies, which is why he emancipated the serfs in 1861, thereby more closely attaching them to what they could now think of as their country. That was also the year that Dmitri Alekseevich Miliutin assumed the duties of War Minister. As Tocqueville had observed some two decades earlier, ‘democracy’ understood as civil-social equality could flourish as readily under a monarchic regime as under a republic. Miliutin affirmed “the unity and integrity of the state” and the “equality of all its members” under the czar. For Russia to thrive, he continued, it must “cast away all outdated, outlived privileges” and “take leave, once and for all, of the rights of one social group over another”; again as per Tocqueville, no aristocracy or oligarchy must stand between the monarch and his people. With respect to educating the officers, Miliutin followed with schools that reward talent, not ‘birth.’ And he instituted mandatory literacy classes in literacy for the common soldiers, who would read books and listen to speeches extolling Russian nationality. 

    Largely blocked from expansion in Europe, whose statesmen had advanced more rapidly into modernity, Russians instead sought territory in Central Asia, seizing Turkistan, Chimkent, Tashkent, and Samarkand in the 1860s, adding several khanates in the following decade. Perssons ascribes these moves to a desire for “defensible borders,” not the quest for raw materials or imperial ambition as such. One important War Ministry document identified a Western Europe full of enemies, Prussia-ruled Germany being the most dangerous. Russian strategists worried three possible hostile coalitions: Austria and Germany; Austria, Germany, Turkey, and Sweden; Austria, Turkey, France, Italy, England. Russia, they feared, had no reliable allies.

    The head of the Military-Scientific Committee of the Russian army, Nikolai Obruchev, authored Considerations on the Defense of Russia, which Perssons describes as “the basis for all of the war plans up to 1909.” Obruchev understood that regime differences among states may lead to war; no longer would wars be based on “personal quarrels among the European sovereigns,” as they had been when rival monarchist dynasts faced one another, hungering for territory or eager to avenge some perceived slight. Further, “the transition from war to peace had become instantaneous,” given modern technologies. At the time, Russia ruled Poland, and Obruchev wanted that substantial territory as a geopolitical buffer in the west; in his judgment, “the position on the Vistula was the only really good one from which to mount an offensive.” (Having stayed in a hotel overlooking that river on the outskirts of Krakow, a hotel occupied by Nazi officers during the Second World War, I can attest that the view is indeed good, and not only in an esthetic sense. One enjoys what’s called a ‘commanding’ view of things.) Obruchev foresaw that a future European war “would take place on Polish territory,” and he planned preemptive attacks on Austria and Germany from there, if war seemed imminent. This strategy in turn made Russian strategists particularly concerned about rising nationalist and therefore anti-imperialist sentiments among European nations, very much including Poland. The unification of the Germanies was the most alarming example. For its part, Russia might be unified around its army.

    Professor of strategy at the General Staff Academy Genrikh Leer, who eventually served as commandant of the Academy in the 1890s, also advocated a tight ‘fit’ between the regime and the armed forces, calling the military system “a reflection of the political system.” Again, Prussia and the new Germany it had organized and now dominated was the example. War, Leer wrote, is “the political bayonet” which “finally determines the most important political issues.” Complementarily, the regime is likely to influence or even determine “the kinds of war” a state will conduct. In this, Leer adopted Montesquieu’s tripartite classification of regimes. He observed that despotic (as distinguished from constitutional) monarchies will likely prosecute offensive wars, whereas democracies (he was thinking of ancient Athens) incline toward defensive wars. Monarchies—centralized states with monarchic regimes animated by the rule of law—can and will conduct both offensive and defensive wars. The overall civil-social democratization of modernity, now common to all three regimes, as Tocqueville had observed, meant that militaries could no longer rely on small professional armies; mass armies in which officers enjoyed the trust of their soldiers beneath them and the civilian authorities above them were not the order of the day, and of course the General Staff Academy was exactly the kind of educational institution designed to improve both the technical competence and the morale of the military.

    With these strategic elements in hand, Russia could continue to keep its West European rivals at bay while serving as Europe’s defender against incursions from Asia. Leer pointed to Peter I as the founder of this policy, emphasizing military history as a principal component of his educational curriculum. “Leer is described as the founder of the ‘critical-historical’ school in Russian military thought,” a school which searched “for eternal rules of warfare by choosing appropriate examples from military history.” Among these “laws” were the claim that war is natural, “a part of human life”; that war is obviously destructive but also civilizing (as seen, for example, in Rome’s conquests); and that military strategy has moral, material, and political elements, which must be coordinated in order for a military campaign to succeed. 

