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    The Renaissance Humanist Revisions of the Liberal Arts

    October 7, 2026 by Will Morrisey

    St. Bonaventura: On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology. Zachary Hayes translation. St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute of Bonaventure University, 1996.


    Pier Paolo Vergerio: The Character and Studies Befitting a Free-Born Youth. In Craig W. Kallendorf, ed.: Humanist Educational Treatises. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002.

     

    Having secured their position in the remains of the Roman world, Christian thinkers needed to come to terms with substantial achievements of that world—perhaps especially its philosophy, which inclined toward skepticism concerning ‘the gods.’ Christians were of course equally skeptical, indeed scornful, of pagan deities and the religious practices and institutions supporting their worship. But they surely could not tolerate skepticism directed at the God of the Bible. What other pre-Christian philosophic motifs, and what other pre-Christian arts, including the liberal arts, could be taken up without threatening one’s salvation?

    Early in the third century AD, the Carthaginian theologian Tertullian answered, ‘not much’— a least when it came to philosophy. As he put it, famously, “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” A millennium later, however, Thomas Aquinas thought otherwise, deploying Aristotelian philosophy to understand much of God’s creation, the natural world, while subordinating that world, and that philosophy, to God and His revelation. His friend, Bonaventure (born Giovanni di Fidanza in the early 1220s) took at different route, in effect sacralizing all the arts, including the liberal arts, by explaining them as pathways to God. He calls this “reduction” by which he does not mean diminishment, as ‘we moderns’ tend to mean. Quite the opposite: He means tracing all the arts back to their origin in God. As translator Zachary Hayes puts it in his helpful introduction, “none of the arts, including philosophy, ought to be allowed to stand as an independent and self-sufficient discipline.”

    Born in Italy and educated at the University of Paris, where he joined the faculty, “The Seraphic Doctor” eventually became General Minister of the Order of St. Francis. He was by all accounts a capable administrator as well as an accomplished theologian, so his interest in practice as well as theory, and thus in the arts, came readily to him. And both theory and practice are rightly sacralized because, as the Apostle James writes, “every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the God of Lights.” Multiple gifts to mankind come from a single Source, “the fontal source of light.” 

    This brings Bonaventure to the first of his many divisions of his topic. There is exterior light, “the light of mechanical art”; inferior light, “the light of sense perception”; interior light, “the light of philosophical knowledge”; and superior light, “the light of grace and of Sacred Scripture.”

    Mechanical light illuminates the forms of artifacts. Following Hugh of St. Victor [1], Bonaventure considers such “servile” knowledge to include weaving, armor-making, agriculture, hunting, navigation, medicine, and drama. This may seem a decidedly heterogeneous list, but they are linked together by their purposes. “Every mechanical art is intended either for our consolation or for our comfort,” banishing “either sorrow or need,” and is accordingly “either useful or enjoyable.” The strict subordination of poēsis to philosophy, seen in Plato, remains in Bonaventure.

    Sense knowledge “provides light for the apprehension of natural forms.” It takes the five forms provided by the five senses. He endorses St. Augustine’s account of the senses, which holds that sight is the purest form of inferior light. If mixed with air, this light becomes sensible to hearing; if mixed with vapor, smell; if mixed with fluid, taste; and if with “the solidity of the earth,” touch. Sense knowledge is physical, “thriv[ing] in the nerves, whose nature is to be clear and penetrable.” That is, the nerves provide accurate information and the information they provide comes from the outside, in. “Because of the well-defined nature of each sense, no apprehension would be possible without a certain similarity and correspondence between the sense-organ and the object.”

    It is with the interior light of “intelligible truths” that philosophy deals. Bonaventure divides philosophic inquiry into three fields: rational, “the truth of speech”; natural, “the truth of things”; and moral, “the truth of conduct.” In terms of what we call academic ‘disciplines,’ rational philosophy “enlightens the mind,” enabling it to discern “the principles of understanding”—the discipline of logic; natural philosophy enlightens the mind to discern “the causes of being”—physics, but also mathematics and metaphysics; and moral philosophy enlightens the mind respecting the order of things, which is moral or practical philosophy. Each of these kinds of philosophy guides a certain human capacity or power. Rational or “discursive” philosophy directs the interpretive power; natural philosophy “directs itself“; and moral philosophy directs “the motive power.” Physics deals with “the generation and corruption of things; mathematics deals with “abstract forms in terms of their intelligible causes,” and metaphysics deals with “the knowledge of all beings according to their ideal causes, tracing them back to the one first Principle from which they proceeded, that is, to God, in as far as God is the Beginning, the End, and the Exemplar.” Moral philosophy concerns the lives of the individual, the family, and the political community.

    Rational or discursive philosophy has three aims: “to reveal one’s thought,” in which case it pertains to grammar; “to move another to greater faith,” the act of teaching, in which it pertains to logic; or “to arouse love or hatred in another,” in which it pertains to rhetoric. Grammar, logic, and rhetoric are of course three of the liberal arts; this is why for Bonaventure philosophy ranks among the ‘arts.’ Grammar enables the reasoner to apprehend; logic enables him to judge; rhetoric, to persuade. “Reason apprehends through appropriate speech, judges through true speech, and persuades through eloquent speech.” 

    The exterior, inferior/sensual, and interior/intelligible forms of knowledge are all subordinate to the “superior light,” the salvific truth of sacred Scripture as given to us by the God of light. Scripture can be understood literally and spiritually. There are three ways in which it may be understood spiritually: the allegorical way, which teaches us what to believe, and whose masters are Augustine and Anselm; the moral way, which teaches us how to live, whose masters are Gregory and Bernard; and the anagogical way, which teaches how to “cling to God,” whose masters are Pseudo-Dionysius and Richard of Chichester. “But Hugh [of St. Victor] excels all three” of these pairs. At the end of times, all the lesser forms of knowledge will be destroyed, along with the world to which they pertain, followed by the new Heaven and the new Earth prophesied in the Book of Revelation. The lesser knowledges stem from God because the heavens and the earth as we know them were created by God. “All those lights had their origin in a single light” and “all these branches of knowledge are ordered to the knowledge of sacred Scripture,” “contained in it,” “perfected by it,” and “ordered to the eternal illumination by means of it.” Of them, the anagogical way of understanding Scripture brings us closest to God. 

    This means that even the lowest form of knowledge, the knowledge of those who practice the mechanical arts, bring men closer to God. “Every artisan who fashions a work does so in order to derive, praise, benefit, or delight from it,” serving a “noble, useful or agreeable good.” “It was for these three reasons that God made the soul rational, namely, that of its own accord, it might praise God, serve God, find delight in God, and be at rest; and this takes place through charity,” through agapic love. “Behold,” then, “how the illumination of the mechanical arts is a path to the illumination of sacred Scripture,” manifesting as it does “true wisdom” on its own level. Accordingly, “sacred Scripture quite rightly makes frequent use” of similitudes derived from the mechanical arts. The same is true of the higher-level light of speech, reason, and persuasion—philosophy. In terms of natural philosophy, it points to the Son of God as the “art of the Father,” as Augustine calls Him, “the union of the rational soul with the material body,” the “Word of God as begotten and incarnate.” In terms of moral philosophy, which “is concerned principally with rectitude,” the rectitude of the will, its central term, right, has “three meanings.” First, it can mean something in the center of two “extreme points.” By this, Bonaventure doesn’t refer to Aristotle’s doctrine of virtue as the ‘mean between two extremes’ of deficiency and surplus but rather to God as the Beginning and the End, the Alpha and the Omega, with Christ as the “Mediator between God and humanity,” both divine and human “so that this mediator might lead humanity back to God.” Second, the right conforms “to that by which it is ruled.” “That person…lives rightly who is guided by the regulation of the divine law,” aligning his will with God’s will, God’s commands. Finally, “something is called right when its summit is raised upward, as in the case of a human being with its upright posture.” Morally, this means the condition in which “the apex of the mind itself” is “raised aloft,” toward God. “This is what actually happens when our rational nature assents to the first truth for its own sake and above all things, when our irascible nature strives after the highest generosity, and when our concupiscible nature clings to the good.” Such a nature achieve union with God, “a union which takes place through charity.” Without charity, “all knowledge is vain because no one comes to the Son except through the Holy Spirit who teaches us all the truth, who is blessed forever.“

    The Renaissance Humanists take a noticeably different approach to the liberal arts and, by implication, to the arts generally. At the same time, they are not to be confused with Machiavelli, who is sometimes lumped in with them. The Humanists do not sharply separate secular and spiritual life from one another, as Tertullian and Machiavelli both do, although for radically different purposes. Nor do they attempt to thoroughly integrate secular and spiritual life in the manner of Bonaventure. 

    Professor of logic at the University of Padua, papal secretary, secretary to the Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund, Pier Paolo Vergerio published The Character and Studies Befitting a Free-Born Youth in 1403. The free-born youth was Ubertino du Carrara, whose family ruled Padua. Vergerio recalls that Ubertino’s grandfather, Francisco the Elder, “the wisest man of his time in general knowledge,” identified “three ways that parents could help their children”: to call them by an honorable name; to settle them in a renowned city; and to instruct them in the liberal arts. Ubertino’s father had met the first two obligations, and Vergerio would assist him in the third, deploying a wise pedagogical strategy. He brings Ubertino into the liberal arts by treating like a teacher showing him the reasons for his own education. 

    Of those obligations, “instruction in the honorable arts and liberal disciplines” is the most important because it enables even children of “obscure family origins and humble homelands” to overcome those disadvantages. Conversely, “if someone,” however well-born, “is not educated from youth in the liberal arts, or if he is infected with illiberal training, there is little hope that in later years, of his own accord, he can just cast aside the latter or take up the former without difficulty”; “the foundations for living well” must be laid “in youth,” the mind “trained to virtue while it is young and impressionable,” “preserv[ing] throughout life the impressions it takes on now.” A man of “lofty rank…cannot say or do anything in secret,” and so will be exposed as dishonorable if illiberal. Echoing Aristotle’s account of the great-souled or magnanimous man, Versilio tells Ubertino, “it is only fair that those who wish all the greatest things to be due themselves, be themselves obliged to excel in the greatest things.” “There is no more firm or solid rationale for ruling than this: that those who rule be judged by all to be the worthiest to rule.” Thus, Vergerio firmly links liberal education to aristocratic honor; unlike Machiavelli, a century later, he is far from advising a prince to learn “how not to be good.” On the contrary, he would have a young man who is an aristocrat ‘by convention,’ by inheritance, to aspire to become an aristocrat in Aristotle’s sense: among the few genuinely virtuous rulers.

    The allusion to Aristotle is telling. Vergerio fixes his student’s attention on the classical more than the Christian virtues. Persons are “composed of soul and body”; “strength of body and intellect are “due to nature,” to which one should be grateful, “cultivat[ing] them through the right sort of studies in the liberal arts.” We, but “especially those to whom nature has given an intellect worthy of free men,” should “turn our attention particularly to those studies for which we are naturally inclined and suited, and to devote ourselves entirely to them.” Free men “should not be allowed to languish in sloth nor be caught up in illiberal affairs.”

    What, then, are “the signs of a liberal temper”? A man of liberal temperament hungers for praise, being “inflamed by love of glory”; Vergerio does not expect that the young aristocrat will be a philosopher, inflamed by love of wisdom. As Plato and Cicero teach, the love of glory is “the next best motive” after the “wondrous longing for wisdom.” The young aristocrat obeys his elders, taking “good advice” from them, understanding that the young “lack experience in life and are unable to grasp rationally the true good of virtue and the face of moral rectitude.” He “always love[s] to do what is right” and, as Socrates observes in Plato’s Republic, his “naturally well-constituted mind…does not hate or scorn anyone but puts the best construction on whatever is said or done,” even as a good bodily constitution “digests everything easily and turns it into nourishment.” Indeed, Vergerio cites Socrates, who advised young men to “look at their own image in the mirror,” not in Narcissus-like self-absorption but with a mind either to make a homely appearance “attractive through their virtues or to avoid dishonoring a good appearance with vices.” Better still, he can gaze at “a living mirror,” emulating “the behavior of someone else of high character.” For their part, “older men in general should maintain at all times a consistent pattern of gravity and discretion, but especially in the presence of their juniors.” As John Locke would tell the father of the “Young Gentleman,” two centuries later, “ill patterns are surer to be followed than good precepts.” 

    Youths “who are good should be strengthened and assisted through practice and precept,” while “those who are bad and blameworthy should be corrected.” Some youths of bad character “are only following their nature,” while “others lack experience” and still others “suffer from both deficiencies.” In addressing Ubertino, Vergerio particularly remarks that the young “are especially generous and liberal by nature because they have not experienced need and have not sought wealth for themselves by their own effort; it is unusual for one who has amassed wealth by his own efforts to waste it rashly,” but you, scion of Paduan lords (he implies) have obviously not expended any such efforts. Do not, therefore, confuse liberality with lavishness. Nor should you confuse magnanimity with high-spirited arrogance, becoming “rule to others, while exalting” yourself. Such youths “are quick to reveal secrets” because “they want to be seen as in the know”—lacking the discretion they will need if they are to become prudent rulers. “And because they are inexperienced at the same time, they think they tell the truth but are deceived in many things.” For these reasons, young men “should be discouraged most of all from the vanity of lying,” attempting “to get around old men with their deceptions.” Better that they “say little and to speak seldom, unless bidden to do so.” This will save them from “speaking at the wrong time” and from exposing their ignorance. 

    With their lack of experience, the young are “excessively credulous.” They change their opinions easily, “since their humors are in motion due to growth and they have in abundance the heat which is the principal cause of motion,” “follow[ing] their passions above all” because “the rational powers and prudence that could moderate their desires are weak.” Accordingly, “we must take care that our young people are kept pure for as long as possible, for premature sexual activity weakens both bodily and mental strength.” Keep them busy, physically and mentally, “for leisure makes young people inclined to lust and every intemperance”; “solitude…caresses a weak mind with constant thoughts about such things and prevents it from finding diversion elsewhere.” Keep them away from wine, as well, but “above all”—and here Vergerio at last invokes piety—it is “proper for a well-educated youth to respect and practice religion and to be steeped in religious belief” (while not being “carried away into old wives’ tales”) “from his earliest youth.” But even this has a ‘humanist’ aims: “What human thing will be worthy of respect to one who holds the divine in contempt?” Warn young men against “utter[ing] curses against holy things” or “hold[ing] up sacred names to scorn” or “swear[ing] lightly of their own accord, for those who swear rashly usually swear often.” (As, one might add, also do liars.)

    Youths should learn to accept criticism and admonishment. This advances self-knowledge. And “people who won’t listen to anything they dislike are the ones most vulnerable to deception,” surely a fatal flaw, especially among rulers. “Excessive parental leniency has generally softened and enervated young people,” a phenomenon “manifest in those who have been brought up in luxury under widowed mothers.” It is better to follow “the custom among certain nations” of bringing up children “outside their city, or at any rate among relatives and friends outside the home,” since “living in someone else’s home makes them less unruly and more inclined toward the better studies that we call liberal.”

    By concentrating a young aristocrat’s mind on how to educate a young aristocrat, Vergerio aims at hastening the youth’s maturation. Having thus prepared his student for a liberal education by inclining him to want one, he turns to what liberal studies are. 

    “We call those studies liberal…which are worthy of a free man: they are those through which virtue and wisdom are either practiced or sought, and by which the body or mind is disposed towards all the best things.” Through liberal study, “people customarily seek honor and glory which for the wise man are the principal rewards of virtue,” even as “profit and pleasure are laid down as ends for illiberal intellects.” Vergerio thus defines the purpose of liberal studies ‘aristocratically’— presenting wisdom as the quest for honor and glory, as befits the likely inclinations of his student. (It should be noted that the Carraresi family had been a major patron of the arts generally, including the liberal arts as taught at the University of Padua.) “We will not be, I say, wise in old age unless we have first begun to be wise in youth.” As an example, Vergerio cites the exchange between an old man and a young man. The old man jibed, “one who is so wise in his youth will inevitably be senile in his old age,” to which the youth replied, “So you must have been remarkably wise in your youth.” Wisdom begins with wit. 

    It won’t begin at all if suppressed “by threats and floggings.” “Excessive freedom unhinges good qualities” but “sharp unrelenting criticism saps intellectual energies and quenches the little fires that nature lights in children,” who “will dare nothing” if they “fear everything.” Special care should be taken with students inclined to melancholy; “it is a good idea to give them their head to enjoy freedom and fun.” As Aristotle and, later, Robert Burton knew “a great many clever people have this sort of complexion.”

    In keeping with the aristocratic ethos, the arts “that have the greatest affinity with cultivating virtue and obtaining glory” are the liberal arts and the arts of war. Your father, he tells Umbertino, wanted him to study only the arts of war (as Machiavelli would advise). But “you have embraced both with such tenacious diligence and zeal that you have left your contemporaries far behind,” not to say your ancestors, as you attempt “to add new renown in letters to your family’s old glory in arms.” You aspire not only to patronize the liberal arts but to practice them. Here, Vergerio displays his own mastery of rhetoric, carefully separating his student from his student’s father, in effect becoming his new father. While an “old Roman emperor” called the liberal arts “a poison and a public plague,” political communities “would be far more blessed, Plato says, if philosophers ruled or if their rulers happened to be philosophers,” and while “to be sure, it is true that the disciplines of letters take away neither madness nor wickedness,” they “are a great help to those who were born for virtue and wisdom, and they often provide the means for uncovering stupidity or more destructive kinds of wrongdoing,” which Socrates’ dialectical questioning indeed did. Vergerio now begins to point his student beyond the love of honor, beyond the claim that wisdom aims at glory. Indeed, “the pursuit of knowledge gives birth to wondrous pleasures in the human mind and in due course bears the richest fruits,” including a respite from the troubles of the life of ruling. “When we are alone and free from all our other cares, what better thing can we do than resort to our books.”

    “What has been entrusted to books endures forever.” Sculpture, painting, architecture—the arts Renaissance rulers prized and paid for—cannot really “describe the times,” as histories can, or “readily disclose motivation in all its variety.” But it is literature that “not only renders speech but also distinguishes styles of speaking and represents people’s thoughts.” As Socrates taught, a regime might readily be seen in a polis, but it is also present in a soul. A regime is a way of life, and “what way of life…can be more delightful, or indeed more beneficial, than to read and write all the time: for moderns to understand things ancient; for present generations to converse with their posterity; and thus to make every time our own, both past and future?” 

    “What a happy family books make! Absolutely honest and well-behaved,” with no “fussing, shouting, rapacity, voracity, stubbornness in the face of authority.” Perhaps the family of books is more congenial than the Carrari?

    It may be that a compromise can be worked out. The study of good books might enhance the family name. Those of “truly noble mind” and those “who are obliged to involve themselves in public affairs and human communities,” can attend primarily to history, moral philosophy, and rhetoric (“which is a distinct part of civics”). Moral philosophy can provide students with “correct views”; eloquence can enable them to win over “the minds of the masses”; history “helps us with both.” History teaches “things worth knowing from many centuries,” enabling us “to produce an example to illuminate every situation,” even as Aristotelian ethics guides us to considering right conduct in every situation. Of these arts, rhetoric is the one that “has now fallen almost totally into disuse,” not only in the law courts, where advocates now content themselves and the judges merely by citing laws against one another, but also in political communities, whether of the one or the few, in which princes and lords “want an opinion explained in few words and arguments brought nakedly into council, or in republics, where “the most brilliant speakers are thought to be those who speak artlessly and at great length.” Today, “in making speeches, nearly everyone uses those arts which may be more properly described as contrary to art.”

    Beyond the public realm, many more liberal arts beckon. Poetics and music, closely related, were much esteemed by the ancient Greeks, who considered no one “liberally educated unless he knew how to sing and play the lyre.” And rightly so: “not all movements of the soul, but those which accord with reason, contribute to a harmonious life,” and “the use of musical modes is highly effective in relaxing the mind and calming the passions,” if it is used for that purpose. It can also be used for the opposite purpose, as the warlike Carrari surely know.

    More comprehensive than knowledge of the human things, “knowledge about nature is especially appropriate to an in conformity with the human intellect, for through this knowledge we understand the principles and processes of natural things, along with “the causes and effects of the motions and transformations of those thing which are contained in heaven and on earth.” With arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, “we are able to explain many things that generally seem miraculous to the vulgar.” As for “the divine science,” metaphysics, Vergerio gives it rather short shrift.

    Each of these studies “could absorb all a man’s efforts.” It is best “to be content with modest learning,” just as it is best to be content “with modest wealth.” A man should “embrace the study most suitable to himself,” since some souls “are abstracted from sensible and material things, and more suited to understanding immaterial substances and universals,” while others incline to “busy themselves with particulars,” being “suited to practical wisdom and natural science.” (“Aristotle, indeed, being concerned with the active, civic life, believed one should not over-indulge in the liberal arts nor linger over them in pursuit of perfection,” becoming “of little use to his city.”) “People should follow the studies appropriate to their natural bent,” while selecting only the best books within their field of study. Do not attempt to “take in everything at the same time,” rendering yourself incapable of retaining anything in particular. In this and in other matters, “the easiest person to deceive is yourself.”

    Vergerio concludes with advice concerning non-liberal arts which, if properly managed, need not be illiberal but can support liberal studies, now reaffirming the authority of Umbertino’s father while effectively putting him in his place. Your father “glories most in his capacity for toil,” exhibiting praiseworthy physical courage. “One must believe he fears nothing—except, perhaps, the possibility that he might die an old man.” And indeed “we should not care overmuch for life,” “bear[ing] all things with equanimity and accept[ing] death calmly, whenever it comes, even hastening to meet it when circumstance or necessity demands.” “We ought not to fear that we have perchance lived too little, but rather that we have lived too little of the life we have lived.” Teach children “from their first years the capacity to dare great things and endure difficulties.”

    As to leisure: music, yes, since singing and percussion are “quite seemly,” although “whistling is less suitable to a gentleman”; dancing exercises the body but often makes young men “lustful and vain”; chess is more consonant with manliness, offering “a semblance of fighting and hostile contest,” but dice “either fosters a greed unsuited to a free person or a softness unbefitting a man.” There will be times, however, when “one needs to do absolutely nothing and be entirely free from work, so as to meet once again the demands of work and toil.” As Charles de Gaulle asked his friend, “Malraux, do you know how to do nothing?” [2]

    “I have written the foregoing for you, Ubertino, as I promised at the beginning, not to remind you that you should be doing something, but to show you to yourself.” If you “follow nature’s lead,” cultivating your “native gifts,” you will not “fail yourself” but proceed to fulfill the “brilliant promise” that I see in you. “Do not be false to those outstanding qualities you possess.”

    As it happened, Ubertino had little chance. Two years after this book was written, the Carrara family was hurled from rule of Padua. His father and older brothers were killed, and it is unclear what became of Vergerio’s student. What is clear that, as Vergerio hints in his encomium to books, the Character and Studies endured far longer, enjoying many printings in the fifteenth century and after. Deprived of his professorship by the conquering Venetians, Vergerio found employment with the pope.

     

    Notes

    1. On Hugh of St. Victor’s Didascalicon, see “Reading with Hugh of St. Victor” on this website, under the category, “Philosophers.”
    2. “It isn’t easy for a man to force himself into a discipline of idleness, but it essential. Life is not work: to work without stopping sends a man mad. Remember that. And to want to do so is a bad sign: those of your colleagues who could not stop working were by no means the best.” Charles de Gaulle, quoted in André Malraux: Felled Oaks: Conversation with De Gaulle. Irene Clephane and Linda Asher translation. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, p.41.

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    Thomas More’s Long Farewell

    September 30, 2026 by Will Morrisey

    Alvaro de Silva, ed.: The Last Letters of Thomas More. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000.

    Stephen Smith: The Last Riddle: Advice on Living and Dying Well from the Imprisoned Saint Thomas More. Washington, D.C.: Word on Fire Publishing, 2026.

     

    “Farewell! a long farewell, to all my greatness!” (Shakespeare, Henry VIII. III.2). So exclaims the anguished Cardinal, Archbishop of York Thomas Wolsey, upon being stripped of his role as Lord Chancellor of England by Henry VIII on proof of his corruption. Repenting of worldly ambition, Wolsey learns that his successor will be the scrupulously uncorrupt Thomas More, who had enjoyed a long career as an attorney, judge, diplomat, royal secretary and member of the Privy Council. As Catholics opposed to the king’s marriage to the Protestant Anne Boleyn, both men would later be charged with treason, Wolsey dying before a trial could be held, More declared guilty and beheaded. More’s long farewell to political greatness occurred in the Tower of London, the prison for traitors, where he wrote the letters collected in these volumes. Of the two, Smith adds the most value, presenting a series of excellent commentaries on the letters and appending several prayers More also wrote during his incarceration. For his part, de Silva begins with five letters More wrote before entering the Tower, letters which provide illuminating background to the later ordeal; he also provides some fine explanatory notes. 

    The first of these letters, dated February 1, 1534, addresses Thomas Cromwell, Wolsey’s friend and protégé and member of the Privy Council. As of this time, More had aroused Henry’s suspicion, having opposed the 1532 Submission to the Clergy Act, which stipulated that English clergy could “make no new laws without the king’s approval,” which Smith rightly describes as a de facto installment of Henry as head of the Church in England. More then resigned his position as Lord Chancellor. In the following year, Henry married Anne Boleyn, his marriage to Katherine annulled by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Cranmer. More “refused to attend the coronation.” 

    By the time of this letter, More has been accused of having written a hostile answer to The Book of Nine Articles, a polemic published in the previous year against Pope Clement VII, who had refused Henry permission to divorce his Catholic queen, Catherine of Aragon, preliminary to his marriage to Anne. More thus stands accused of being a secret traitor to the king. On the contrary, he tells Cromwell, “I am of duty to God and the King’s Grace,” ready to “discharge my conscience” with respect to both. “I know my bounden duty, to bear more honor to my prince, and more reverence to his honorable [Privy] Council, than it could become me, for many causes, to make an answer unto such a book.” But this is not the end of the charges. A few weeks later, a bill of attainder was issued against him, accusing him of communicating with Elizabeth Barton, the “Nun of Canterbury,” who had claimed to have had divinely inspired visions compelling her to criticize Henry’s divorce and remarriage. Cromwell reports that More has been accused not only of communicating with the Nun, but of concurring with her judgment.

    More admits that he knew of her and had examined a record of the words she had spoken in her trances. Father Richard Risby, the Friar’s Observant at Canterbury, had told him of the Nun’s “revelation” of “three swords,” as she had reported to Cardinal Wolsey. They were: “take none of the Pope’s right and patrimony from him”; “destroy all these new folks of opinion”—the Protestants—and “the works of their new learning”; if the king marries Anne Boleyn, God will be avenged. More explains to Cromwell that when Risby began to tell him of the Nun’s criticism of “the great matter of [Henry’s] marriage” to him, he had rejected any further discussion, replying simply that he doubted not “but the goodness of God should direct his highness with his grace and wisdom, that the thing should take such end as God should be pleased with, to the King’s honor and surety of the realm.” As for his own communication with the Nun, he had met with her later on and had asked for her prayers; he did not discuss the visions that others had attributed to her. Instead, they conferred about another woman who had claimed to receive divine revelations, which the Nun, in conference with her, condemned as “plain illusions of the devil”; this rebuke “hath wrought much meekness in her soul,” the Nun told More. The Nun further remarked, “how great need folk have, that are visited with such visions, to take heed and prove well of what spirit they come of.” She herself had been troubled by an evil spirit in the form of “a strange ugly fashioned bird,” which she had promptly thrown out the window. “We talked no word of the King’s Grace or any great personage else.” Further, More continues, the Nun eventually confessed the fraudulence of her revelation (possibly under coercion).

    In sum, “I trust verily no man will, and I wot well truly no man can, any word or deed by me spoken or done, touching any breach of my loyal troth and duty toward my most redoubted sovereign and natural liege lord”—natural, in the sense that Henry is his sovereign by birth, not by conquest. For “I neither have in this matter done evil nor said evil, nor so much as any evil thought.” He vows to Cromwell, “neither good man nor bad, neither monk, friar nor nun, nor other man or woman in this world shall make me digress from my troth and faith, either toward God, or toward my natural prince, by the grace of Almighty God.” At this point, More seems confident that his loyalty to God and King Henry can be reconciled. And so he tells the king himself, in a letter dated March 5: “unto myself it is not possible any part of my said demeanor to seem evil, the very clearness of mine own conscience knoweth in all the matter of my mind and intent so good.” Citing Henry’s “high prudence,” “accustomed goodness,” and “virtuous mind,” he avers that if he should prove “a wretch of such monstruous ingratitude” as his accusers claim, “then desire I no further favor at you gracious hand, than the loss of all that every I may lose in this world, goods, lands, and liberty and finally my life withal,” in the assurance that they will meet someday “again in heaven, and there by merry with you.” Meanwhile, his slanderers, “by the peril of their own souls, do themself more hurt than me.” 