    Leer found a critic among his colleagues in Mikhail Dragomirov, who denied that military science could really exist. Such a science, he wrote, “is as unthinkable as a science of poetry, art, and music.” Students of military history should look at past battles not as phenomena that can be reduced to a science but rather “just as a painter or a composer studies masterpieces—not to copy them, but to be inspired by them.” Theory is too general for actual use, and the events chronicled by historians can be mined for ‘proofs’ of any theory: which example “to pick is the choice of the one picking.” Chance played too great a part in any battle, let alone any war, to enable a commander to rely on some scientific theory. This notwithstanding, Dragomirov did concur with Leer’s judgment that war is natural, “arguing against Tolstoy’s pacifist views on war”. For Russia, given its geopolitical circumstance, it must seem so. Therefore, Dragomirov advocated a policy whereby common soldiers would be trained only in those skills they need to fight effectively; at the same time, in a nod to civil-social democratization, he insisted that officers treat the men with respect. Consistent with these points, he recommended training in the use of the bayonet, “not because firing is not important but because the bayonet attack require more psychological strength, which is more difficult to train and take longer to acquire.” His geopolitical stance, resembled Leer’s: that Russia should guard against incursions from Asia while disagreeing with Czar Nicholas II’s push into the Far East, which led to the collision with Japan. The 1905 Japanese defeat of Russian forces, “a blow to Russia’s international prestige,” confirmed the prudence of his worries about military overextension. 

    World War I saw not only the defeat of Russia’s military but the collapse of the monarchic regime, resulting in a civil war won by the Bolsheviks, who established the Red Army in January 1918 under the leadership of Leon Trotsky. That army supported the regime, “not only on the battlefield” but with “agitation, propaganda, and literacy campaigns”—Trotsky being something of a littérateur, himself. Trotsky went so far as to assert that “our state orientation has long been formed by Marxist methodology and there is no need to form it again in the bosom of them military administration.” Among the important Soviet military strategist in this first decade of the regime was Andrei Snesarev. Snesarev understood the dictatorship of the proletariat as ‘totalitarian’—to take the word coined by Communism’s enemy-twin, Benito Mussolini, who used it to describe Italian Fascism. “Wars in the future, according to Snesarev, would become increasingly large-scale and ever more complex, requiring the entire effort of the state”; this would require the state “to prepare for war in peacetime, involving not only the army and soldier but also the entire population.” A reader of Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, Snesarev brought some philosophic heft to ‘totalitarian’ military strategy. 

    A non-Marxist, Aleksandr Svechin, was permitted to publish his thoughts on strategy up until 1938, when Stalin decided to have him executed. Svechin regarded political and military defense as “the most prudent for Russia,” writing that “war is not a cure for the internal diseases of the state but the most serious exam on the health of internal politics,” an exam he evidently was not entirely sure that Soviet Russia could pass. Nor could Russia’ geographic vastness protect it, as it had when Napoleon took Moscow, only to be beaten back by ‘General Winter.’ Modern technology “had rendered distances less significant.” “We are not wearing any geographic armor,” he warned; “our chests are open to blows” and “the enemy is not asleep.” This ran afoul of Stalin’s hopes, based upon the notion that a war against the USSR would be “a struggle against the proletarian revolution” first and foremost, a war whose outcome would be “determined by the real balance of international class forces,” not so much “territorial successes.” Those class forces were assumed to favor the great homeland of socialism, and so, instead of strengthening the military, Stalin conduced several purges against Red Army officers, beginning in the late 1920s and continuing into the late Thirties. “Almost the entire military intelligentsia was obliterated” for having failed to regard Communist Party operatives as the supremely sagacious strategists of the coming world revolution.