    On the same day, More wrote his final letter to Cromwell, thanking him for interceding with the king on More’s behalf. The core of the controversy lies in questions surrounding Henry’s marriage to Katherine of Aragon in 1509. She had previously been married to his brother, Prince Arthur, then presumptive heir to the English throne. Arthur died a few months later. Henry and Katherine produced a daughter, Mary, but no sons, and in the next two decades Henry became increasingly displeased with the lack of a male heir. In this letter, More recalls a conversation from several years earlier in which the king had disclosed that “it was now perceived that his marriage to Katherine of Aragon was not only against the positive laws of the Church and the written law of God, but also in such wise against the law of nature, that it could in no wise by the Church be dispensable”—i.e., relaxed in this particular case, inasmuch as a pope can only do so with ecclesiastical laws. Katherine maintained that her previous marriage to Prince Arthur had never been consummated, which would have made her marriage to his brother, Henry, legitimate, but Henry suspected otherwise and eventually found English authorities who went along with his quest for a new wife.

    Henry showed More the Levitical law prohibiting a man to wed the wife of his brother, on penalty of the childless deaths of both spouses. Since Henry and Katherine did have a child, this would have seemed irrelevant, no proof that Katherine’s marriage to Arthur had been consummated, but a scholar friendly to the king claimed that the correct translation was not “childless” but “without sons.” (De Silva observes that this is incorrect, that the ordinary translation is the right one.) For his part, in the presence of the king More modestly declined to interpret the passage, preferring not to pronounce the judgment of “my poor mind in so great a matter,” while holding out the possibility of considering it further. This Henry allowed, assuring him, crucially, that More was free to follow his conscience in his interpretation of the law. Since then, More assures Cromwell, he has made no such interpretation, preferring neither to “murmur” at the new marriage nor to “meddle” in it, instead joining the king’s “other faithful subjects” in “faithfully praying to God for his Grace and hers both, long to live and well and their noble issue too, in such wise as may be to the pleasure of God, honor and surety to themself, rest, peace, wealth, and profit unto this noble realm.” He does, however, regard the general councils of the Catholic Church as authoritative, since “I never could perceive but that in the declaration of the truths [the Church] is to be believed and to be standen to; the authority thereof ought to be taken for undoubtable, or else were there in nothing no certainty, but through Christendom upon every man’s affectionate reason, all things might be brought from day to day to continual ruffle and confusion,” as indeed was occurring, with the Protestant movement. He concludes with a request for another favorable intervention by Cromwell with the king, saying he cannot “find in mine heart otherwise to say than as mine own conscience giveth me, which condition hath never grown in anything that ever might touch his gracious pleasure of any obstinate mind or misaffectionate appetite, but of a timorous conscience rising haply for lack of better perceiving.” One might recall, however, the Gospel story: “The Son of Man is about to be delivered into the hands of men” (Luke 9:44).

    Smith’s commentary begins with More’s April 1534 letter to his elder daughter, Margaret Roper. More has, he reports, “refused the oath”—that is, the Oath of Succession, required by the Act of Succession, passed earlier that year, which established children born of the Henry-Anne marriage as the rightful heirs in the stead of Mary, daughter of Henry and Katherine. In response to interrogation by the King’s Commissioners, he had said, “My purpose was not to put any fault either in the Act or any man that made it, or in the oath or any man that sware it, nor to condemn the conscience of any other man.” For himself, however, he considered that “I could not swear without the jeoparding of my soul to perpetual damnation”—damnation, because the oath implicitly denied the spiritual authority of the pope, betokening schism in the Church. Exerting what much later generations would call peer pressure, the Commissioners told him that “I was the first that ever refused it” and the king’s suspicions would intensify. But, More counter-argues, if you will not trust me in my protestations of loyalty to His Majesty, why would you suppose that you could trust me if I swore an oath? To this, the Commissioners ordered him to think things over in a garden outside; he never quite got there, preferring to stay in another room, watching the “pageant” of men in the garden who had signed the oath, who may have been placed there to pressure him further. Summoned back to the Commissioners’ meeting, he heard the Archbishop of Canterbury’s argument that, since he did not condemn those who had sworn, he must be uncertain and therefore must obey the king. More answered that “I am not…bounden to change my conscience, and confirm [i.e., conform] it to the council of one realm.” England, “against the general council of Christendom,” the Catholic Church. (This, of course, was Henry’s intention: to found an Anglican Church ruled by himself.) As for other men, he repeated that he would “leave every man to his own conscience” and hoped that “every man should leave me to mine”—an application of the Biblical injunction to judge not, that you not be judged. Da Silva intervenes with a fine note, observing that by “conscience” More most assuredly does not invoke “modern individualism or moral relativism.” Rather, More “believed that the authority of conscience [is] anchored in objective reality and in the community of faith, in what Thomas Aquinas and other medieval theologians had called veritas rerum, ‘the truth of things.'” Conscience is no mere feeling, depending rather “upon right reason and a well-disposed will,” a reason and a will formed by “the life and teachings of Christ, as transmitted by the Church.” That is, “the Christian’s inner voice is Christ himself.” And as Smith remarks, “one great goal of Thomas More’s writing, exemplified in these prison letters, may be understood as helping to foster, fashion, and forge a truly free and virtuous reader”—that is, indeed to shape that reader’s conscience as the Church intends. “The road to truth and good conscience is long and requires real diligence, patience, and humility,” very much in resistance to tyrants, for whom “there is nothing worse…than the free and strong judgment of such a virtuous reader.”

    More’s second letter to Margaret is personal, not reportorial, He assures her that his body is “in good health,” his mind “in good quiet.” Ask Our Lord to “make you all merry in the hope of heaven,” trusting in the Holy Spirit and His teachings, which must substitute for the teachings that your father would otherwise be present to instill. Smith directs readers to More’s Treatise upon the Passion, where he argues that man’s “original calling” is “to be of real service to others through a life of diligent labor and care, all be performed with good hope and active love,” a love corrupted by the disobedience of Adam and Eve. “In More’s thinking, human redemption involves the vital recovery of our original vocation.” Even while imprisoned, More intends to continue his service to family and friends. The latter included John Fisher, the bishop of Rochester and confessor to Queen Katherine, whom da Silva describes as “the only member of the English hierarchy who remained faithful to the Roman Pontiff.” He too would be rewarded with a beheading. The two men exchanged letters and gifts; in one letter, Fisher wittily suggested that More defend himself by observing that the statute establishing Henry as the supreme head of the English church used “the word ‘maliciously'” to describe refusal; “therefore a man who spoke nothing of malice did not offend the statute.” With equal good humor, More wrote back, concurring but “fear[ing] that [the statute} would not be so interpreted” by his judges.

    Margaret next sent a letter imploring her father to take the oath, for the sake of his family and friends. Following the suggestion of the first editor of More’s letters, which were published in 1557, Smith suspects that this was actually a ploy to get Cromwell to allow her to visit him in the Tower. Be that as it may, More replies that while danger to those he loves is “a deadly grief to me,” worse than any death sentence that may be handed down by his captors, “I can no further but commit all unto God.” It is the fear of God’s displeasure, not the fear of men’s displeasure, that has “stirred my own conscience,” in reverent imitation of Christ’s passion on the Cross. “And thus my dear daughter, the blessed spirit of Christ for his tender mercy govern and guide you all, to his pleasure and your weal and comfort both body and soul.” This effectually reminds his daughter that Christ rules, in finality, what secular rulers rule temporarily; while we may hope for the best on earth, and More does so hope for their sake, we may need to bear a cross of our own. To this, Margaret replied, picking up on her father’s mention of comfort, that his family’s comfort in this ordeal has been “the experience we have had of your life past and godly conversation, and wholesome counsel, and virtuous example.” This being so, we may hope to “meet with you, mine own dear father, in the bliss of heaven to which our most merciful Lord has bought us with his precious blood.” After another visit from Margaret, More wrote a letter to “all his friends,” requesting that any request she makes of them be considered as if it had come from himself. If a friend is ‘another self,’ then Margaret may have been not only his daughter but the closest of his friends.

    There follow two of the most important letters in the collection, from August 1834, usually referred to as the “Dialogue of Conscience.” The first is a letter from More’s stepdaughter, Alice Alington, to Margaret, the second ostensibly Margaret’s reply to Alice, but likely written by More himself. Alice reports a conversation she had with Lord Chancellor Audley, in which he told her two of Aesop’s fables. In the first, there is a country in which a few were wise, many fools—not an unheard-of circumstance. The wise, whose superior wisdom consists of a combination of natural and divine science, learned that a cursed rain was about to fall, one that would make everyone in the country a fool—making the wise fools, too, and the existing fools (presumably) even more foolish. With apparent wisdom, they dug caves in which to hide from the rain. Upon emerging from the caves after the rain, expecting to rule the many with ease, they were shocked to find that the many fools simply ganged up on them, making their wisdom useless. They might as well have allowed themselves to be rained on; at least then they would have shared rule with their fellow fools. Audley implies that More and his friends are the wise minority, but not so wise practically, in failing to follow the majority who have sworn fealty to England’s new, statist and tyrannical, regime. Smith observes that for Audley, “the desire of the wise and the foolish proves the same”; it is libido dominandi. The will to power of the ‘theoretically’ wise fails because they are not practically wise; their scientific knowledge does them no good because they don’t understand the ‘power politics’ they attempt to play. More is not only no wiser, practically, than the foolish majority, he is also no better, spiritually or morally, as he (Audley suspects) is motivated by the same tyrannical passion as everyone else.

    The second fable consists of the confessions of a lion, an ass, and a wolf. The lion confesses that he has devoured all beasts that he comes upon. The priest forgives him because the lion is a king, an official who ought to make himself feared, and it is “also his nature” to devour. The ass ate a straw in his master’s shoe, and even that small subtraction made his poor master cold. The priest sends him to the bishop. The wolf, a carnivore like the lion, was put on a strict diet by the priest, but became so hungry that he ate not only a whole cow but her calf, too. His conscience judges him blameless, since a cow and a calf are worth nearly nothing—to the conscience of a wolf. So much for the priest-imposed diet. Here, the king is of course Henry, the pardoned heavy eater. The ass, as Smith interprets the passage, is Thomas More, who orients himself by the teachings of the Bishop of Rome. The wolf is the one Thomas More should be, if he were to follow Audley’s counsel. Alternatively, it might be the real More whom the wolf represents, an animal that makes too much of his conscience, which only ‘justifies’ his own predatory nature. In that reading, the ass might represent those who have taken the oath, similar in their nature to the fool-majority in the first fable, their punishment (if they eventually receive one) deferred to the judgment of a higher authority, a bishop who happens now to be under the control of the lion-king.

    However Audley intended this Aesopian wisdom to be understood, he is tempting More through the medium of his stepdaughter, who pronounces herself displeased by them but at a loss for an answer. The letter signed by Margaret provides her with a very fine one. She (or more probably More himself, writing in her name) reports that she has warned her father that if he doesn’t change is mind he is “likely to lose all those friends that are likely to do you any good.” More rejected this suggestion as serpentine. De Silva quotes Augustine on the point, that Adam ate the fruit not out of concupiscence but out of “attachment and affection [to Eve], by which it often happens that we offend God while we try to keep the friendship of men.” More told her, “If it were possible for me to do the thing that might content the King’s Grace, and God therewith not offended, there hath no man taken this oath already more gladly than I would do,” in gratitude to the king’s many favors. But my conscience will not let me do it, “and “for the instruction of my conscience in the matter, I have not slightly looked, but by many years studied and advisedly considered.” Conscience requires instruction and thought, and it tells him “that either I must deadly displease” God, “or abide any worldly harm that he shall for mine other sins, under name of this thing, suffer to fall upon me.” This is an important teaching for Alice and Margaret to receive. They, and others, might suppose that More will suffer punishment because his refusal to take the oath is sinful, a violation of Romans 13. On the contrary, his refusal is the right action to take, and God allows him to be punished only apparently for it, but really for previous sinful acts which he, along with his daughters and the rest of us, do commit. He trusts that God “should give me strength rather to endure all things, than offend him by swearing ungodly against mine own conscience”; “I look in this matter but only unto God,” even “though men call it as it pleaseth them and say it is no conscience but a foolish scruple.” If wisdom is what enables human beings to distinguish between appearance and reality, More thus imparts some of his wisdom to the women.

    More then turned to a refutation of Chancellor Audley’s use of the two fables from Aesop. Recalling that Thomas Wolsey, when he was Lord Chancellor, used the first fable to great effect in persuading Henry to intervene on the continent against the French king—comparing those advisers who counseled against intervention to the seeming-wise men who tried to escape calamity by hiding in caves—More interprets the fable to mean that the self-supposed wise men were “stark fools before the rain came.” What is more, according to the Gospel, the ‘fools’ who trust in God are fools only in appearance, only in the eyes of the world. “I trust my Lord reckoneth me among the fools, and so reckon I myself, as my name is in Greek”—as more indeed is. Those who charge that he is animated by libido dominandi, rather than Christian conscience, are simply mistaken. “I was one of the greatest rulers in this noble realm,” but he gave up his high office at his conscience’s command. He cites Boethius’ simile in The Consolation of Philosophy, where his esteemed predecessor in martyrdom wrote that a man who takes pride in ruling other men “is much like as one mouse would be proud to bear a rule over other mice in a barn.” [1] Rather than that, “God, I say, gave us the grace so wisely to rule ourself here” by remaining awake to His promises. I shall never “pin my soul at another man’s back, not even the best man that I know this day living”—perhaps Lord Rochester, perhaps Erasmus.” Yes, those who want me to take the oath and save my life may mean well, but they would “carry my soul a wrong way.” Some even ‘wisely’ say one thing, take the oath, while thinking the contrary—in anticipation of the recommendations of some Jesuits in the next century, the ones Pascal condemned—but More will have none of that. 

    Calling her now “Marget” (the French word for apple, as Smith notes with amusement, in view of her “serpentine” temptation), More tells her his own fable, which is no fable at all but as instructive as one. A man named “Company” held out on a corrupted jury, refusing to be companionable with men in order to avoid companionship’ with lost souls in Hell—a wise choice, indeed. “I pray thee now, good Marget, tell me this, Wouldst you wish thy poor father being at the leastwide somewhat learned, less to regard the peril of his soul than did there the honest unlearned man?” He wittily lodges an imaginary plea to those respected men who want him to go along to get along with them. You want me to swear to the oath as you have done, to “sware because you sware,” to go along because you went along. Very well, then, “let me not go alone” in following my conscience; “if there be any good fellowship with you, some of you come with me.” Fellowship should work both ways, should it not? Conscience is a form of company. With More, it keeps him in good company with God, the Church, and with himself. His soul is rightly ordered.

    As for the law, attorney More observes that “every man being born and inhabiting” England, where the common law rules, “is bounden to the keeping in every case upon some temporal pain, and in many cases upon pain of God’s displeasure too, yet is there no man bounden to swear that every law is well made, nor bounden upon the pain of God’s displeasure, to perform any such point of the law, as were indeed unlawful.” And even the oath, which requires Englishmen to follow Henry in his break with the Catholic Church, ignores the laws established not by one segment of the Church but by the whole Church in its general councils. No Christian need follow a law laid down in contradiction to the Canon Law as determined by those councils, unless under the command of “special revelation and express commandment of God.” Thus “I can see none that lawfully may command and compel any man to change his own opinion, and to translate his own conscience from the one side to the other.” What is more, some of More’s critics have themselves changed their opinion on this matter, whereas More has stood fast. They are in the majority, you say? Not really, if you count, as you should, those in Christendom as a whole, “well learned men and virtuous that are yet alive.” Then add the saints who are long dead. If I follow God, trusting that He will keep me in His grace, “no man shall do me hurt but if he do me wrong.” And if they do me wrong, I reply with a riddle of my own: “A man may leese his head and have no harm.” He has built a “castle for the safeguard of mine own soul.” 

    Margaret made one last attempt. What if you are executed, but you would have changed your mind, had you lived longer? No, he replies: the only motive he could have for changing his mind would be fear of bodily torture and death, which count for little against spiritual and eternal torture and death. “I know myself.” I might succumb to fear, but God’s grace “hath strengthened me hitherto, and make me content in my heart, to lose goods, land and life too, rather than to swear against my conscience.” (At the same time, as Smith observes, he will not judge those who have sworn the oath as fearful, although he evidently suspects that they are.) The king “hath taken from me nothing but my liberty,” for which loss he has been more than compensated by “the spiritual profit that I trust I take thereby.” I am no better than the Apostle Peter, whom he, like all Catholics, regards as the one designated by Jesus as the first pope; he and the other apostles feared for their lives in the boat on the Sea of Galilee, only to be rebuked by Jesus as men of little faith. “I trust that [God’s] goodness will cast upon me his tender piteous eye, as he did upon Saint Peter and make me stand up again and confess the truth of my conscience afresh, and abide the shame and the harm here of mine own fault.”

    Here, Smith makes an especially fine observation: In refusing to eat the “apple” that is Alice’s letter, with its deceptive, serpentine interpretations of Aesop’s fables, an apple proffered by Margaret whom he initially, playfully-seriously calls “Eve,” then “Marget” or apple, More would turn her into the “Daughter Margaret,” as he calls her at the end of the letter. In this, he shows himself “ready for the experience of this great testing point of his mind, soul, body, and character.” And he also shows Margaret “how he has retained his peace and gladness of soul, even under such trial.” If he can do so, cannot she? Not by herself, but guided by her father and relying on strength of soul fortified or even provided altogether by God’s strength. Smith quotes the Apostle Paul, quoted by More “several times in the Tower”: “We know that all things work together for good for those who love God, who are called according to his purpose.” “Serve God, be merry, and rejoice—here are the three parting counsels from More to his daughter, likely coauthor [of this letter], and friend.” He may not be able to convince the others of his conscientious insights, but her, yes.

    The following two letters went to Dr. Nicholas Wilson, chaplain and confessor to Henry VIII. More recalls Wilson’s extensive research on the question of marriage and divorce, particularly the relevant question at hand, namely, whether it is licit to marry one’s brother’s wife. By now, Wilson had been imprisoned in the Tower (he would be released three years later, after surrendering and signing the oath). More cites many Church Fathers on the subject, and they agreed on their interpretations of these authorities. Yet More still refuses to admit his reasons for signing the oath, “for they be secret to mine own conscience.” I shall “make answer to God, and shall leave every other man to his own” conscience. “I put my trust in God and in the merits of his bitter passion, and I beseech him to give me and keep me the mind to long to be out of this world and to be with him.” Smith remarks More’s refusal to become “a partisan over the oath.” He has eschewed factitious statements and acts “in an already fraught political situation in his country.” That is, at exactly a moment when More seems least ‘political,’ he exercises sober political judgment. As for Wilson, he was wavering, perhaps hoping (in Smith’s words) “to escape the drama of his own conscience, the burden of thinking, deliberating, and freely choosing and acting for himself,” hoping that More could decide the matter for him with an airtight argument against the oath. If so, More’s insistence on “meddl[ing] with no man but of myself, nor of no man’s conscience…but of mine own” must have frustrated him. More prefers to offer him the comfort of prayer. Just as Henry had told More to look first to God, only then to his English king, so More now tells Wilson to look first to God in prayer, only then to More. The difference is that More will not go back on his advice. Smith emphasizes how these letters from More to his “fellow prisoner, professional colleague, and friend,” concluding with the sentence, “in God is all,” illustrates “the spirit of friendship” as it should be among Christians. Shortly before his execution, More would write a letter to another friend, the Italian merchant and friend of the humanists, Antonio Bonvisi, who had been sending supplies to him in the Tower. Calling him “of all friends most friendliest,” More thanked him for his kindness. “This faithful prosperity of this amity and friendship of yours towards me (I wot not how) seemeth in a manner to counterpoise this unfortunate shipwreck of mine.” Calling their friendship a gift from God, even greater than Bonvisi’s gifts to him, he bade him farewell. In Smith’s words, “This priceless letter communicates as clearly as anything More ever wrote his character and vision as an author and a man,” a man grateful that Bonvisi has remained his friend despite More’s inability to do anything for him. “The worst of times for Thomas More was the best of times for their friendship. It is also to be noted that More was actually capable of doing something for Bonvisi.” In praying to God that they both “hold cheap all the riches of this world all the glory of the whole universe, and even the sweetness of life itself, for the ardent desire of that joy” that will come to those who spend eternity in His company, he provides a gentle reminder to a man of great worldly wealth.

    In response to a grateful letter from Margaret, thanking him for his latest “most godly and loving letter,” which gave her heart “inestimable comfort,” More repeats that “to the world, wrong may seem right sometimes by false conjecturing” (More has studied philosophy), “sometimes by false witnesses” (as the practiced lawyer has seen in the many trials). The world calls his refusal of the oath “an heinous offense” and “my religious fear toward God” an instance of “obstinacy toward my Prince.” If women are more ‘social’ than men, more inclined to look for peace with their neighbors, it may be that More wants to shore up his daughter’s conscience on that side. His refusal to divulge his reasons for declining the oath might exasperate “my most dreadful Sovereign Lord and Prince” even more than his supposed obstinacy. If the king relents, he will declare his reasons. Meanwhile, he will continue to live in gratitude to God has granted him the strength to resist his fear of pain and death, enabling him to govern himself by “reason with help of faith,” which solves the “riddle” of how “a man may lose his head and yet have none harm, but instead of harm inestimable good at the hand of God.” 

    “I thank our Lord in this quiet and comfort is mine heart at this day, and I trust in God’s goodness so shall have grace to continue, yet (as I said before) I verily trust that God shall so inspire and govern the King’s heart that he shall not suffer his noble heart and courage to requite my true faithful heart and service with such extreme unlawful and uncharitable dealing only for the displeasure that I cannot think so as other do. But his true subject will I live and die, and truly pray for him will I, both here and in the other world, too.”

    More’s wife, Lady Alice More, has not been passive in this ordeal. Around Christmas of 1534, she wrote to Henry, asking him to have compassion for her husband’s physical condition (he suffered from several painful afflictions while imprisoned, including kidney stones) and the family’s impending financial ruin. By this time, Parliament had passed the Act of Supremacy, making the king the Supreme Head of the Church of England, a formal break with the Catholic Church. A few months later, Parliament, again at the king’s behest, passed the Act of Treason which made speaking maliciously against the king’s new title an act of treason punishable by disembowelment. Under these circumstances, Mrs. More’s hope for an exhibition of “tender pity and compassion upon” her husband’s “long distress and great heaviness,” and her plea for allowing him “to live the remnant of his life with your poor said beadswoman his wife and other of your poor suppliants his children,” was unlikely to induce His Majesty to unbend, and he did not. Just before More’s execution, she would write a similar letter to Privy Council member Thomas Cromwell, who would himself be executed by the king, a few years later. This letter had no better effect than the other.

    Early in 1535, More wrote to Stephen Leder, the Vicar of Ware, who had told him of rumors that More had capitulated and signed the oath. Not so, and “I trust in the great goodness of God, that he shall never suffer it to be true.” On the contrary, I shall continue to refuse, “not for obstinacy but for the salvation of my soul, because I cannot induce mine own mind otherwise to think than I do concerning the oath.” Nor has he, or will he, write to the king to beg for mercy—again, not out of obstinacy “but rather of a lowly mind and a reverent,” preferring not to further irritate Henry, who gives every evidence of being convinced that More is a man of ill intent. He quotes Proverbs 21:1: God is the one “in whose hand the hearts of Kings are,” and he “commit[s] the whole matter” to Him.

    In his final letters to Margaret, he reports on his last appearances before his judges, the four undoubting Thomases: Cromwell, Audley, Cranmer, and Howard. Cromwell showed him the text of the Act of Supremacy. More contented himself with saying that he remained “the King’s true faithful subject,” one who continued to pray for him. He professed no intention to “meddle in the world again”; “my whole study should be upon the passion of Christ and mine own passage out of this world.” Upon being handed a copy of the Treasons Act he repeated what he had said before. “And if this be not enough to keep a man alive in good faith I long not to live”; “therefore my poor body is at the King’s pleasure, would God my death might do him good.” 

    In still another hearing, in which he was informed that Henry was “nothing content nor satisfied with mine answer” because his “obstinate mind and an evil toward” Henry, expressed by his “demeanor” had “been occasion of much grudge and harm in the realm,” he “answered that I had no malignity and therefore I could none utter,” “very heavy” though he was “that the King’s Highness should have any such opinion of me.” He now said what he had previously told Margaret, and Margaret only, that “a man may in such case lose his head and have no harm.” He politely declined to incriminate himself by stating his objections to the statute. At this point, Cromwell recalled that, as Lord Chancellor, More had himself exacted confessions from accused men. To this, More pointed to “a difference between those two cases”: “at that time, as well here as elsewhere through the corps of Christendom, the Pope’s power was recognized for an undoubted thing which seemeth not like a thing agreed in this realm and the contrary taken for truth in other realms.” To Cromwell’s threat of death, More considered “the difference in charge of conscience” as “the difference [that] standeth between [be]heading and hell.” 

    “Much was then answered unto this by Master Secretary [Cromwell] and my Lord Chancellor [Audley],” which answers would be “over long to rehearse,” as they doubtless were. For a final time, they demanded that he sign the oath. At his refusal, “Master Secretary said that he liked me this day much worse than he did the last time, for then he said he pitied me much and now he thought that I meant not well.” To this, More tells his daughter, “God and I know both that I mean well and so I pray God do by me.”

    The day before his death on July 6, 1535, More wrote to her, recalling the martyred Thomas Beckett and telling her, “tomorrow long I go to God,” as it is the saint’s feast day “Fare well my dear child and pray for me, and I shall for you and all your friends that we may merrily meet in heaven.”

    _________

    One of Smith’s finest choices as editor of these letters has been to append four of Smith’s short Tower writings and some illuminating quotations from his last interview with the king’s inquisitors. In these, More does not address his daughter, in which correspondence he lovingly navigates the Biblical injunction to subordinate one’s love of family, love of one’s own, to the love of God with a father’s love for his loving child. He rather addresses, first, all Christians and indeed all human beings, and finally his persecutors, giving them the confession they had long sought while making it clear that they are the ones who should be confessing.

    In “A Godly Instruction,” More advances the reasoned justification for the Biblical command to love enemies. “Bear no malice nor evil will to no man living.” Why not? The man whom I hate is either good or bad. If I hate a good man, I am evil. If I hate a bad man, two things might happen: he might “amend and die good and go to God”; he might not amend, die evil, “and go to the devil.” If he and I are both saved, we will find ourselves together in loving harmony in the Kingdom of God. Why, then, should I be the “enemy to him with whom I shall in time coming be coupled in eternal friendship?” If, however, he continues in the way of evil and “be damned, then is there so outrageous eternal sorrow towards him that I may well think myself a deadly cruel wretch if I would not now rather pity his pain than malign his person.” Better to “pray for such merciful amendment in other folk as our own conscience showeth us that we have need in ourselves.” This last adjuration illuminates More’s reflections on conscience in the Letters. There, he understandably concentrates his attention on the accusations against himself, justifying his conduct in his own eyes and in the eyes of those who are willing to see. He remarks his own sinfulness but emphasizes his conscientious sinlessness with respect to the charges. Here, he turns his examination of conscience inward, upon himself, upon More as sinner leaving no possible misperception of him as self-righteous.

    In a second “Godly Instruction,” More turns to reasoning on the threat of death, paraphrasing Scripture: “Whosoever so saveth his life that he displeaseth God thereby shall soon after, to his no little grief, full sore mislike the same.” Every man must die; that you know. What you don’t know is “how, or how soon.” If you attempt to delay your death, you risk bringing down “the everlasting torments in hell,” given your human, all-too-human propensity to succumb to sin. By escaping death in this world, you merely delay the inevitable “for a while.” Further, suffering here provides you with an opportunity to “wholly commit” your soul “into the hands of God,” your “trusty and faithful Creator.” You will imitate Christ in His willingness to suffer—far more intensely than you ever will—while trusting in His Father, in the promise of Resurrection. “Inasmuch as ye be partakers of Christ’s pains and Passion, full heartily rejoice, that thou mayest likewise rejoice at the revelation of his glory.” And “what a shame were it for a Christian man to be content rather to lose the life and bliss everlasting than suffer a short death somewhat before his time.” As for himself, it is “my firm hope” that “he which so dearly bought me will not, without my own damnable fault, lose me to his most malicious enemy.” 