    Hitler, tyrannical heir to Bismarck’s unified Germany, made the Communists pay for their ideologically inspired folly before the Nazis themselves were driven back by forces led by some of the few survivors of the Stalinist depredations. After the Man of Steel’s welcome death, such strategists as Marshall Vasily Danielovich Sokolovsky and Admiral Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov attempted to reconcile Marxism-Leninism with military reality. War with the ‘capitalist’ and ‘imperialist’ Western regimes was inevitable. “Therefore,” as Persson nicely summarizes, “the ‘peace-loving’ Soviet Union was forced to take action in order to defend itself.” Such defense required preparation for the inevitable war, a defense that in turn would like require the innocent Communist regime to strike first—offense being the best defense, in accordance with longstanding Russian, not only Soviet, strategy. Nuclear weapons, though obviously devastating, didn’t change this mindset. According to Sokolovksy’s Soviet Military Strategy, published in 1962, Soviet policy aimed at a first strike aiming at the annihilation of both the enemy’s military forces and the ruin of his civil society. This world war between “two opposing social world systems” would inevitably (as per the Marxist-Leninist ‘laws of history’) end in victory for Communism, a victory guaranteed by the coming superiority of socialist economies over capitalist economies. Meanwhile, propaganda must be intensified at home and abroad, unifying Communists worldwide and disunifying the capitalist enemy. As Stalin had intoned, “It is impossible to defeat the foe without learning to hate him with all the forces of one’ soul,” and the post-Stalinist strategists continued his legacy in this regard; this was quite consistent with the regime’s aim at forming the ‘new Soviet man,’ animated by an ethos that comported with the regime of socialist collectivism. As a complement to this, “clearly, by the early 1960s Russia’s war planners were planning to destroy cities and bomb civilians using nuclear weapons in a future war” in an initial phase that would be followed by a ground invasion of Europe resulting in a swift military sweep through Europe that would “reach the English Channel within days.”

    Gorshkov’s naval strategy followed from these principles. “Soviet strategy considered submarines armed with nuclear missiles to be the main fighting weapon of the navy and vastly more effective than surface vessels.” It should be remarked that submarine-based missiles, necessarily smaller than most types of land-based missiles, are useful not so much against hardened military targets as they are against ‘soft’ targets: cities and their civilians. The ‘totalitarian’ regime prefers ‘total’ war. Gorshkov regarded his navy as one element supporting an overall military and political strategy. “Gorshkov’s naval principle for Soviet strategy would be ‘specific in form, socialist in content.'” With his fleet’s most important function (as he put it) “being actions against [enemy] land,” the Soviet navy “played a significant role in the local wars conducted by the imperialists,” making it “the state’s political weapon” against them. Gorshkov’s “vision was of an oceangoing fleet with the strategic task of conducting actions against enemy territory,” a vision that “has not always been understood in the West.”

    This comprehensive, Marxist-Leninist strategy may be seen in the writings of Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1977 to 1984. Two decades earlier, Soviet premier Nikita Khruschev had introduced his policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the Western democratic republics, a supposed “pause from the Marxist-Leninist dogma of the inevitability of a war between the socialist and capitalist camps.” As Persson knows, Lenin had first formulated the notion, a complement to his New Economic Policy on the domestic front. As in more or less all Communist policy, peaceful coexistence, eventually followed by “detente,” wasn’t quite what it seemed. “It did not mean peace.” Economic, political, and ideological warfare would continue, and as for the military substance of it, Ogarkov ascribed war to (of course) “the emergence of private property.” With “the spread of socialism in the world,” the “real and objective conditions to abolish war from social life” might well prevail, were it not for malignant Western imperialism. Warfare, and not only nonviolent warfare, could still be pursued, especially by supporting ‘anti-imperialist’ proxy wars in the impoverished ‘Third World.’ Nuclear war was the kind of war to be avoided, if possible. Ogarkov’s grand strategy consisted, in his words, of an assessment of “the degree of probability of future war and against which enemy; the character of that war and the way it would take the country and its armed forces; the goals and missions that could be assigned to the armed forces and what kind of armed forces are necessary to meet these goals”; and, finally, “the military programs that should be accomplished and the preparations needed by the army and the country for war” along with “the means with which the war should be conducted if it breaks out.” According to this Communist variant of “the Great Russian perspective,” “Russia had never attacked anyone” but “was forced by others to react, in spite of abundant historical evidence to the contrary.”

    “It was not until the mid- to late 1980s that Russian strategists drew on the lessons of World War II and seriously challenged the offensive strategy,” recently dressed up as defensive. After all, Soviet Russia had lost about 27 million lives during the war, roughly half of them soldiers. Nuclear war quite obviously would be worse, unless (somehow) the Soviets could contrive a first strike on U.S. missiles that would wipe out America’s second-strike arsenal—highly improbable, inasmuch as Americans had submarine-launched missiles, too. Accordingly, Ogarkov adjusted Soviet doctrine. As late as 1979, he had insisted that nuclear war “was winnable for the entire socialist camp, due to the “just missions of the war, the superior character of these societies, and their political systems,” but after the Reagan Administration jettisoned detente and began to augment its nuclear deterrent, he started writing about ‘no first use,’ suddenly deeming prevention of nuclear war both possible and necessary. 