    “A Godly Meditation” is a poem addressed not directly to men but to God, for the benefit of men. In it, he asks for God’s grace to enable him “to set the world at naught.” He would put his mind on God, not on “the blast of men’s mouths.” He would find contentment in solitude, “rid[ding] my mind of all worldly business” in order “to lean upon the comfort of God.” Repenting of his sins, accepting his suffering as punishment for them, he wishes “gladly to bear my purgatory here.” (More fully accepts the Church’s teaching on Purgatory, but may suffering on earth reduce one’s time in it?) He would “foresee and consider the everlasting fire of hell,” grateful therefore to Christ in His supreme suffering. Mindful of his own inclination to playfulness and witty speech, he determines “to eschew light foolish mirth and gladness,” the temptation to take his merriment too far. Finally, he would “think my most enemies my best friends,” in view of the fact that Joseph’s brothers “could neve have done him so much good with their love and favor as they did him with their malice and hatred.” To put oneself in the mind of More’s unworldly ambitions is “more to be desired of every man”—not only in More, in the Tower, faced with his accusers—than “all the treasure of all the princes and kings, Christian and heathen, were it gathered and laid together all upon one heap.”

    “A Devout Prayer,” written a few days before his execution in July 1535, consists of an eloquent elaboration of the Jesus Prayer: “Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me, a sinner.” Imploring God to “take from me…this lukewarm fashion, or rather key-cold manner of meditation, and this dullness in praying unto thee,” he asks instead for “warmth, delight, and quickness in thinking upon thee.” He alludes to Revelation 3:15-16, where Jesus warns the Church of Laodicea, “Because thou art lukewarm—neither hot nor cold—I am about to spit you out of my mouth.” Christ’s Passion should not be met with men’s indifference. He asks for mercy not only for himself but for “all that bear me evil will, and would me harm,” whom he hopes to see in Heaven. As Smith well observes, “More longs for all his actions to savor of the Holy Spirit.” 

    In the end, More told his inquisitors exactly what he thought of the Oath of Succession, the Act of Succession upon which it was based, and the other legal innovations establishing Henry as the head of a centralized, Machiavellian, modern state. “This indictment is grounded upon an act of Parliament directly repugnant to the Lawson God and his holy Church, the supreme government of which or of any part whereof, may no temporal prince presume by any law to take upon him, as rightfully belonging to the See of Rome.” As “but one member and small part of the Church,” England “may not make a particular law disagreeable with the general law of Christ’s universal Catholic Church.” Further, England’s Magna Carta stipulates that the English Church shall be “free and have all of its rights whole and its liberties uninjured,” rights now violated by Parliament and king. In addition, Henry took an oath of obedience to the See of Rome upon his coronation. The “pestiferous law” appointing Henry as “Head of the Church of England” contradicts “all human and divine laws.” More charges that “the one single cause” of his persecution unto death has been his unwillingness “to consent to the second marriage of the King.” He hopes for clemency not from the king but from God, and he hopes for God’s clemency for his enemies. “We read that Saint Paul persecuted Blessed Stephen, but they are now together in heaven,” and “so all of us, though we disagree in this life, will nevertheless agree in another life with perfect charity.”

     

    Notes

    1. Smith suggests, plausibly, that the Consolation served as “a great inspiration for More’s own Dialogue of Comfort Against Tribulation,” the “masterpiece” among the writings he composed in the Tower.

     

     

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    “Sir Thomas More”: the Play

    September 23, 2026 by Will Morrisey

    Anthony Munday, Henry Chettle et al.: Sir Thomas More. John Jowett, editor. London: The Arden Shakespeare, 2025. 

    The first draft of this play was written ca. 1600. It underwent subsequent revisions by Chettle, most notably by William Shakespeare, by Thomas Dekker (himself no mean playwright), by  Thomas Heywood, and by two anonymous ‘hands.’

     

    Sir Thomas More seems never to have been produced, and there is little wonder in that. It presents a sympathetic portrait of More, whom King Henry VIII had beheaded for refusing to sign the Oath of Succession stipulating that the king’s heir would be the children of the newly crowned queen, the Protestant Anne Boleyn. Famously or notoriously, Henry had divorced his wife of many years, Catholic Katherine of Aragon, in favor of Protestant Anne. This was part of Henry’s construction of a modern state in England along the lines commended by Machiavelli in The Prince. Such a state would break from feudalism by centralizing monarchic authority; in England, it would break with the Catholic Church, as Henry founded a ‘state church,’ the Anglican Church, which he could control—again, very much in line with Machiavelli and his philosophic follower, Francis Bacon (himself a mentor of Thomas Hobbes). To refuse to sign the Oath was an act of treason against the new regime. And it in effect denied the legitimacy of Henry’s daughter, Queen Elizabeth I, mother of the reigning monarch, James I.  A play that put More in a favorable light attracted the keen attention of the royal censor, Edmund Tilney, who demanded substantial alterations; the project likely never reached production.

    Unlike Shakespeare’s plays, Sir Thomas More isn’t divided into ‘Acts,’ instead consisting of seventeen scenes. As Professor Jowett remarks, these might be grouped into three sections, three interlinked dramas: those depicting the London riots of “Ill May” 1517, when More intervened to calm the crowd; a visit to More’s home by his fellow Christian Humanist, Erasmus, followed by a play-within-the-play staged in the home after Erasmus’s departure; and finally, the events leading to More’s execution on July 6, 1535. 

    The play opens as John Lincoln, a trader in foreign goods, the Betts brothers (one a Londoner, the other a “clown” or rustic who has moved to the city) watch an argument between a Lombard banker and moneylender, Francis de Barde, and Doll Williamson, “an honest, plain carpenter’s wife,” as she describes herself (I.4-5). De Barde has made himself unwelcome. He had lured a local goldsmith’s wife to his home, probably raping her, and then audaciously charged her husband for her room and board. He is now attempting to do that to Mrs. Williamson, who is having none of it. Her husband arrives, quarreling with another Lombard, Anthony Cavaler, about two doves the Williamson had purchased and Avaler stole, justifying this by saying that pigeon meat is too good for a “coarse carpenter” (I.25). As Doll indignantly protests, one foreigner wants to take her husband’s food, another his wife. Lincoln looks on, bitterly: “It is hard when Englishmen’s patience must be thus jetted on by strangers, and they dare not avenge their own wrongs” (I.26-29). 

    They dare not, because the Lombards are under the protection of the Crown. More than two centuries earlier, King Edward I had expelled Jews from England, having already begun to use resident Lombard bankers, who had emigrated from northern Italy, for the country’s financial dealings. Jews had already been subordinated throughout Europe by the Catholic Church, as the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 had banned them, along with Muslims, from holding public office and required them to wear identifying badges. Since Roman Catholic canon law banned Christians from lending money at interest, a necessary practice that had been taken up by Jewish people—much to the benefit of England but much to the irritation of those who preferred not to pay their debts—someone had to replace them. The Lombards proved no more popular than the Jews, partly because debtors still preferred not to reimburse creditors and partly because they abused their protected status, as the outrages of de Barde and Cavaler exemplify.

    George Betts dares to intervene on the Williamsons’ behalf, to the outrage of de Barde, who threatens to call no less a personage than the Lord Ambassador to see Betts punished. That’s enough for Doll, who tells de Barde, “Hands off, proud stranger, or, by Him that bought me, if men’s milky hearts dare not strike a stranger, yet women will beat them down ere they bear these abuses” (I.63-66). And the same goes for you, caviling Cavaler. “If our husbands must be bridled by law, and forced to bear your wrongs, their wives will be a little lawless, and soundly beat thee” (I.74-76). Such threats recall the depredations of the Maenads of Greek legend, who tore to pieces the Theban king, Pentheus, and the poet, Orpheus. The Maenads were followers of the god, Dionysus, no respecter of law; they lived in the woods outside cities, far from civility. Despite this show of pagan rage, Doll is also the person who cries out to Jesus and the Virgin Mary; this will prove important, later. For now, we are left to wonder if her Christian words betoken superstition, merely.

    The Lombards beat their strategic retreat in search of the Lord Ambassador, while Doll laments, loudly, “I am ashamed that free-born Englishmen, having beaten strangers within their own bounds”—the Spanish, the French—should “thus be braved and abused by them at home” (I.80-83). Her husband’s friend, Mr. Sherwin, defends Englishmen’s honor, protesting that “It is not our lack of courage in the cause, but the strict obedience that we are bound to.” As the goldsmith wronged by de Barde, I too have suffered these injustices, “but how to redress yours or mine own is a matter beyond all our abilities” (I.84-88). 

    “Not so, not so, my good friends,” Lincoln says (I.89). We can bypass the secular authorities because the Catholic Church has an independent voice and authority. He intends deliver “a bill of our wrongs” to the preachers who speak at the Easter Week services outside the church of St. Mary of the Hospital. Dr. Standish won’t preach on it, but his colleague Dr. Beal will, doing “as much as a priest may do” (I.112). Lincoln already has his appeal to public opinion written. It calls upon “the worshipful lords and masters of this city” to “take compassion over the poor people your neighbors”; “aliens and strangers eat the bread from the fatherless children and take the living from all the artificers, and the intercourse from all merchants,” whereby “craftsmen be brought to beggary and merchants to neediness” (I.118-129). If commoners are “knit and united to one part,” setting “their willing power for remedy, and not suffer the said aliens in their wealth,” the “natural-born men of this region” will no longer “come to confusion” (I. 130-134). The follow-on to this organizing, George Betts adds, will be to organize the allies thus won over, then to riot on May Day, the traditional day for apprentice celebrations. The Williamsons agree to join the plot. 

    That is, the law, enforced by the monarchic regime, which already intends to break with the Catholic Church, reducing its authority in favor of a state-established church, favors the financial and commercial activities of a protected class of foreigners who serve the needs of that state. Although at least one woman would counter this with Dionysiac frenzy, the leader of the men has a plan. He will attempt to trump the law by appealing to the people through the churchmen over and beneath the statesmen. At least one of the churchmen will go along, acting on the Christian principle of compassion or charity, and perhaps because he sees Henry VIII’s intention to undermine the Catholic Church in favor of an English version of Machiavelli’s lo stato. In this, Lincoln will appeal to nationhood, Englishness, against foreign interlopers who test Englishmen’s patience by tyrannizing freeborn men and women under legal protection. This is an appeal to nature over convention, law—an appeal to the rights of natural-born English of this region against men whose ancestors arrived much more recently, men who are foreigners in the eyes of the native sons.

    At the Court of Sessions, the Sheriffs’ Court held in the City Guildhall, the Lord Mayor (John Rest of the Grocers’ Company), Justice Suresby and several unnamed colleagues, and two sheriffs, one of them Thomas More, are hearing the case of Smart v. Lifter (an appropriately named habitual thief). In this time and place, the convicted cutpurse faced the death penalty, although the law classified their crimes as petty. With the permission of the Court, More interrogates Lifter privately. More wants to give some much-needed moral instruction to self-assured Justice Suresby, who has argued that Smart is even more culpable than Lifter because he had tempted him by flashing a large “sum of money” (II.56). As he puts it, intending a mot, “knaves and fools meet when purses go” (II.146). More has a prank to play on Suresby and asks Lifter (whom he has often “saved…from this place” and therefore can trust him) to help with the setup, in exchange for getting him exonerated. “As I am a Christian and a man, / I will procure thy pardon for that jest” (II.59-60). A Christian and a man: as a Christian, More will not lie to him and desires to give the judge a lesson in humility; as a man, he enjoys a good joke. While initially skeptical (“You are too deep for me to deal withal,” please to not go about “to undermine my life”), Lifter agrees, once More explains his plan (II.65-67). First, “I am a true subject to my king” (II.68)—a point of some importance, as events will unfold—and “all that I am at is a merry jest. / Perform it, Lifter, and expect my best.” (II.75-76). That is, More is a man of loyalty, wit, and wisdom—a rare combination of virtues. The plan is to get Lifter alone with Suresby, giving the skilled pickpocket an opportunity to lift his purse. No fool, Lifter sees More’s intention: “to check the folly of the Justice / For blaming others in a desperate case / Wherein himself may fall as soon as any.” (II. 92-94). The crime is serious (“desperate”), the jest is witty, but the purpose of the jest is also seriously and wisely intended as a lesson in Christian humility. More wants what is good for the soul of Suresby. 

    The plot goes as planned. Unknowingly shorn of his purse, Justice Suresby re-joins his colleagues and intones a rebuke to plaintiff Smart: “Wise men look to their purses well enough” (II.147). When he discovers his own purse to be missing, More closes the trap, using Suresby’s argument about incaution against him. “Being a wise man”—that is, prudent, a man of practical wisdom—and “a magistrate,” More exclaims, as if surprised, how could you “trust your purse with such a liberal sum” of money? “‘Fore God, it is a shame / With such a sum to tempt necessity.” (II.168-171). That is, the natural virtue of prudence ought to inform Suresby’s conventional, civil role as a magistrate, wherein he must make distinctions based upon chance, choice, and necessity as they bear upon those who appear before him. Echoing Suresby’s argument against Smart, and wittily bringing a larger civil-social circumstance into consideration, More presses on: “What makes so many pilferers and felons / But these fond baits that foolish people lay / To tempt the needy, miserable wretch?” (II.175-177). Suresby gets the joke and takes the lesson. In case he doesn’t, the Lord Mayor needles him further, saying “Master Suresby, it is strange, / You being a man so settled in assurance / Will fall in that which you condemned in other” (II.191-194). More duly returns the money to the hapless judge, and the case is closed, with justice wittily tempered by mercy for all concerned, including the lead judge. With this scene, the playwrights have given us much of what we need to know about Thomas More.

    Meanwhile, in the King’s Court, a cast of notables has assembled: George Talbot (Earl of Shrewsbury), a firm royalist, Henry Howard (Earl of Surrey)—the humanist poet whose sonnets are still read in English literature classes to this day, typically paired with those of his contemporary and fellow humanist, Thomas Wyatt—Sir Thomas Palmer—a soldier and friend of the king—and Sir Roger Cholmley—a member of the royal Council. [1] Concerned by the “frowning vulgar brow,” the “displeased commons of the City” and their unrest, Talbot solicits advice from Palmer and Cholmley (III.4). Surrey, for his part, deplores the “high-crested insolence” of the foreigners, who are ungrateful to the king for his permission to live and profit in London (III.12). They are tempting the native commoners to unrest; that is, this case is a larger-scale parallel to Smart v. Lifter. De Barde is suing Sherwin, demanding interest on a loan, much to Surrey’s displeasure, and all the men suspect the foreigner of sexual advances toward the wives of Englishmen. “If English blood be once up,” Surrey warns, “I fear me much,” as “some of these saucy aliens for their pride / Will pay for’t soundly, wheresoe’er it lights,” and “this tide of rage, that with the eddy strives, / I fear me much will drown too many lives.” (III.57-63). More-like, Cholmley assigns some blame to Shrewsbury and Surrey themselves. “Men of your place and greatness are to blame” because you have “not informed” His Majesty “of this base abuse” (III.65-67). If Henry knew of these “daily wrongs,” “I know his gracious wisdom / Would soon address it” (III.69-70). This links Henry to More as a man of justice, wisdom, and graciousness. It also means that the regime of the modern state that Henry is building has malfunctioned. The aristocrats should act as links between the people and the monarch. They are the ones who manage estates, governing the people. With political centralization, the upper levels of the aristocracy have a weakened connection to the provinces; it is to be noted that the lower-level aristocrat, Cholmley (a mere ‘sir,’ no ‘lord’) is the one who sees this. Additionally, with statist centralization will come urbanization; commercial London becomes an ever more important source of revenue for the Crown. But native-born Englishmen, Catholics, may not perform the crucial function of lending money at interest. To meet this problem, English monarchs have given this function to foreigners who have no ties of affection to the people, unlike the landed aristocrats. To them, the English are the foreigners—in England. They are oligarchs, out to exploit the lower orders. And they operate under royal protection, at least so long as Henry doesn’t know what they’re doing. 

    A messenger arrives to report, “The City is in an uproar” (III.74). Sure enough, Dr. Beal has indeed published a “bill of wrongs,” presumably the bill that Lincoln had drawn up, with exactly the effect Lincoln had desired (III.80.). Surrey suggests that his fellow humanist, Thomas More, who is in “especial favor with the people,” might “prevail more than we can with power” (III. 87, 90). Shrewsbury concurs. That is, Surrey—a poet, a man of words—wants More to use words, calming rhetoric, to counter the incendiary words of Lincoln, mouthed by the preacher. Rightly chosen words, a rhetoric of peace, may prove more effective that “we can with power” (III.90). Lord Shrewsbury concurs, urging haste in view of the impending violence. 

    His fears are justified. Lincoln, the Betts brothers, the Williamson (Doll arrayed in military attire), and Sherwin intend to lead an attack on the Dutch and French enclave, exacting rough justice on their abusers. Impassioned Clown Betts avers, “We are free-born / And do take scorn / To be used so” (IV.13-15). As before, it is Lincoln who proposes a strategy—he, too, has a sort of prudential wisdom, if of a low level, and the grievances he addresses are very real, as acknowledged by the aristocrats, as well. Since the authorities know about the uprising and the foreigners have already fled, he argues, we should burn their houses. The fires will keep the Mayor’s forces busy. Clown Betts likes this ‘middling’ way between swords and words, but Sherwin and Doll Williamson caution that Englishmen’s houses might burn, too. They are overridden by Lincoln and Betts. “If hanging come, ’tis welcome; that’s the worst,” Clown Betts avers (IV.81). He is willing to lose his property and even die for his rights as an Englishman, a willingness that foreshadows but will also contrast with the future self-sacrifice of Thomas More.

    More himself, the Lord Mayor, and Sir John Munday, a London alderman injured in the riot, are now conferring [2]. The rebels have broken into Newgate prison, releasing the inmates, who include “felons and notorious murderers” (V.21). They threaten the lives and properties of the foreigners, undermining the rule of law. Shrewsbury, Surrey, Palmer, and Cholmley join them, having been dispatched by the king to deal with the rioters. However, “in God’s name,” “the King laments if one true subject bleed,” Shrewsbury tells them (V.34). More, a jurist as well as a sheriff, interjects, “My lords, I doubt not but we shall appease / With a calm breath this flux of discontent” (V.38-39). Against Lincoln and Clown Betts, then, he will oppose words to both swords and fire. “Let’s to these simple men, for many sweat / Under this act [i.e., the riot] that knows not the law’s debt / Which hangs upon their lives” (V.42-44)—a suggestion to forgive those who know not what they do. “For silly men / Plod on they know not how; like a fool’s pen”—an instrument of unwisdom—that, “ending, shows not any sentence writ / Linked but to common reason or slightest wit” (V.44-47). This likely allusion to the Lincoln/Beal document might also glance at the manuscript of the play itself, whose authors had better take care not to stir up more trouble than they intend with this treatment of supremely sensitive political and spiritual themes. Both the treatment of the rioters and the writing of the play will require wisdom and wit, consistently combined. Therefore, More continues, let us act and speak “I’God’s name on, to calm our private foes”—the rioters are private men, subjects of the King, not rulers like themselves—and do so “with breath of gravity, not dangerous blows” (V.51). That is, the King’s intention at this point comports entirely with that of Thomas More, and so does their motive, namely, Christian mercy for justly aggrieved English men and women. Shrewsbury says that “the King laments if one true subject bleed” (V.34). He and More are both true subjects, as are most of the foolish rioters, but Henry will come to doubt More’s fidelity, and therefore will make him bleed.

    Scene Six, attributed to Shakespeare, begins with chief conspirator Lincoln calling for peace, so that he can be heard. He cites inflationary food prices caused by the foreigners as another of their grievances. Attempting a logical syllogism, he begins with the major premise: “Our country is a great eating country,” Lincoln rightly observes (VI.8). “Argo they [the foreigners] eat more in our country than they do in their own,” with the resulting scarcity driving up prices for us (VI.9). But this reasoning based on appetite quickly descends into a dubious set of contentions about how the foreigners have introduced root vegetables into the country (parsnips are especially to be dreaded), a supposed source of disease which in turn is somehow connected, or perhaps analogous, to the political disease afflicting London.

    Lincoln’s effort to rule by rather loose reasoning does little to quiet the mob he has gathered. A messenger from King Henry then arrives, offering the King’s mercy. Interpreting this as an attempt to throw him and his followers off-balance (this, assuming that they are on balance), Lincoln replies with some insolence that they will accept it but still “show no mercy upon the strangers” (VI.26); he may be a determined Englishman, but his Christianity is in doubt. To this, the king’s man makes the mistake of calling the rebels simple, for which insult they begin to close in on him, necessitating his rescue by the Lord Mayor and his allies. Going from the messenger’s insult to flattery, addressing the seditionists as “masters,” Shrewsbury and Surrey call for order, but the citizens cannot agree on which one to hear. Now recognizing that his followers have careened out of control, Lincoln questions their “wisdom,” which Surrey then denies altogether (VI.41). More remarks, “Whiles they are over the bank of their obedience,” like a chaotic flood, “Thus will bear down all things” (VI.47-48). Their disorder threatens the state and regime. Knowing More’s credit with the many, Lincoln asks if they should let him speak, a thought heartily seconded by Doll Williamson. She is grateful to him for appointing her brother to a position of watchman for the City. The crowd agrees to hear from him.

    More tells Lincoln to command the crowd to be silent, to which the ringleader protests that the Devil himself “cannot rule them” (VI.63). To that serious admission, More replies, with telling logic—better than any Lincoln has displayed—”Then what a rough and riotous charge have you / To lead those that the devil cannot rule” (VI.64-65). This is the beginning of the rule of reason in service of the rule of law. It is also the beginning of a Christian turn, as Doll Williamson swears “by th’ mass” that the “good housekeeper” More can be trusted (VI.67-68). When the citizens cry “Peace, peace!” More, echoing the Biblical rebuke of unpeaceable ones who raise that cry, rejoins, again with logic, “Look what you do offend you cry upon; / That is the peace” (VI.71-72). He sets out their self-contradiction. What is more, you violate “the peace wherein you have till now grown up,” a peace that, had it “been ta’en from you,” the resulting “bloody times / Could not have brought you to the state of men” (VI.75-77). Not only does their cry contradict their actions, but the consequences of their actions contradict their intention, which is to improve their condition. Prudently, rather than calling them simple he expresses compassion: “Alas, poor things! What is it you have got / Although we grant to get the thing you seek?” (VI.78-79). George Betts, Clown Betts’s more civilized older brother, knows the answer to that one: “Marry, the removing of the strangers” (VI.80). 

    More then joins him in a public deliberation. If the foreigners are removed, their children suffering as they leave, and your “opinions” now wear the royal “ruff” of supreme authority, if “this your noise / Hath chid down all the majesty of England,” and “you sit as kings in your desires”—not in reason—with “Authority quite silenced by your brawl,” what then “have you got?” (VI.83-84, 88-90). You will have “quelled” order itself by “insolence and strong hand” because you will have set an example by which “Not one of you should live an aged man,” since “other ruffians, as their fancies wrought, / With selfsame hand, self reasons, and self right, / Would shark on you, and men, like ravenous fishes, / Would feed on one another” (VI.91-95). This is the same kind of argument he had used against too-sure Suresby. You must know yourselves before you judge others, perhaps the true meaning of “Judge not, that ye be judged.” Ordinarily, what is quelled is a riot, but these rioters are quelling injustice with injustice, and so quelling nothing, as they can see if they follow More’s reasoned speech. To her great credit, Doll Williamson does follow it: “Before God, that’s as true as the gospel.” The God who is Logos is a logical, a reasonable, God. George Betts too is persuaded (VI.99). The core group of conspirators has fractured; More has divided them and soon will conquer. 

    More can now address the crowd as his “good friends” (VI.102). Friendship is friendship in reasoned word and in Logos, the supremely reasonable Word that is God. The crowd’s “innovation,” their violation of the English law, albeit in the name of natural rights, rights of native Englishmen, is “a sin / Which oft th’apostle did forewarn us of, / Urging obedience to authority”; “you were in arms ‘gainst God” (VI.105-109), against the stern admonition of the Apostle Paul (Romans 13:1-2). God has endowed the King with an office to which He has “lent” his own power to inspire fear, ensure justice by commanding and enforcing it (VI.111-112). God “hath bid him,” the King, “rule, and willed you to obey” the man to whom he has given “His own name,” that of “a god on earth” (VI.114-118). That is, More is fully aware of the Biblical command to subjects of kings to obey political authorities who do not wield the sword in vain. You who rise against the king God has installed rise against God Himself. This is not only an appeal to physical fear but to spiritual prudence: “What do you to your souls / In doing this?” (VI.120-121). Thankfully, like God, the king will meet repentance with mercy. “To kneel to be forgiven / Is safer wars than ever you can make / Whose discipline is riot”—a vivid illustration of their self-contradiction (VI.125-126). In fact, your very rebellion “cannot proceed but by obedience” to a demagogue, obviously a false freedom for professedly freedom-loving Englishmen (129). As for your “rebel captain,” Lincoln, “who will obey a traitor?”—a question Lincoln himself has already answered, against himself (VI.130, 132). You kill the foreigners and destroy and/or seize their houses, “lead[ing] the majesty of the law” on a leash and then letting the law “slip…like a hound” (VI.137). Behind the majesty of the King is the majesty of God and another majesty, the English law. You disobey the one and make a travesty of the other. 

    Moreover, as punning Shakespeare might have it, if the King exiles you, given “the nature of your error,” what country would take you, other than some enemy of England, where you would now be the foreigners? (VI.142). Your “mountainous inhumanity” will cause foreign nations to treat you as inhuman, to “spurn you like dogs” (VI.VI.156, 151). “All citizens” acclaim this as true: “Let’s do as we may be done by,” first as Christians, then as human beings, and as finally as law-abiding Englishmen (VI.158). Prudently (having been brought to reasoning by More), they ask for pardon, and More assures them that “mercy will be found if you seek it”—again, as Christianity teaches (VI.164-165). Fittingly, it is Doll Williamson who congratulates him, acknowledging that he has “done more with thy good words than all they could do with their weapons” (VI.187-188). Just so. Cautiously, she adds that if he betrays them, of there are no pardons, “by the Lord, I call thee a plain cony-catcher,” a cheat. The soldier Palmer, a man of force, concurs: “You have redeemed us from much threatened blood” by using “eloquence” instead of “steel” (VI.202-203). Meanwhile, Lord Shrewsbury stipulates, “let them be sent to several prisons,” where they will be well treated (VI.168). 

    Congratulated by More, who describes himself as motivated by love of country and care for the City of London, and considers himself only God’s “instrument,” the aristocrats concur with his advice that guards be placed at the London city gates as a precautionary measure (VI. 206). Shrewsbury reports the good news to Henry, then returns to announce the King’s “loving thanks” and More’s reward, a knighthood (VI.217). And better, he has been appointed to the King’s Privy Council. “Stale custom” would have him (Protestant-like?) refuse the office because of his “imperfections, in a show of excess humility”; the ancients would have credited their own virtue for such a well-deserved honor, in an exhibition of pagan pride; a Machiavellian would have attributed it to his virtù; but More shows how a Christian conceives of political authority—as service to higher authority. “My service is my king’s,” since “life or death hangs on our sovereign’s eye,” as indeed it will prove to do (VI.235-236). (As the Apostle Mark observes, “Even the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many.”) (Mark 10:45). While on the Council, “My studious thoughts shall tend the City’s good,” although he recognizes that “New days beget new tides” and “Life whirls ’bout fate, then to a grave it slides” (VI.254-255).

    At the order of the Privy Council, Lincoln is to be hanged, forthwith. On the scaffold, he repents. “I was the foremost man in this rebellion, /And I the foremost that must die for it” (VII.47-48). While “I must confess I had no ill intent /But against such as wrong us overmuch,” he now understands “that private men” should not “carve out their redress / Which way they list,” that witnesses to his punishment should learn that “obedience is the best in each degree”—that is, each person ought to obey the authorities in accordance with his civil-social status (VII.54-58). “I patiently submit me to the law” while forgiving those who caused his transgression of it; “and, as a Christian, truly from my heart, / I likewise crave they would forgive me too”(VII. 60-63). Doll Williamson delivers a short eulogy: “Say all what they can, / Thou lived’st a good fellow, and died’st an honest man” (VII.70-71).

    She then learns of More’s elevation to the Privy Council. More is “honest,” like Lincoln, but also “wise” and “well-spoken”—worthy of the position (VII.101). But how honest, and how good a fellow? “I would “praise his honesty much more / If he had kept his word and saved our lives” (VII. 102-103). She readies herself for death as a Christian, knowing “I do owe God a death” (VII.112), and for her husband’s death, hoping that their two children will be adopted by “some good honest friend / To bring them up in charitable sort” (VII.116-117). And “So long as I an Englishman can see, / Nor French or Dutch shall get a kiss of me”; say “I died in scorn to be a stranger’s prey” (VII.128-129). 