    This avenue closed, Defense Minister Dmitri Federovich Ustinov pushed for more military spending, focusing on ground forces arrayed against NATO and against Afghanistan. His policy contributed to the financial crisis of the central state, which Premier Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to overcome by reducing the number of men under arms, signing a treaty limiting intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and rearranging troops in Europe in a defensive configuration. As is well known, this proved too little, too late; the empire collapsed and the regime changed—sort of. 

    Marxism-Leninism eschewed, Russian territory reduced by twenty-five percent, their borders well away from the coveted ports on the Baltic and Black seas, “the civilian and military leadership” nonetheless “maintained a continued consensus on relying on military power as “the basis for Russia’s status in the international arena.” By the 2010s, under the premiership of Vladimir Putin, “the offensive force posture had returned.” The no-first-use policy had been quietly dropped in the mid-1990s. With conventional forces, Putin seized Crimea under the pretext, as he put it, of “correcting historical injustices.” There were many more to correct: Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov, Odessa, Kherson, and others were all the “historical territories” of Russia, deserving of retrieval by force. Russian policymakers gave up their line about American imperialism but substituted “NATO eastern expansion” and the “unipolar world” dominated by the United States. Expansion threatened regime change in Russia, a thought not to be countenanced. Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov averred that “the use of force is the most efficient problem-solver if applied decisively and massively,” with negotiations useful only “as a cover for military action.” Although written in 2000, his doctrine anticipated the invasion of Ukraine, two decades later. 

    To get to that, however, military reform was necessary, as the campaign to wrest South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, though successful, exposed an unimpressive land invasion force. Russia undertook a transformation “from a conventional mobilization army to a permanently combat-ready force,” a transformation involving improvements to the command-and-control system, force structure, military education, and an arms buildup. But while Andrei Kokoshin, who has served in numerous high-level position in the Russian government and academia, emphasized the importance of “the assessment of oneself and of the most likely enemy” as the foundation of strategy, such assessments evidently had not been properly undertaken by February 2022, when Russia attacked Ukraine, citing itself as “the legal successor of the Soviet Union” and the protector of “historical truth.” “Russia is perceived as being under attack from a hostile West, and the Russian Armed Forces are tasked with defending Russia’s historical and spiritual traditions”—the latter embodied by the Russian Orthodox Church, still firmly under control of the central state, as it has been for a very long time. Under such circumstances and with such authority, Putin declared in 2021, Ukraine had no right to independence from its rightful mother country, especially as it was being used as the thin end of the Westernizing wedge, “alien to the Russian people” and coated with immoralist poisons, including “violence, egotism, permissiveness, immorality, and nonpatriotism,” and “objective threat to Russia’s national interests,” bound up as they are with the ideal of “Holy Russia,” with its capital of Moscow as “the Third Rome.” Defending this mythologized version of Russian history forms part of Russia’s official military doctrine. Thus does Russia “prepar[e] itself for a long-term conflict with the West, whose “destructive influence” on innocent Russian youths must be stopped.

    What went wrong for the Russians in Ukraine? They sent in far too few troops—only 200,000 against a country of more than forty million. This assumed that the Ukrainians believed Russian claims that they were really Russian, that they would welcome the invading troops as liberators. But there was no “mass surrender” and on their own side, the Russian soldiers weren’t adequately informed about the purpose of the war or given any strong motive to fight it. Whatever the outcome, it evidently will have come at a brutally high cost for Russia.

    Persson concludes his study by identifying several constant themes in Russian military strategy. Because the state has been so thoroughly militarized for so many centuries, whatever regime rules it features military force as an integral part of the whole. As a consequence, military strategy shapes the regime fundamentally, even as the regime guides the strategy according to its own principles; Western analysts often overlook “the primacy of policy over strategy” in Russia. Those regimes have never taken natural rights as their foundation, looking instead to history, although ‘history’ might range from Russian Orthodox providentialism to Marxist-Leninist dialectic. Whatever the history, it typically casts the West—Roman Catholicism, democratic republicanism, capitalism—as the enemy of Russia. Given the geographic insecurity of its borders, the enemy must be attacked, not merely defended against; territorial expansion makes it less likely that Russia’s center will be overrun. This leads to fits of overexpansion, followed by humiliating retrenchment. The difficulties in maintaining Russian strategic policies derives from its centralization. The policies are designed to strengthen the centralized state, which attempts to rule some 150 ethnic minorities over a vast territory, but over-centralization weakens the state. For example, the various sorts of Russian monarchs, whether czars, commissars, or presidents, have inclined to rule by fear, and to kill or fire the most prominent military thinkers. This leads to “institutional loss of memory” and, more profoundly, a moral atmosphere of distrust in regimes of despotism. 

    Filed Under: Nations

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