    But it transpires that More is indeed an honest man. The news comes: at More’s entreaty, “humbly upon his knee,” the King has pardoned everyone (VII.144). Surrey tells them that “his highness’ clemency and mercy” have saved them from “the sharp rod of justice” (VII.158, 162). In this, the King imitates God, who checks “awe-full justice” with “mercy”—both justice and mercy evidence of His, and his, majesty. God chooses kings with the intention of seeing them display Godlike virtues. Like God, the King “looketh through a veil of sufferance / Upon the frailty of the multitude,” forgiving them for “striking with the hand of public hate” and “giv[ing] you life,” in exchange for which beneficence all of you should pray for him to live long (VII.169-170, 174). And they do, shouting, “God save the King, / My good Lord Chancellor, and the Earl of Surrey!” (VI.175-176). 

    These first seven scenes of the play might be thought of as an “Act” relating a single set of events in the drama, with Lincoln and his followers rising then falling, and with More rising in his public career to the height of Lord Chancellor precisely because he governed the fall of those who had assaulted the rule of king, God, and English law with prudence and charity, bringing right order back to the regime. Because justice and the law can conflict, men and women may seek redress beyond the law. But by so doing, they commit acts of injustice, becoming inhumane. Further, by violating the law they injure themselves in the long run, even if they right the immediate wrongs, because the rule of law prevents the stronger from destroying the weaker, the bigger fish from swallowing the smaller fish. The legal rights of Englishmen thus can cut both ways, for and against justice, but the rule of law is more just ‘in the long run.’ God ordains obedience to lawful authority for that reason. 

    There is still another paradox, which Shakespeare and his fellow playwrights may or may not have foreseen clearly. By invoking their Englishness against their unjust tormenters’ foreignness, they invoke a sort of nationalism or patriotism that comports not so much with Catholic Christendom but with the modern state that Henry VIII intends to found. Nationalism follows statism. It is internationalism, the universality of the Catholic Church, that follows Christianity. Machiavelli was no friend of Christianity, or of the small states and feudal orders Christendom favored. Henry is consistent, as he will install himself as the head of Christianity in England, the head of the national, Anglican, Church. Thomas More is also consistent, as he will defend the authority of the Pope, head of the international, universal, Catholic Church. The people are not consistent, and do not know they are not consistent. With logic, More teaches them the reasonable way that consists with Christendom. He will now find himself fatally in conflict with a form of Protestant Christianity, one that protests not against state authority but reinforces such authority, in the name of Christianity.

    Scene 8 is the first scene set in a private home, Thomas More’s home in Chelsea. The remaining scenes in the play will alternate between the private and the public. This public man has a family life, but he is now alone, a man who loves his household who is now in high public office. In his soliloquy, he recognizes that God has ordained his elevation to great authority. “That which we profanely term our fortunes”—as Machiavelli does, preparatory to tempting princes to master them— is really “the provision of the power above, / Fitted and shaped just to that strength of nature / Which we are born with” (VIII.2-5). Divine providence accounts both for events and the nature that fits us to discharge the responsibilities those events impose upon us. Providence has elevated him from “an humble bench of birth,” from nature as conceived in the people’s minds, by nativity, to the role of a lawgiver as well as one obedient to the law (VIII.6). By that nature, he owes respect to his “elder kinsmen,” and especially his father (VIII.10). Along with this humility, he reminds himself that the more honor, the higher office, wealth, and calling he may attain, “the more do thou in serpents’ natures” notice; therefore, prudently “fear their gay skins with the thought of their sharp state” (VIII.17-18) and be guided by the maxim that “to be great” is like a tightly spun thread, “great wound up, greatly undone” (VIII.19, 21). 

    But for now, More will stage another piece of Christian merriment, another joke like that enjoyed at Suresby’s expense, but now with a genuinely fine man, Erasmus—a foreigner and indeed a Dutchman, like some of the unjust sharpers, but also a great humanist. Or is he? More will test him, now that Erasmus is about to be his house guest. Can Erasmus “distinguish merit and outward ceremony,” appearance from reality? With his manservant, Randall (and as he had done previously with the thief, Lifter), he devises a play within the play, a witty test now not of foolish certainty but of humanist wisdom, discernment. 

    Before that, however, he acts in accordance with another reality—namely, that appearance at times betokens reality. The local sheriff enters with a ruffian named Falconer, who, like Lincoln, is accused of inciting a riot. Falconer is a scruffy fellow, long haired—this being “an odious sight” in More’s eyes (VIII.121). “Sirrah,” he tells him, “great sins are bred / In all that body where there’s a foul head” (VIII.127-128). Proper grooming betokens a certain self-care—civility, not barbarism. In this sense, appearance can be telling. With that, he sends Falconer off to his just punishment. Unlike the rioters, Falconer’s sinfulness has little or no spice of outraged decency.

    Erasmus arrives, escorted by Surrey, who introduces More to him with an encomium, “He’s great in study: that’s the statist’s grace / That gains more reverence than the outward place” (VIII.136-137). The inner is what’s worthy, more than the outer. But this is not More; it is Randall, dressed as More, an inferior inner man appearing as the greatly virtuous man. Surrey remarks that the scholarly study in which More is great is the study of “the general watch of England,” guarding “the Prince’s safety and the peace / That shines upon our commonwealth” in his “loyal industry” (VIII.147-149). Erasmus admires a man whose very gatekeeper, as he has witnessed, greets visitors “in Latin good phrase,” a reflection on the master of a civil household (VIII.155). He begins to address Pseudo-More (call him ‘Less,’ perhaps?) in elegant Latin, only to be told that the master has “foresworn speaking” in Latin, the language of civility as against the ‘bar-bar’ speech of barbarians (VIII.164). Discerning Erasmus immediately questions whether this is really Thomas More. Surrey hastens to explain this away to the surprised Erasmus: “He’s ever furnished / With these conceits,” these playful inventions (VIII.170-171). Randall himself tells Erasmus that he loves a “parlous wise fellow”—wise in speech, witty—who “smells of a politician” (VIII.175). At this, the real More enters, bidding his “fool” to retire, telling his “loving, learned friends,” his fellow humanists, that the glittering appearance of “base illiterate wealth” is esteemed “whilst men of schools,” of humanist learning, “shrouded in poverty” and “counted as fools”—very much as Christians are (VIII.184-185). Scholars and Christians do not care so much for wealth, for worldly things. Erasmus delights in the joke. Melancholy is the scholar’s danger, “chok[ing] the passages / Of blood and breath” (as that magnificent eccentric, Robert Burton, would propound at witty length, in a subsequent century). [3] While “study should be the saddest”—that is, the most serious—time of life, a heightened spirit “lengthens our days with sportful exercise” such as this (VIII.194-196). More is a merry scholar, a Christian scholar confident that life in this world can look forward to life in the City of God, when life on earth is over.

    Then More turns to Surrey, addressing him as “my noble poet,” and Surrey laments that “poets were ever thought unfit for state,” unlike the sportive jurist, More. Surrey’s friend adjures him not to pour such contempt on “fair poesy, ” the “sweetest heraldry of art / That sets a difference ‘tween the tough, sharp holly / And tender bay tree”—that is, between harsh statecraft and poetic harmony and grace (VIII.202-207), but Surrey continues his lament, saying that the liberal arts practiced by humanists are being eclipsed by “mechanical sciences” (VIII.208), the philosophic promoter of which will be Shakespeare’s contemporary, Francis Bacon. True enough, More replies, but “the reason / This is no age for poets” is that it has seen no heroes, no great kings—this, a measuring glance at Henry. But no matter, in the More household tonight, Surrey will be king, “master of my house” as they listen to “the Muses’ music” to “cheer our spirits” (VIII.217, 219). The food may not be sumptuous “where scholars sit,” but the courses will be seasoned with wit (VIII.220). Henry is a Machiavellian-Baconian builder of an unpoetic modern state. He replaces Roman Catholicism with a civil religion, Anglicanism, making himself the head of the new, statist church. That state will undermine the Christian family in which More takes such delight. That is, in the Christian Aristotelianism of the English old regime, the right government of the soul, seen in More, the right government of the family, seen in More’s household, and the right government of the political community (promised by More’s elevation to the position of Lord Chancellor) are being eroded by individuals like Falconer and monarchs like Henry.

    Before dinner, Falconer is brought back. He’s undergone a haircut and requests a second hearing. As a result of this gentle form of beheading, I am “a new man, my lord,” he announces—cleaned up, if not baptized. That’s good enough for gracious More: “Thy head is for thy shoulders now more fit: / Thou has less hair upon it, but more wit” (VIII.247-248). As a low-life version of witty More, Falconer finds pardon in the court of the Christian humanist, who plays the role of his own future judge, Henry, but with considerably more justice, wisdom, and mercy. Falconer thus escapes the beheading More will suffer.

    The ninth, central scene of the play, features another play within the play. By now, Erasmus has departed, returning to the continent. New guests are expected: the Lord Mayor (still grateful to More for his role in ending the disorders of “Ill May”) and his wife—a happy event since, as More says of himself, “More’s heart lives by good company” (IX.17). He will arrange the seating of the male guests, as “Men can best order men” (IX.32). Fortuitously, a troupe of itinerant actors arrives, offering to entertain the guests. From their repertoire, More selects a play titled The Marriage of Wit and Wisdom. “The theme is good, / And may maintain a liberal argument”: “To marry wit to wisdom asks some cunning. / Many have wit that may come short of wisdom.” (IX.65-70). The marriage of wit and wisdom is central to the central scene of the play, Sir Thomas More. Will the author of this play consummate the advertised marriage, or will he prove impotent when it comes to prudence? 

    A contretemps ensues, the play delayed because the boy who will play the character, Wit, lacks part of his costume, a beard that betokens the age that may come with wisdom. More pounces, addressing the player who will portray Inclination: “Wit’s Inclination may gallop so fast that he will outstrip wisdom and fall to folly” (IX.157-158). Just so, the player admits, but in the play he will succumb to Lady Vanity, since “we have no Folly in our play” (IX.159-160). If so, More tells him, “There’s no wit in it,” as “Folly waits on wit as the shadow on the body, and where wit is ripest, there folly still is readiest” (IX.161-163). Better have a player without a beard play Wit than a Wit who is all beard and no brain—perhaps a bit like Falconer, deserving of pardon but not of admiration. And so the play begins.

    The player taking the role of Prologue deplores the fact that today, “throughout the whole world in every land,” not only England, “Vice doth increase and virtue decays” (IX.173-174). How has this happened? Because, as Wit recalls, I have “dreamed fast of mirth and play,” since “In youth is pleasure, in youth is pleasure” (IX.186-187). More whispers to the Lord Mayor, “What will [Wit] be by that time he / comes to the commodity of a beard?” (IX.197-198). Before that can happen, Inclination passes off Lady Vanity as Wisdom, gulling young Wit. Since the player who was sent to retrieve the missing beard has yet to arrive, and he was the one slotted to play Good Counsel, More takes that part. He exposes Lady Vanity as an impostor Wisdom—as so much that passes for wisdom is—and tells foolish young Wit, “Be ruled by me” (IX.270). He invokes the distinction between appearance and reality. “Wit, judge not things by the outward show. / The eye oft mistakes, right well you do know,” well, now that you have been goodly counseled (IX.279-280). At this point, the player, Luggins, arrives belatedly, lugging the beard that was to have betokened Good Counsel. Since More had already played Good Counsel, neither the boy-player nor the prop-beard are needed. Having taught the lesson of the play, More calls his guests to the banquet, which will begin after the player who played Wit alerts him to fact that they have not received full payment. That is, Wit counsels More well, appealing to his sense of justice. More praises him for that, then sets things right by adding to the payment and punishing the unjust servant: a just conclusion to this morality play that the host has cut short. The marriage of wit and wisdom has occurred, in the soul of Thomas More and in his household for the edification for the assembled public men. If the family is the microcosm of the political community, More shows that he can make a sound Lord Chancellor, replacing the corrupt Lord Wolsey. The advent of the modern state has brought the increase of vice and the decay of virtue; More might have remedied that, in England.

    The morality play embedded in the center of a ‘modern’ play embodies the soul of More, a man seemingly of a season whose time has come and is now going. The morality play was the dramatic genre invented by Christians. They are now challenged by Machiavellian statists who would turn their religion into an instrument of statecraft. Can a Christian humanist survive in modernity? If so, on what terms? Can he become, somehow, a man for all seasons?

    The next scene of Sir Thomas More shows how this might become so, and how it does not. The Privy Council has convened, with More arriving a bit late, ready with a complimentary speech intended to relieve the awkwardness but also to frame the purpose of the Council as it moves forward with its deliberations: “Upon this little board is daily scanned / The health and preservation of the land, / We the physicians that effect this good, / Now by choice diet, anon by letting blood”—by political economy or by war (X.14-17). It is “our toil and careful watching” that enables the King to sleep peacefully, when he sleeps (X.18). Here, in public life, wit is, or should be, subordinated to wisdom. The councilors take up the question of what to do about France, which has attacked northern Italy, perhaps intending to move against the Pope in the south. To oppose the French effectively, an ally on the continent would be very helpful. Surrey recommends against allying with the Holy Roman Emperor, as that would make the Empire too strong on the continent, but Shrewsbury argues that “The Emperor is a man of royal faith” who loves the English king (X.42). He “will not soil / His honor with the theft of English spoil” (X.55-56). More concurs, and the policy is set. The Christian humanist sides with the statesman who has based his argument on his assessment of the character of him who rules the allied regime, against the humanist poet who has made a ‘geopolitical’ argument, a surprisingly impersonal assessment for a man like Surrey. (Is he merely overcompensating for his ‘poetic’ side, or has the lack of heroic kings in modern Europe, perhaps the result of a creeping Machiavellianism, inclined him to discount persons?) More and Shrewsbury look at the regime, embodied by a Christian prince, not (or not so much) at the balance of power, as a Machiavellian would do.

    The English king has state-building, Machiavellian, plans, and these interrupt the deliberations of the Council. Good soldier Palmer arrives with “articles” from Henry, the Oath of Succession which commits those who take it to his plan to make the children of Protestant Queen Anne Boleyn the heirs to the English throne. More calls for delay, time to deliberate. For his part, the Bishop of Rochester, a faithful Catholic, refuses the oath outright. Palmer sharply retorts that the Bishop must now report to the King for “this capital contempt” (X.82). At this, More resigns from the Council. Seeming-prudent Shrewsbury predicts that both Rochester and More will change their minds. Surrey justifies his decision to sign the king’s order in Christian terms, as did More. While More called for consultation with conscience and the laws of England, Surrey thinks of the Pauline injunction to obey rulers because God has ordained them as such. The question, then, is whether obedience to monarchs has no limits, whether monarchy is by divine right absolute.

    At More’s home, Lady More recounts “the strangest dream / That e’er my sleep was troubled with” to her two daughters and her son-in-law (XI.8-9). Images of severance from “the golden fleet” of King Henry’s barges, of the Tower where traitors are imprisoned, and of death for her husband and herself: she will not be far wrong; elder daughter Margaret and her husband, William Roper, share her forebodings, even as he asks her to pay “no respect” to “fond dreams” (XI.19, 27). But More enters “merrily” with the news that he has been stripped of his titles. “Weep not at my fall” but “here joy like to private friends,” since public “triumph” and “public scorn” balance one another, with “days of pleasure” having “repentant ends” (XI.84-86). Good cheer in the face of worldly failure marries wit and wisdom. To his wife’s terror, he replies, “breed not female children in your eyes” (XI.75); that is, against Machiavelli’s suggestions that Christians are ‘effeminate,’ More suggests that manliness and Christianity go together.

    At the same time, the Bishop of Rochester, already imprisoned in the Tower, explains the benefit of his ruin to his friends Surrey and Shrewsbury: “In my restraint / From worldly causes I shall better see / Into myself than at proud liberty” (XII.13-15). His imprisonment will give him time for introspection, for self-knowledge. “The Tower and I will privately confer / Of things wherein at freedom I may err” (XII.16-17). In the privacy of his home, with his family, More looks to good cheer in good company, with sober repentance in the background. In the privacy of the Tower, Bishop Rochester, who has no family to consider, no family to encourage, to teach by his example, will exhibit no merriment, put repentance in the foreground of his soul. He assures his friends of his continued love for the King, and they in turn promise to work for his release. The Catholic priest thus foreshadows More’s conduct, when the Catholic layman will be imprisoned.

    Back at Chelsea, More reminds his family that virtue is what truly “breeds gentry,” not bloodlines (XIII.9), that “great men” must be “musicians” who “learn low strain after the notes that rise,” (XIII.39-40). Eschewing his merriment, bidding “farewell of mirth’s hurtless laws,” he soberly remarks that both Court and King, his judges, are mortal, that God may “pardon me in my saddest hour,” and therefore they have no reason to lament “my exile from the Court” or even his bodily torture, “wer’t imposed” (XIII.56,69-73). God’s Court is the site of true judgment. And “Perchance the King, / Seeing the Court is full of vanity”—the vanity that he had exposed as false wisdom not long before this—exhibits “pity lest our souls should be misled, / And sends us to a life contemplative,” away from the strife of political action (XIII.78-81). “O, happy banishment from worldly pride / When souls by private life are sanctified!” (82-83). And if, as his wife now fears, he will be wrested from private life and executed, in that case the King only “intends to send me” to a greater King, “the King of Heaven” for a richer present than any Henry can bestow. “The worst chance is death, / And that brings endless joy for fickle breath” (XIII.90-91). But what of the children, Lady More asks. If stripped of their inheritance, her husband replies, “they have minds instructed how to gather more,” as “there’s no man that’s ingenious can be poor” (XIII.95-96). Natural ingenuity in gathering more is practical wisdom, and if Thomas More is practically wise, then the children More has taught will continue to gather more. “And therefore do not weep, my little ones. / Though you lose all the earth, keep your souls even, / And you shall find inheritance in heaven.” (XIII.97-99). He is more concerned with his household servants, whom he has not educated but to whom he proceeds to offer a lesson. Releasing them from service, he tells them to “Think, when an oak falls, underwood shrinks down / And yet may live, though bruised. I pray ye strive / To shun my ruin; for the axe is set / Even at my root, to fell me to the ground.” (XIII.116-119). In view of his prudentially envisioned liberation from the world, he liberates his servants, “for heaven can tell / That More loves all his followers more than well” (XIII.121-122). In a few minutes’ time, More has told of his love of family, of king, of servants, and, animating all those loves, his love of God.

    The love of king will not be reciprocated. Shrewsbury and Surrey return from their mission of entreaty to inform him that if he continues to refuse to subscribe to the Oath of Succession, he will be removed from house arrest and sent to the Tower on the charge of high treason. This is too much for his wife and daughters, who cry out to God in their sorrow. Unperturbed, More looks at the sergeant-at-arms who accompanies his friends, recalling that he was the man he’d saved from “cruel riotous assault” during Ill May (XIII.158). Far from condemning him for ingratitude, More savors the real import of the coincidence: “Thou art reserved / To be my summoner to yond spiritual court” (XIII.159-160). Against his wife’s entreaties, he will go to the Tower “with all submissive willingness, and thereto add / My bones to strengthen the foundation / Of Julius Caesar’s palace” (XIII.176-178). English tradition taught that Julius Caesar had built the Tower of London, a place to enforce the Roman law he brought to English barbarians. Now, Henry is Caesar, a modern state builder, and Thomas More will render him his due. “Friend,” as he calls the sergeant-at-arms, “do thine office,” the office that enforces the new law of the new Rome, as More himself had done so recently (XIII.180). “To a great prison, to discharge the strife / Commenc’d ‘twixt conscience and my frailer life, / More now must march” (XIII.184-186); he had already “discharged” the strife of Ill May, which now can be seen as a prefiguration of this. Conscience bids him both to remain faithful to Rome, not to Henry’s calculated severance of his state and regime from it, while at the same time remaining faithful to the King, God’s appointed ruler of England. His life will be the price of these duties, which conflict only in appearance, not in the reality he has consistently preferred to appearance. If, in another play, Cardinal Wolsey bids farewell to all his greatness, here More bids farewell to Chelsea (“I shall ne’er see thee more”) and to his family—family being the bond that Christ splices asunder with His Word-sword. He reserves a taste of punning wit for his departing word to them: “Grave More thus lightly walks to a quick grave” (XIII.194).

    Outside the Tower, a crowd has assembled, blocking the bridge. The people remain steadfastly with More, as they would do decades later, Jowett recalls, when Sir Walter Raleigh was conveyed to the prison in July 1603. Even the warders agree: “A wiser or more virtuous gentleman / Was never bred in England,” says one, his partner adding, “I think the poor will bury him in tears”—testimony to his care for the poor in purse and in spirit (XIV.10-12). As Shrewsbury, Surrey, bring More past them, delivering him to the Lieutenant of the Tower, a woman cries out, “Ah, gentle heart, my soul for thee is said. / Farewell, the best friend the poor e’er had.” (XIV.43-44). After he and his friends bid him farewell, More welcomes the Tower itself, where “many a guilty soul, and many an innocent, / Have breathed their farewell to thy hollow rooms” (XIV.60-61). He enters with clear conscience, “my comfort,” since “God is as strong here as he is abroad” (XIV.70). No respecter of persons, of rank, God is equally no respecter of places; He rules them all. 

    At More’s house, his servants have lingered. More is at trial, not yet convicted. If, as one says, there is neither a wiser, a merrier, or a more honest man in “the universal world” that God rules, it may be that, being “too good a lord for us,” as another remarks, “God himself will take him” (XV.14, 20-21). They agree that their master has been a just ruler of the household—the household, the building block of political life. When word arrives of their master’s conviction, they show themselves true servants of him. Like the crowds during Ill May, they are now “masterless,” but unlike them they defer to the authority of the king and the law, even as king and law intend to make him “a dead man to the world,” “his sweet soul to live among the saints” (XV.37, 39-40). They learn that in addition to their liberty, he has granted each of them a substantial payment, “a kind remembrance / Of a far kinder lord,” in an act of providence for the innocent victims of his conscientious choice, imitatio Christi (XV.53-54). 

    More converses with the Lieutenant of the Tower, whose experience of his prisoner has convinced him of his wisdom, patience, “constancy of mind” and “Christian resolution in all troubles”—all signs that he is “not unprepared” for death, thanks to his “peace of conscience” (XVI.7-10,12). With “peace of conscience, ” “I have not lived so ill I fear to die,” More rejoins, and although afflicted with severe pain during “a sore fit of the stone” that night, this only induces him to thank King Henry for choosing to end his suffering anon (XVI.13, 17, 19). “In life and death, still merry Sir Thomas More,” the Lieutenant exclaims; wisdom has not eclipsed wit. Rightly so, in Christian terms. Christianity leaves room for wit and wisdom, permitting their marriage, because in it ‘comedy’ overcomes ‘tragedy,’ Resurrection overcomes Crucifixion. God guarantees the comic or happy ending, even while not excusing His followers from the tragic ending of physical pain from disease and strife, emotional pain from farewells to families and friends, and death. If Christ weeps several times in this world, but never laughs, He provides for human beings the chance neither to weep nor to laugh, when they come into His presence in the Kingdom of God. More often laughs and smiles but never weeps. As it happens, that will not make him an anti-Christ.

    Hearing that Bishop Rochester has died at the executioner’s hand, More calls him “a rich man, believe me,” one now resident in the City of God (XVI.36). As for himself, he is likely “the poorest chancellor / That ever was in England,” a testament to his honesty in office (XVI.46-47). He has spent much of his money on charitable gifts to “halting soldiers and poor needy scholars,” while the remainder of his estate will revert to the Crown (XVI.55-56). Surrey was not entirely mistaken in saying that poets are poor, always out of pocket. More explains that he has had a poetic side, playing the role of a poet in the sense that “poets were never thrifty,” and “never shall” be (XVI.65). 

    Enter his wife, daughters, and son-in-law, weeping. But More tells them that he is better-off now, since “when I was Chancellor” I had no peace from business; “here there’s none of this” (XVI.70, 73). His impending death only means that “tomorrow I shall be at liberty” not only from political business but from all the world (XVI.81). Reminded by his wife that his “poor wife and children” still need care, he leaves them to the protection of God, who “hath the power to keep / You safer than I can” (XVI.87-88). “Live all, and love together, and thereby / You give your father a rich obsequy” (XVI.122-123). “God send us all his everlasting light” (XVI.128). In this stern farewell, More exemplifies Christian love, which is never sentimental, never ‘compassionate’ in the modern, Rousseauian sense. He wants his family to imitate him, even as he imitates Christ, sternly directed to the Cross by His Father. “God bless you” (XVI.125).

    Allusions to his Christlikeness abound when he arrives at the scaffold for his beheading, the following morning. “I am come about a headless errand, / For which I have not much to say, now I am here,” the end of witty speech being, in his case, wise silence (XVII.51-52). He says nothing that would inflame the passions of his friends, the many who are poor, against the regime of the one. He calls the executioner his “honest friend,” remarking that his ‘dropping’ will result in his ascending “i’God’s name” (XVII.53). It is the hangman, not the former lawyer, former sheriff, former Lord Chancellor Thomas More who now has the law in his hands, and More obeys the law as Paul the Apostle commands Christians to do.

    Shrewsbury and Surrey are the witnesses, and he rallies them a bit: “Ye see, though it pleaseth / the King to raise me thus high, yet I am not proud; / for the higher I mount the better I can see my friends / about me,” although “I perceive by / your looks you like my bargain so ill that there’s not/ one of ye all dare venture with me” (XVII.59-65). Shrewsbury wants him to confess to committing “great offense unto his majesty,” and More obliges in his own way: “I confess his /majesty hath been ever good to me, and my offense / to his highness makes me, of a state pleader, a stage player” in what he ironically calls “this last scene of my tragedy” (XVI.73-78). He will send His Majesty his bald head—hatless, since “it is not / requisite any head should stand covered” to a king (XVII.78-80). His beheading is “good for / the headache” (XVII.87-88). That is, dying is as medicinal for the Christian More as it was for the philosopher, Socrates. When the executioner begs his forgiveness for what he is about to do, he wittily wishes that were in the executioner’s power to forgive him, to exonerate him from legal judgment, but “the law, my honest friend, lies in thy hands now” (XVII.94). And he gives the man his purse as “thy fee,” as if the executioner were his attorney before the law, a cock to Asclepias being an unnecessary sacrifice for a Christian to make, the supreme sacrifice having already been made for him. He remarks that he shaved off his beard last night, perhaps in honor of the example of his forerunner, Falconer, whom he had pardoned in what turned out to be a very un-Henrylike act.

    Before heading to the block, he “forsakes all mirth,” but also all tears, since “The fool of flesh must, with her frail life, die.” Morus means ‘fool’ in Latin, and Christians are fools in the world’s eyes, as his friend, Erasmus teaches in a witty book, In Praise of Folly). “Our birth to heaven should be thus: void of fear” (XVII.121-124). If Nietzsche intended to go beyond good and evil, the Christian More finally intends to go beyond laughter and tears, beyond comedy and tragedy.

    The final words of a play of this time were typically spoken by the survivor of the highest rank. Would that not be Shrewsbury? Not here. Here they are spoken by the humanist poet, who speaks of “a very learned worthy gentleman” who “seals error with his blood” (XVII.125-126)—evidently More, at least in appearance, but possibly King Henry? Professor Jowett notes the ambiguity, which at very least ‘saves’ the play from the royal censors. And it is true that More saved the king’s rule, threatened by rebels, by appealing to Christian principles, as Henry himself has conspicuously failed to obey, thereby undermining his own legitimacy. Whatever Surrey may mean, More knows they must now act instead of speaking: “Come, we’ll to Court / Let’s sadly hence to perfect unknown fates, / Whilst he tends progress to the state of states” (XVII.126-127). Does he thereby save Henry’s rule a second time? In this world, Christians go towards fates that are perfectly unknown with the intention of perfecting them insofar as they are able. After death, they undertake the truly royal progress to the Kingdom of God, where they will receive their crowns, honors greater even than a chancellorship.

     

    Notes

    1. For the purposes of the play, the authors have conflated the poet with his father, who was the one who was active at this time. The senior Howard supported the advancement of More to the position of Royal Chancellor and was later beheaded at the command of Henry VIII.
    2. The editor remarks that this Munday is unrelated to Anthony Munday, the playwright.
    3. See Robert Burton: The Anatomy of Melancholy. Six volumes. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling, and Rhonda L. Blaoir, eds. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1989). The great Oxford don combatted melancholy with the ‘physic’ of wit and merriment, More-like.

    Filed Under: Nations

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